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While there have been studies on capital structure and corporate strategy, 
limited research has considered the unique characteristics that influence the 
capital structures and corporate strategies of Saudi Arabian manufacturing 
firms. This thesis, therefore, intends to enrich the literature that relates capital 
structure to corporate strategy in the Saudi context. Informed by the literature, 
this research has developed a theoretical framework to study the influence of 
corporate strategy on capital structure. The framework could be extended to 
other industries with similar characteristics in Saudi Arabia in addition to other 
countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
A mixed methodology was adopted in this research that consists of quantitative 
analysis, supported by qualitative results where relevant. The findings of this 
thesis highlight three main points. First, the results on the determinants of 
capital structure demonstrate the significance of the cost of servicing debt, 
zakat, industry structures and the nature of assets in influencing leverage. The 
results indicate a negative relationship between leverage and profitability and a 
positive relationship between leverage and risk. Second, when considering the 
influence of stakeholders on capital structure, the evidence indicates that debt 
is strategically used as a disciplining device for managers. The findings also 
underline the importance of equity-holders and debt-holders, demonstrating that 
corporate attitudes towards debt could depend on ownership structures. 
Institutional and family ownership positively influence leverage. Government 
ownership is found to be insignificant. The results demonstrate that strong 
banking relationships and the availability of government loans lead to higher 
leverage. Limited evidence was found to support a relevant role for non-
financial stakeholders. The thesis illustrates to managers the possible strategic 
considerations of capital structure decisions that go beyond the need for 
finance. Further, the evidence illustrates that Saudi bankruptcy laws require 
clarification and that disclosure rules ought to be more stringent.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the relationship between corporate strategy and capital 
structure. The aim of the thesis is to analyse the determinants of the capital 
structure of manufacturing firms in Saudi Arabia and the implication of corporate 
strategy on capital structure for these firms. The thesis focuses on the 
manufacturing industry, one of the largest industries in Saudi Arabia, 
contributing approximately 13.4% to GDP (SAMA, 2013). Moreover, significant 
government support is provided to this industry. Saudi manufacturing 
companies can receive up to 75% of their capital in the form of Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF) loans and other forms of government subsidies. 
Therefore, this industry presents a unique case to assess the different strategic 
considerations that could motivate capital structure decisions.  
Within the confines of this thesis it is first important to define some key 
terminologies (capital structure, financial leverage and corporate strategy). The 
capital structure of a firm relates to the way it finances its operations. According 
to Brealey et al. (2009:366), capital structure is defined as the “mix of long term 
debt and equity financing”. Financial leverage is the degree to which firms utilise 
debt in their capital structure (Gill and Mathur, 2011).  
Corporate strategy directs the company’s objectives and relates to how the 
resources of the company should be utilised (Boquist et al., 1998). Collis and 
Montgomery (2005:11) state that “corporate strategy formulation begins with a 
vision – what the company wishes to become in the distant future”. The mission 
of the company is then formulated, including its purpose, goals and philosophy. 
Measurable goals might be market share, sales growth, return on investments 
and that the aim, or target, is determined at the start (Cohen, 1973). Managers, 
therefore, take into consideration the different external factors that could 
influence the performance and market share of the firm (Underwood, 2002). 
This thesis focuses on the extent to which corporate strategies influence the 
capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
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In addition, corporate strategy relates to the overall scope of an organisation 
and how value is added to different business units of the organisation (Johnson 
et al., 2008). It includes diversity of product/services or business units, and how 
resources are allocated between different parts of the organisation. Hence, 
corporate strategy is related to the expectations of the firms’ stakeholders, and 
given that shareholders, in their position as owners of the firm, are the most 
important stakeholders, the firm’s corporate strategy is highly related to the 
expectation of shareholders. This can be explicitly or implicitly reflected in the 
firm’s mission statements.  
 
The effect of the competitive environment on capital structure relates to how 
various businesses included in the firm’s corporate strategy should compete in 
their respective markets. Thus, the competitive environment effect includes the 
businesses pricing strategy, differentiation/innovation, quality, and distinct 
distribution channels. Operational strategy is concerned with how each part of 
the organisation delivers effectively the firm’s corporate and business strategy 
using the firm’s resources, processes and people.  
 
Moreover, the effect of the competitive environment on capital structure is 
adapted from Franck and Huyghebaert (2004), Istaitieh and Rodriguez-
Fernandez (2006) and La Rocca et al., (2008) to include signalling, market 
timing, investments and aggressiveness. The rational for including these factors 
stems from the fact that the thesis investigates firms’ corporate strategy and  
competitive environment effects are a subset of corporate strategy.  
 
The thesis examines corporate strategy and competitive environment and 
ignores operational strategy. However, even though the thesis focuses on 
specific areas such as stakeholders and competitive environment, it is by no 
means exhaustive of what is covered in corporate and business strategies. As 
aforementioned, these strategies include, among other factors, resources 
allocation and diversity of products, which are not covered in the thesis. In 
addition, the thesis does not consider the fit between strategy, capital structure 
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and the impact on performance. These limitations could be addressed in future 
research.  
 
The thesis utilises a mixed methodology approach, which combines both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to assess and gain a deeper 
understanding of the implication of corporate strategy on the capital structure 
decisions of the manufacturing firms. The data sample consists of 431 listed 
manufacturing firms over a five-year period from the third quarter of 2007 to the 
second quarter of 2012. The quantitative analysis uses panel data (which 
combines cross sectional data with time series information) with two measures 
of leverage as dependent variables. These variables are total liabilities to total 
assets (TLTA) and long-term debt to total assets (LTDTA). The qualitative 
approach consists of semi-structured interviews with senior managers.2  The 
semi-structured interviews constitute a significant part of the data analysis. 
However, the findings of the qualitative study complements the quantitative 
results. The qualitative semi-structured interviews address three main areas: 
determinants of capital structure, capital structure and stakeholders, and capital 
structure and competitive environment. However, because of the difficulties of 
quantifying some of these variables, the quantitative approach focuses only on 
a subset of the analysis of the semi-structured interview results. It mainly relates 
to the determinants of leverage using quantitative variables that proxy for 
profitability, size, risk and dummy variables that proxy for ownership structure 
and relationship banking.  
1.1 Research Question 
This thesis answers the following research question:  
To what extent does corporate strategy influence the capital structure 
decisions of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms? 
                                                                            
1
 This represents 38% of total market capitalisation and 69% of listed manufacturing firms in Saudi Arabia, 
as of June 2012.  
2
 This was conducted with senior managers and board members from ten listed manufacturing firms, three 
entrants and three financial institutions.  
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1.2 Determinants of Capital Structure  
Capital structure decisions are influenced by the location, market structure, 
industry structure, tax regime and the nature of debt and equity markets in 
which a firm operates (Booth et al., 2001). Saudi Arabian firms are generally 
more equity-oriented than firms in developed countries. In their sample of Saudi 
Arabian firms, Omet and Mashharawe (2003) report an average of 9% leverage, 
which implies that the equity proportion of their capital structure is significantly 
higher than their debt proportion.  
The Saudi Arabian economy presents a unique case amongst emerging 
markets. Islamic culture is at the core of its constitution and has significant 
influences on credit markets. The banking system in Saudi Arabia comprises a 
mix of conventional banking and Shari’a compliant Islamic banking (Al-Ajmi et 
al., 2009). Bank finance dominates the debt market, and the secondary market 
for sukuk (Islamic bonds) remains minimal and underdeveloped (Al-Ajmi et al., 
2009). Shari’a compliance stipulates that accrued interest is prohibited and, 
therefore, Islamic banks must provide financing through equity-participation 
structures and short-term facilities (Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007). Furthermore, no 
income taxes are levied on local firms in Saudi Arabia. Instead, they pay a 2.5% 
‘charity tax’ or zakat on unused wealth over an Islamic calendar year (Al-Ajmi et 
al., 2009). Foreigners, however, pay corporate income tax on the non-Saudi 
share of their firm (Al-Sakran, 2001).  
Nevertheless, one of the key considerations for the capital structure decisions 
taken by an individual firm is the industry structure in which it operates. 
Empirical studies, such as those carried out by Lev (1969) and Van der Wijst et 
al. (1993), reveal the importance of industry effects in shaping the capital 
structure of the firm. However, other strands of existent literature suggest that it 
is the nature of the industry and firm assets that determine capital structure 
(Myers, 1984; Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). It is, therefore, relevant to consider 
the structure of the Saudi manufacturing industry and its influence on a firm’s 
capital structure decisions.  
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Capital structure decisions play a crucial role in defining a firm’s future 
performance and its strategic ability to face internal and/or external pressures. 
Corporate finance literature provides an explanation of what determines the 
capital structure decision of the firm by considering macro- and firm-specific 
factors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). A capital structure 
decision is not only determined by the market and industry structure of the 
economy but is also a function of firm-specific factors such as firm size, 
performance, risk and ownership structure (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Studies on the 
Saudi market have examined the relevance of such factors in determining the 
capital structure decisions of Saudi firms (Al-Sakran, 2001; Omet and 
Mashharawe, 2003; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). The findings of the thesis will, 
therefore, be compared and contrasted, not only with international empirical 
evidence, but also with the findings of Saudi-specific studies in order to 
contribute to the literature on the determinants of capital structure in Saudi 
Arabia and more specifically, in the Saudi manufacturing industry.  
1.3 Capital Structure and Stakeholders 
Corporate finance theories suggest that, when markets are perfect and efficient, 
capital structure is irrelevant for corporate strategy (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
However, upon introducing market imperfections, capital structure decisions 
affect a firm’s value and its competitive advantage and, therefore, assume 
strategic importance (Hillier et al. 2008). The extent to which capital structure 
decisions have inextricable links with the corporate strategy of a firm has been 
the subject of intense debate in finance literature. Several studies provide an 
overview of this debate; focusing on how the nature of financial stakeholders3 
and the potential interaction between managers, financial stakeholders and 
non-financial stakeholders4 influences capital structure, corporate governance 
activities and the value creation processes (Franck and Huyghebaert, 2004; 
Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006; La Rocca et al., 2008; and Hillier et 
al., 2008). It is within the context of these interactions that a capital structure 
decision assumes its strategic significance.  
                                                                            
3
 Financial stakeholders include equity holders and debt holders.  
4
 Non-financial stakeholders include government, suppliers, customers, employees and competitors.  
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Capital structure decisions can, therefore, relate to the corporate strategy and 
managerial practices of an individual firm. Different strands in the literature 
examine the benefits and costs of capital structure decisions and their 
relationship with corporate strategy. The interests of managers are particularly 
relevant in this context. When managers are self-serving, leverage reduces 
managerial overinvestment in risky projects and empire building (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen 1986). By contrast, when managerial and shareholder 
interests are aligned, leverage may lead a firm to underinvest in positive Net 
Present Value (NPV) projects (Myers, 1977) or to avoid risky projects (Brito and 
John, 2002).  
Other studies examine the influence of a firm’s ownership structure on its capital 
structure decisions in terms of mitigating agency costs, information asymmetry, 
liquidity constraints, and adjustment costs (Jensen, 1986; Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Booth et al., 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005). Hence, corporate attitudes 
towards debt and equity ownership structures could affect capital structure 
decisions. Moreover, Fan et al. (2010) argue that variations in financial 
institutional structures and banking concentration significantly influence capital 
structure decisions. Therefore, it is also important to consider the impact lending 
environments and debt-holders have on leverage decisions.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 13 
In addition, stakeholder theorists suggest that capital structure decisions are 
related to non-financial stakeholders (Hillier et al., 2008). This strand of the 
literature focuses on the signals conveyed by capital structure decisions to non-
financial stakeholders. Additionally, it considers a firm’s ability to adjust its 
capital structure to limit the bargaining power of suppliers (Perotti and Spier, 
1993; Sarig, 1998; Kale and Shahrur; 2007), the concerns of customers 
(Titman, 1984) and higher wage demands by employees (Hillier, et al., 2008). 
Other studies highlight the significance of government support in the form of 
subsidies to certain industries and their influence on a firm’s need for finance 
and its competitive advantage (Schwartz and Clements, 1999; Mitra and 
Webster; 2008). Therefore, the thesis will examine the significance of non-
financial stakeholder considerations in impacting capital structure decisions. 
The thesis will then pay particular focus to the implications of the competitive 
environment on the capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
 
1.4 Capital Structure and Competitive Environment 
The competitive environment in which a firm operates could affect capital 
structure decisions. Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) emphasise the 
endogenous nature of the relationship between capital structure and the 
competitive environment. The authors argue that far-sighted firms ought to 
consider the structure of their product markets when deciding on their capital 
structures. Macroeconomic factors, such as the economic climate of the market, 
could have adverse liquidity constraints and affect the capital decision of the 
firm (Huang and Ritter, 2009). Market timing theorists suggest that managers 
take advantage of market conditions to derive the maximum value from their 
financial decisions (Welch, 2004; Huang and Ritter, 2009). Moreover, Istaitieh 
and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) suggest that financially strong (unleveraged) 
firms take advantage of economic downturns to aggressively position and price 
their products to drive weaker (leveraged) competitors out of the market. Thus, 
this thesis aims to examine whether higher leverage exposes Saudi 
manufacturing firms to market volatility and predation.  
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In addition, the leverage decision of a firm has both direct and indirect 
influences on its asset acquisition and investment decisions, which in turn 
strongly influence its strategy (Hillier et al., 2008). Kovenock and Phillips (1997) 
claim that there is a positive and significant relationship between the increase in 
leverage of a recapitalising firm and its rival firms’ investment. Hence, the thesis 
intends to test whether Saudi manufacturing firms adjust their capital structures 
and investments according to rival firms’ leverage positions. The firm’s capital 
structure also affects its aggressiveness toward competition, with authors 
predicting that leverage causes greater aggression toward competition (Brander 
and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988; Showalter, 1999). On the contrary, others 
suggest that leverage leads to softer competition (Chevalier and Scharfstein, 
1996; Glazer, 1994; Lambrecht, 2001). Therefore, the thesis endeavours to 
study the implications of capital structure decisions on competitive 
aggressiveness.  
 
Moreover, Healy and Palepu (2001) stress the importance of disclosure rules in 
reducing agency costs and information asymmetry, as well as their impact on 
the competitive advantage of a firm. Additionally, different disclosure rules affect 
the manner in which information about a firm’s financial position is signalled to 
the market where it operates. Klein et al. (2002) emphasise the importance of 
information asymmetry on capital structure decisions. The authors suggest that 
the signalling function of capital structure decisions is particularly relevant when 
information asymmetry is high. In addition, Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez 
(2006) argue that information that is revealed through disclosures about capital 
structure decisions will be taken into account by rival firms. Therefore, firms 
could strategically use this decision to signal their financial strength and deter 
rivals from competing aggressively or entering the market (Poitevin, 1989). 
Accordingly, the thesis intends to investigate whether Saudi manufacturing firms 
use debt as a signalling tool.  
1.5 Aims and Objectives  
This thesis analyses the different factors that shape capital structure decisions, 
in the unique socio-economic and cultural context of Saudi Arabian 
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manufacturing firms, and their implications on corporate strategies. The thesis 
explores and addresses the following:  
 
 the main determinants of capital structure decisions underpinning Saudi 
manufacturing firms’ actions 
 the ways in which capital structure decisions relate to the corporate 
strategies of Saudi manufacturing firms 
 the implications of the competitive environment on the capital structures 
of Saudi manufacturing firms. 
 the implications of the relationship between capital structure and 
corporate strategy upon academic literature, practitioners/managers and 
policy makers 
1.6 Contribution 
While there have been studies that examine the determinants of capital 
structure in the Saudi Arabian market, scant research has been done on the 
relationship between capital structure and corporate strategy in this context. 
This thesis addresses a gap in existing literature on the determinants of capital 
structure and the relationship between capital structure and corporate strategy 
in the context of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms.  
 
There are two main contributions by this thesis. The first is theoretical and the 
second is methodological. The theoretical contribution is in the two frameworks 
presented for exploring the relationship between corporate strategy and capital 
structure. The thesis proposes a general conceptual framework to identify and 
explore the relationship between corporate strategy and capital structure by 
also considering corporate finance determinants of capital structure. Previous 
studies have attempted to explain the capital structure decision by either testing 
corporate finance determinants of capital structure (such as size, profitability 
and risk) or by narrowly focusing on possible corporate strategic implications 
(such as the management and non-financial stakeholders). By combining both 
approaches, the thesis proposes a general conceptual framework that takes 
into account both financial and strategic elements that influence the capital 
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structure decision. This framework is then specifically focused, developed and 
adapted to include unique characteristics of the Saudi Arabian manufacturing 
industry in order to better explain the capital structure decision within that 
context. The methodological contribution is due to the fact that, to my 
knowledge, this is the first study to have tested the corporate strategy and 
capital structure in the context of Saudi Arabia using both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques.  
 
While corporate finance literature has touched upon the strategic importance of 
debt, few studies have directly tested the relationship between capital structure 
and corporate strategy in this context. Moreover, the studies that have 
discussed the relationship between capital structure and corporate strategy 
have either provided an overview of the literature on the subject (Franck and 
Huyghebaert, 2004; Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006; La Rocca et al., 
2008; and Hillier et al., 2008) or have used quantitative methods to test the 
relationship (Nguyen, 2008). A mixed methodology approach is relevant to this 
research, due to the endogenous nature of the relationship. Senior managers in 
the firm are responsible for both capital structure and strategic decisions. As 
such, by directly engaging with the decision makers within the firm, this thesis 
contributes to the existing capital structure literature in Saudi Arabia by 
providing a more complete understanding (through a mixed methodology 
approach) of the factors that influence capital structure decisions in the 
manufacturing industry.  
 
With regards to the relationship between corporate strategy and capital 
structure, this thesis makes unique contributions to the policy-making domain 
and business management. The thesis shows that bankruptcy laws are less 
stringent in Saudi Arabia than in western economies, and this could have 
implications on the behaviour of manufacturing firms. For example, firms may 
overinvest in risky projects. Hence, policy makers and regulators must ensure 
that there are clear bankruptcy rules that govern the activities of firms and 
establish strict priority rules in the event of bankruptcy. Moreover, disclosure 
rules in Saudi Arabia are less stringent than the International Financial 
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Reporting Standards (IFRS). Therefore, regulators must ensure that the 
disclosure rules become more rigorous so as to reduce information asymmetry 
and protect unsophisticated investors. The thesis highlights that a positive 
relationship exists between firms’ leverage and their relationships with banks. 
This implies that firms ought to keep a close relationship with lenders. 
Nevertheless, due diligence and checks must be taken by lenders to 
discourage firms from increasing their leverage purely on the basis of their 
relationship with banks.   
 
In addition, the general results noted in this thesis do not support the notion that 
the competitive environment has implications on capital structure decisions in 
the Saudi manufacturing industry, yet few respondents recognised that debt 
induces greater competitive aggressiveness and can be used as a signalling 
tool. Managers ought, therefore, to consider the strategic implications of he 
capital structure decisions of rival firms.  
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into the following chapters. Chapter two sets the 
theoretical grounds for the thesis and analyses of the main empirical findings of 
studies on developed and developing economies, as well as relevant studies 
that are specific to the Saudi market. Given that the theoretical framework is 
developed from the mainstream literature, the thesis is designed to extend the 
general conceptual theoretical framework by taking into account the traditional 
determinants of capital structure. In addition, this conceptual general theoretical 
framework was developed further in order to extend the knowledge and to 
address Saudi manufacturing firms in specific. The chapter is subdivided into 
sections that relate to capital structure theories: determinants of capital 
structure, capital structure and corporate strategy, and capital structure and 
competitive environment. The chapter presents a general theoretical framework 
for testing the relationship between capital structure and corporate strategy. 
Chapter three details the Saudi context and underlines cultural and industry 
specific considerations. Subsequently, chapter three provides a theoretical 
framework for the thesis and a list of the propositions that are explored. Chapter 
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four justifies the rationale for adopting a mixed methodology approach and 
describes the data sample, as well as the different data limitations and 
methodological issues associated with this thesis. Chapter five outlines the 
main qualitative and quantitative results and findings, while chapter six 
discusses and analyses the results and findings. Finally, chapter seven 
concludes the thesis. In doing so, it highlights the key contributions of this work 
on policy and on financial/business management, as well as this paper’s 
limitations and recommendations for future research.  




Chapter 2: Literature and Theory Building 
2.0 Introduction  
The literature review is divided into two sections. This chapter focuses on the 
first part of the literature review, which investigates corporate strategy and 
capital structure in general. The second (Chapter 3) part specifically focuses on 
the review in the context of Saudi Arabia. In this chapter, the theories of capital 
structure will be applied in the Saudi context. Hence, the hypotheses are 
discussed after considering both literature reviews at the end of Chapter 3.  
 
With the aim of establishing the unique theoretical grounds of this thesis, this 
chapter uses both a macro- and micro-level approach to analyse the 
international literature on capital structure and corporate strategy. First, the 
main corporate finance theories and concepts that relate to the research topic 
are underlined. The chapter then examines common determinants of capital 
structure based on corporate finance theories and empirical studies. Capital 
structure decisions are then related to corporate strategies, detailing the 
manner in which managers and financial and non-financial stakeholders 
influence capital structures. Finally, the chapter hones in on studies that relate 
competitive environments to capital structure decisions. In doing so, it 
establishes a theoretical framework for testing the influence of corporate 
strategy on capital structure. 
2.1 Theories of Capital Structure  
Corporate finance literature has been concerned with the way firms finance their 
operations, namely, their capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
Financial leverage is the degree to which a firm utilises debt in its capital 
structure (Gill and Mathur, 2011). In a perfect and efficient market, financial 
decisions are irrelevant to the firm’s value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
Nevertheless, while the Modigliani and Miller capital structure irrelevance 




proposition fails when market imperfections5 are introduced, it provides a base 
for understanding capital structure decisions (Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
Corporate finance theories—such as trade-off, pecking order, market timing and 
stakeholder—provide insights into the drivers behind capital structure decisions 
in imperfect markets. Below is a brief explanation of these varied theoretical 
perspectives. 
  
Trade-off theory states that the optimal capital structure is a trade-off between 
the benefits of debt (tax shields) and the costs of debt (expected bankruptcy). 
To establish an optimal capital structure, companies have to balance these two 
opposing forces. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the capital structure 
decision of firms, market imperfections (such as taxation) ought to be 
introduced. The original trade-off theory stems from the debate over the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance propositions, which state that—in 
perfect and efficient markets—the choice between debt and equity is irrelevant 
(Frank and Goyal, 2007). Additionally, Modigliani and Miller (1963) posit that, 
when corporate taxation is added to their original Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
irrelevance proposition, firms should be 100% debt financed because of the tax 
advantage of debt. 6  However, introducing bankruptcy costs into this model 
implies that the optimal capital structure becomes a trade-off between the tax 
advantage of debt and the deadweight costs of bankruptcy (Myers, 1984; Frank 
and Goyal, 2007).  
 
Myers (1984) argues that firms that follow the trade-off theory set a target 
leverage ratio and then steadily move towards it. Graham (2003) suggests that 
taxes alter these targets, as firms tend to pursue the tax benefits of debt in high 
tax regimes. Supporting this notion, in their survey of Canadian and US firms, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 37% of managers adhere to flexible target 
leverage ratios, and 10% of managers have strict targets. One of the aims of 
                                                                            
5
 Such as taxes, adverse selection and information asymmetry, agency conflicts, bankruptcy costs and 
transaction costs. 
6 Assuming that there were no offsetting costs of debt. 




the thesis is to examine whether managers of Saudi manufacturing firms have 
such targets in mind when deciding on their capital structures. 
 
Dynamic trade-off theory models suggest that firms respond to market shocks 
by adjusting their capital structure continuously. Brennan and Schwartz (1984) 
find that, without adjustment costs, firms would maintain high levels of debt in 
order to take advantage of tax benefits. However, other studies highlight the 
effects of transaction costs and the implications of adjusting a firm’s capital 
structure (Fischer et al. 1989; Goldstein et al., 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005; 
Strebulaev, 2007; Byoun, 2008). Transaction costs will cause debt ratios to 
deviate constantly from the optimum target (Strebulev, 2007). Even minor 
adjustment costs could result in delays in adjusting capital structure and could 
therefore yield wide differences in leverage (Fischer et al. 1989).  
 
Pecking order theory, popularised by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers 
(1984), suggests that, if debt is risk-free, then it should be no different from 
internal financing. However, if debt is risky, the order of preference should be 
retained earnings (internal equity), debt and external equity. Adverse selection 
problems stem from information asymmetry between owners/managers and 
outside investors. The former know their firm’s true value, whereas outside 
investors do not. This results in the market mispricing the firm’s claims (Klein et 
al., 2002). Managers would, therefore, issue equity when the firm is overvalued, 
and their motives could be questioned by outside investors who cannot 
accurately predict the value of the firm in the presence of information 
asymmetry. 
 
Agency theory suggests that managers prefer internal financing to external 
financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The theory argues that external 
financing requires managers to disclose project details to outside investors, and 
in so doing, they expose themselves to outside investor monitoring (Frank and 
Goyal, 2007). Therefore, Myers (2003) argues that agency costs would imply a 
pecking order. The theory also suggests that debt can be used in modulating 
the traditional conflict between the shareholders (owners) and the managers 




(agents) of a firm. When ownership and control are separated, the theory 
demonstrates that there is a significant conflict between shareholders and 
management. Debt can be used not only for financing, but also as an effective 
disciplining device, as managers have to meet debt obligations in order to avoid 
bankruptcy (Jensen, 1986).  
 
Market timing theory proposes that, when managers need financing, they 
examine both debt and equity markets, and they choose whichever market 
seems more favourable (Frank and Goyal, 2007). If neither market looks 
favourable, fundraising could be postponed. Conversely, if both markets look 
remarkably favourable, they may raise finance even if they do not require it 
(Frank and Goyal, 2007). Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that the capital 
structure decisions of firms are not determined by pecking order theory, but by 
managers’ timing of the markets. Hillier, et al. (2008) demonstrate that firms 
tend to issue equity when market-to-book valuations are high and issue debt 
when market-to-book ratios are low. Managers, therefore, do not have an 
optimal capital structure in their sights; they simply take advantage of market 
conditions (Fama and French, 2002; Welch, 2004; Huang and Ritter, 2009). 
 
Stakeholder theory suggests that a firm’s non-financial stakeholders can 
influence the capital structure decisions of a firm. These stakeholders are 
defined as “parties other than debt and equity holders who have a stake in the 
financial health of the firm” (Hillier et al., 2008:608). Non-financial stakeholders 
include suppliers, customers, employees and government officials. They may 
not have a direct monetary stake in the firm, but they are concerned with the 
firm’s capital structure, due to the costs imposed upon them when the firm faces 
financial distress (La Rocca et al., 2008). Firms implicitly take the claims of non-
financial stakeholders and consider them when they take their capital structure 
decision, even if those claims are not specified contractually (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987). Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) highlight the relevant 
role non-financial stakeholders play in shaping capital structure decisions. The 
authors posit that capital structure decisions are endogenously related to 
strategic behaviour in a competitive environment. Therefore, the thesis aims to 




test the possible implications of non-financial stakeholders and competitive 
environments on capital structure decisions.  
 
 





Table 2.1: Theories of capital structure 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) The MM (1958) capital structure irrelevant proposition was established based on a set of 
assumptions about capital markets, taxation, and information asymmetry. In general, the authors 
assume that the firm has a set of expected cash flows which is divided among debt and equity 
holders. Investors create homemade leverage because it is assumed that investors and firms 
have equal access to financial markets. As such, the leverage of the firm has no impact on the 
market value of the firm. Thus, in a perfect capital market, the firm’s capital structure choices do 
not matter. However, the MM (1958) proposition is difficult to test because debt and firm value 
are plausibly endogenous and are therefore driven by other factors, such as profits, growth 
opportunities and collateral. Hence, even though the theorem is not realistic in terms of how 
firms finance their operations, it provides a reasonable interpretation of much of the theory of 
corporate finance. Therefore it could be argued that the MM theory influences the development 
of the pecking-order and the trade-off theories.     
Modigliani and Miller (1963) After receiving much criticism on MM1, the authors revised their thinking and came up with a 
second proposition in 1983. This proposition relaxes the assumption of no taxes. Assuming that 
there are no bankruptcy or financial distress costs, the optimal capital structure should be 100% 
debt financed (Atrill, 2009).   
Miller (1977) The author revised the original MM II (1963) to consider the effect of personal and corporate 
taxes. The author argues that, because stocks are taxed at a relatively lower rate than bonds 
return, investors would be willing to accept a lower pre-tax return from stocks relative to the pre-
tax return on bonds. However, Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005) argue that, although personal taxes 
reduce the cost of equity, there is no guarantee that they completely offset the saving from the 
lower cost of debt financing.   





Table 2.1: Theories of capital structure - continued 
Static Trade-off Theory 
Graham and Harvey (2001)  The authors conduct a comprehensive survey on the practice of corporate finance by examining 
issues related to capital budgeting, capital structure and costs of capital. Using a sample of 
4,440 firms and 392 CFOs, questionnaires were sent out to companies in the US and Canada 
on 16th February 1999. The authors find that 19% of firms do not have a target debt ratio. 
However, 37% of managers have a flexible target, and 10% have a strict target.   
Myers (1984) The author looks at the capital structure puzzle. The author posits that, under the static tradeoff 
theory, a firm has a target debt-to-value ratio and moves towards it gradually. However, under 
the pecking order theory, the firm has a preference for internal, rather than external, financing. If 
the firm issues securities, it will prefer debt over equity. In addition, the author argues that, in a 
pure pecking order theory, there is no well-defined target leverage.  
Dynamic Trade-off Theory 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) The authors develop a continuous time model that takes into account risk, taxes, financing and 
investment constraints and how managerial decisions affect alternative financing. They then 
assume a costless adjustment of capital structures. The authors find that firms maintain high 
debt if there are no adjustment costs. 
Strebulev (2007) The author uses a simulation approach on a sample of 3,000 firms for 152 quarters to assess 
the firms’ optimal capital structure. The finding indicates that, in the presence of frictions, firms 
adjust their capital structure less frequently. Hence, firms’ leverages are more likely to deviate 
from their optimal leverage during readjustments.   
Pecking Order Theory 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) The authors develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm using elements from the 
theory of property rights, agency theory and the theory of finance. Agency theory implies that 
managers prefer internal, rather than external, finance. External finance exposes the company 
to significant monitoring.  




Table 2.1: Theories of capital structure - continued 
Myers (2003) The author evaluates the four major theories of corporate finance – capital structure irrelevancy, 
the trade-off theory, agency theories and pecking-order theory. Agency costs suggest that firms 
would prefer the pecking order theory. In the pecking order theory of capital structure, firms 
prefer internal, rather than external, financing. If capital investment implies that external 
financing is needed, firms are likely to issue the safest security first. That is, firms will prefer the 
issue of debt, rather than equity.   
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) The authors evaluate a situation in which firms must issue stocks in order to raise funds for 
investments. Another assumption is that information asymmetry exists, which implies that 
managers know more about the firms’ value than the investors.  Using these assumptions, the 
model shows that firms may refuse to issue stocks and pass up valuable opportunities. In 
addition, in situations where external financing is needed, firms prefer debt to equity. Hence, 
risky debt implies that retained earnings are preferred to debt and external equity. 
 
Fama an French (2002) The authors test both the pecking-order and the trade-off theory in order to assess which of the 
two theories better predicts observed capital structures. The authors find support for both 
theories of capital structure.   
Market Timing Theory 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) In their sample of firms obtained from COMPUSTAT between 1968-1999 the authors find that 
firms are more likely to issue common stocks when the market values are high relative to both 
their past values and book values. Also, firms are more likely to repurchase common stocks 
when the market values are low. The authors conclude that the capital structure is strongly 
related to the firm’s historical market values. Hence, the authors find that capital structure is the 
cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.  
Hillier, et al. (2008) The authors outline that, under market-timing theory, capital structure decisions relate to the 
market value of equity. Firms issue more equity when the market value-to-book of equity is high 
and issue more debt when the market value of equity is low. 
Huang and Ritter (2009) The authors examine a sample of US firms during the period 1964-2001. They find that firms are 
more likely to issue equity when the cost of equity is low. Hence, the authors argue that the 
historical values of the cost of equity have long-lasting effects on capital structure.  




Table 2.1: Theories of capital structure – continued  
Stakeholder Theory 
Hillier, et al. (2008) The authors underline the role of non-financial stakeholders in influencing capital structure 
decisions. They argue that, even though non-financial stakeholders do not have a direct 
monetary stake in the firm, they are concerned about the firm’s financial health and therefore 
influence capital structure through their implicit claims.  
Istaitieh and Rodriguez Fernandez (2006) The authors present an overview of the literature that links factor product markets and capital 
structure. They relate modern financial theory to industrial organisation, stakeholder theory and 
firms’ strategic management. The authors emphasise the role of non-financial stakeholders in 
influencing capital structure decisions.  
La Rocca et al. (2008) The authors analyse the literature on strategic interactions between firms’ non-financial 
stakeholders. They identify the role of capital structure decisions in mitigating conflicts between 
firms’ financial stakeholders (equity holders, debt holders) and management. Further, the 
authors underline that capital structure decisions could influence non-financial stakeholders and 
vice versa. 
  




2.2 Determinants of Capital Structure  
Corporate finance theories suggest that in perfect and efficient markets, capital 
structure decisions are irrelevant to the value of the firm (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). Capital structure decisions assume importance to firms’ values when 
market imperfections are introduced (Barakat and Rao, 2004). Corporate 
finance theories suggest that market imperfections play a central role (i.e. 
through taxation) in influencing capital structure decisions (Graham, 1996). 
Other strands of the literature posit that industry effects are detrimental to 
capital structure decisions (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Aivazian et al., 2005). Examining tax and industry structure attributes 
provides greater insight into firms’ capital structure decisions (Booth et al., 
2001). Moreover, firm-specific characteristics—such as profitability, size and 
risk—could also have an impact on capital structure decisions (Booth et al., 
2001). Studies have found these factors to be significant in explaining the 
capital structure decisions of Saudi firms (Al-Sakran, 2001; Omet and 
Mashharawe, 2003; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). One of the objectives of this thesis is 
to assess whether these same factors are relevant in explaining the capital 
structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
2.2.1 Tax Structure 
Taxation is one form of market imperfection that can influence a firm’s capital 
structure. Trade-off theory highlights the importance of taxation in determining 
the capital structure of a firm (Frank and Goyal, 2007). Bradley et al. (1984) 
demonstrate the implications of static trade-off theory on a firm’s optimal 
leverage. The authors suggest that, according to static trade-off theory, optimal 
leverage would decrease when bankruptcy costs, non-debt tax shields and/or 
marginal tax rates to bondholders are boosted. Conversely, it would increase 
when the personal tax rate on equity is increased. Therefore, the tax 
jurisdictions under which companies operate significantly influence their 
leverage decisions. Studies attest to the complexity of these “tax-regime” based 
influences on capital structure decisions (Ozkan, 2001; Gaud et al., 2005). This 
strand of the literature demonstrates how aspects like dividend imputation 




systems within the tax regime, tax credit systems for the investor, rates of 
taxation for the company and the investor and other such considerations better 
explain firms’ leverage decisions. 
 
Mackie-Mason (1990) argues that firms consider tax benefits when deciding 
between issuing substantial amounts of either new debt or new equity. The 
author finds that firms that are incapable of gaining from the tax advantage of 
debt are more inclined to issue equity. In contrast, firms that have significant 
taxable earnings are more inclined to issue debt. Nevertheless, Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006) demonstrate a contradictory result, which illustrates that firms 
with high taxable earnings carry less debt. The authors attribute their results to 
the fact that some of these firms have less access to public debt markets, due 
to low credit ratings, and therefore carry less debt.  
 
Moreover, Graham et al. (1998) criticise empirical studies on the relationship 
between tax and leverage by stating that the relationship is spurious for 
common proxies of tax. The authors claim that corporate taxation is 
endogenous to financing decisions. By adjusting for this, the authors confirm 
the positive relationship between tax and debt levels. The thesis endeavours to 
overcome such endogeneity by directly questioning managers on the influence 
of taxation on their capital structure decisions.  
 
From the above, it can be argued that taxation has significant implications on 
capital structure. The theoretical prediction is that firms with high marginal tax 
rates tend to carry more debt. However, due to cultural-specific factors, the 
Saudi tax system differs from other markets, altering traditional economic 
behaviours and incentives. Saudi firms are taxed 2.5% of their idle wealth, 
including long term debt, in the form of zakat. This minor tax requirement, along 
with the absence of the tax advantages of debt, could imply an insignificant 
effect of taxation on the capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing 
firms. However, Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) demonstrate that zakat is a significant 
determinant of capital structure in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the proposition is 
that zakat significantly influences the capital structure decisions of Saudi firms. 




 Table 2.2: Studies on tax and capital structure  
Bradley et al. (1984) In this study, the authors examine a sample of 851 firms in the US from 1962 to 1981 and use 
cross-sectional, firm-specific data to test for the existence of an optimal capital structure. They 
argue that the presence of significant bankruptcy and agency costs, loss of non-debt related tax 
shields, and untaxed equity income would result in a positive tax advantage of debt financing. 
Thus the optimal leverage is a tradeoff between the tax advantage of debt and costs that are 
related to leverage.  
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) The authors examine a sample of 77,659 firm year observations from COMPUSTAT during the 
period of 1986-2000. The authors find that tax-related trade-off theory is not applicable in their 
sample. Their results on firm specific determinants of capital structure show that leverage is 
lower for firms with large taxable earnings. The authors attribute these results to public markets 
failing to supply debt to such firms. 
Gaud et al. (2005)  The authors examine the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 104 listed Swiss 
companies. They find that tax related trade-off theories better explain the capital structure of 
Swiss firms.   
Graham et al. (1998) The authors analyse a data sample of 18,193 firm-years from COMPUSTAT from 1981-1992. 
They find that corporate tax status and capital structure decisions are endogenous. The authors 
find the relationship between capital structure and tax proxies to be spurious. Their evidence 
supports the notion that low tax rate firms carry less debt than high tax rate firms.  
Mackie-Mason (1990) The author analyses the tax effect on the choice between equity and debt financing, using a 
sample of 1418 observations from 1977 to 1984.  The author finds that firms consider tax 
benefits in making decision on issuing debt or equity. Firms are more likely to issue equity if they 
cannot gain from the tax advantage of debt (or are more likely to issue debt if they can gain from 
the tax advantage of debt). Hence, firms with high tax rates are more likely to issue debt than 
those with low tax rates.  
Ozkan (2001)  The author examines a sample of 390 UK firms from 1984-1996 and tests for firm-specific 
attributes that influence capital structure. The author finds that firms with a high level of non-debt 
tax shields carry less debt than other firms.  
  




2.2.2 Industry Structure/Nature of Assets  
The structure of the industry in which a firm operates could influence its 
leverage position. Several studies demonstrate similarities in debt levels of firms 
within the same industry and stress the significance of industry effects on 
influencing capital structure decisions (Lev, 1969; Van der Wijst et al., 1993; 
Hall et al., 2000). Hall et al. (2000) document evidence for this industry effect in 
their study of 3,500 SMEs in the UK by illustrating that companies in the same 
industry carry similar debt levels. In addition, firms tend to benchmark their 
capital structure according to the industry average debt ratio. Graham and 
Harvey (2001) indicate that managers have target leverage ratios in mind when 
deciding on their firms’ capital structures.  
 
However, Myers (1984) suggests that debt level is motivated by external 
demand for funding, and it is therefore unnecessary for firms to benchmark the 
industry average. Furthermore, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) posit that a firm’s 
specific needs are more significant than following the industry average. These 
arguments are supported by earlier empirical studies, which demonstrate the 
failure of industry-structural characteristics to explain the differences in capital 
structures between firms (Bradley et al., 1984; Spence, 1985). Spence (1985) 
emphasises the importance of firm-specific product market considerations in 
influencing capital structure decisions. 7  Therefore, capital structure is not 
confined by the industry average, as firm-specific characteristics and 
competitive pressures have significant effects on a firm’s capital structure.  
 
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) introduce the connection between the type of 
assets used in the industry and the capital. They argue that assets, which are 
specific to a firm, can enhance quality and competitive advantage and reduce 
costs. However, these firm-specific assets are often intangible and are difficult 
to monitor and evaluate, or use as collateral. Therefore, they impose higher 
costs on the firm in the event of bankruptcy. As a result, the authors suggest 
that there is a trade-off between asset specificity and leverage. Vilasuso and 
                                                                            
7 Competitive environment considerations are explored in more detail in Section 2.4.  




Minkler (2001) suggest that an optimal capital structure would be a mixture of 
debt and equity that minimises both the agency costs of debt and the 
transaction costs of specific assets. Firms would fund their specific assets with 
equity and their non-specific assets with debt (Williamson, 1988). This view is 
supported by Mocnik (2001). Accordingly, this strand of the literature claims that 
asset specificity influences capital structure decisions within the industry.  
 
Nevertheless, the nature of a firm’s assets also depends on the industry in 
which it operates. The high level of tangible assets that characterise 
manufacturing firms implies that firms that operate in the manufacturing industry 
may have, on average, a different capital structure than those that operate in 
industries such as the service industry. Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that a 
firm’s leverage increases with its level of fixed assets. As the level of tangible 
fixed assets increases, the asset serving as collateral reduces the risk of the 
firm to the lenders (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Myers, 2001). This would 
eventually influence the firm’s capital structure by increasing its leverage. In 
contrast, firms in industries such as the service industry may not have enough 
tangible assets for banks to accept as collateral. This might force these 
companies to use internally-generated funds to service their capital projects. In 
support of this, Aivazian et al. (2005) demonstrate that leverage and tangible 
assets are positively related.  
 
Hence, industry effects could significantly influence capital structure decisions. 
The nature of a firm’s assets could determine its capital structure decisions. 
Manufacturing firms may have a different capital structure than firms that 
operate in other industries, since manufacturing firms possess tangible assets 
to offer as collateral for loans. Therefore, the proposition is that manufacturing 
firms are more likely to have greater access to credit, due to the nature of their 
assets, and, hence, carry more debt. 





Table 2.3: Studies on capital structure and industry structure/nature of assets 
Aivazian et al. (2005)  The authors study the impact of leverage on firm’s investment decisions in a sample 1,035 
Canadian industrial companies during the period 1982-1999. The authors find that fixed assets 
have a positive impact on leverage. They find that the correlation between leverage and asset 
tangibility is 0.613.  
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) The authors empirically examine the relationship between firms’ specialised assets and 
variations in their levels of leverage. They find that the main reason for the variation in firms’ 
leverage is related to firm-specific effects. Firm-specific intangible assets (R&D) impose higher 
costs in bankruptcy. In addition, firms do not benchmark their leverage position but follow their 
individual needs.  
Hall et al. (2000) The authors test the determinants of capital structure decision based on a sample of 3,500 
unquoted SMEs in the UK. They that find asset structure has an impact on leverage. Also, the 
authors find significant variation across industries in most of the explanatory variables. 
Lev (1969) The author assesses whether firms adjust their financial ratios to a pre-determined industry 
average. Using a partial-adjustment model, the author finds evidence that, periodically, financial 
ratios are adjusted to their industry average. The industry has an impact on the firms’ capital 
structure. 
Mocnik (2001) The author examines the relationship between asset specificity and capital structure for a 
sample of Slovene manufacturing firms, using a sample of 136 firms from 1991 to 1996. Firms 
finance their firm-specific assets with equity due to lower transaction costs.   
Rajan and Zingales (1995) The authors investigate the determinants of capital structure by analysing the financing 
decisions made by public firms in the G7 countries, using a sample of 2,583 non-financial firms. 
Tangible fixed assets have a positive relationship on the firms’ leverage. Tangible assets that 










Table 2.3: Studies on capital structure and industry structure/nature of assets – continued  
Spence (1985)  The author examines product market data for 1972 and finds that firms optimise their leverage 
according to competitive pressures. Highly competitive product markets reduce firms’ deviation 
from optimal capital structure.  
Van der Wijst et al. (1993) The authors analyse a sample of 27 “shoptypes” covering a period of 24 years. The authors find 
that industry-specific effects help explain capital structure decisions.  
Williamson (1988) The author assesses the financing decision of firms and argues that firms’ financing decisions 
depend on the type of assets they possess. Specific (or non-redeployable) assets are usually 









The profitability of a firm and its relationship with a firms’ leverage depends on 
capital structure theory (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Pecking order theory argues that 
profitable firms depend more on internal financing to reduce information 
asymmetries, avoiding costly external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, 
pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage. Trade-off theory predicts that profitable firms will have more income to 
shield from taxes and therefore enjoy greater benefits from the tax advantage of 
debt (Huang and Song, 2006). Consequently, trade-off theory predicts a 
positive relationship between leverage and profitability.  
 
In addition, if a significant part of the profit is in the form of free cash flows, then 
agency theory could also be relevant. Agency theory states that firms with high 
levels of free cash flows should carry debt, as it serves as a disciplining device 
for managers (Jensen, 1986). However, Chang (1999) opines that, when the 
optimal contract between managers and outside investors is translated into a 
combination of debt and equity, profitable firms ought to carry less debt, as the 
disciplining function of debt reduces the firm’s need for additional finance. This 
suggests that there is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
Firms with the ability to generate acceptable amounts of profits and earnings 
are inclined to use their internal funds to finance projects, hence, the negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage (Myers, 1984).  
 
Several empirical studies find evidence in support of the negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage (Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Huang and 
Song, 2006; Tong and Green, 2005). Additionally, Fama and French (2002) 
state that pecking order theory is consistent with the behaviour of small growth 
firms, which are more inclined to use internal funding than external funding. 
Booth et al. (2001) also show that profitable firms in developing countries carry 
less debt. Moreover, using international comparisons between different firms’ 
capital structures, Kester (1986) demonstrates a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage but finds that Japanese firms use more debt than their 
US counterparts, despite being less profitable. The author attributes this to less 




stringent disclosure rules in Japan. Accordingly, one of the aims of the thesis is 
to test for the relationship between leverage and profitability in a context of high 
information asymmetry.  
 
Moreover, while the majority of empirical evidence points to a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage, Prasad et al. (2001) argue that 
the market is not willing to finance companies with low profits. Therefore, a 
positive relationship exists between profitability and leverage.  
 
Empirical findings from studies on the Saudi market show that the effect of 
profitability on capital structure is mixed. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) find that 
profitability has a negative impact on leverage. This result is consistent with 
pecking order theory, which indicates that firms prefer to use surpluses from 
profits to finance their investments, or that they generally prefer internal over 
external funds. The results are also in line with those reported by Omet and 
Mashharawe (2003). However, the study by Al-Sakran (2001) shows mixed 
results regarding the relationship between leverage and profitability, depending 
on the sector. Further, the author reports a significantly negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage in the industrial sector, which constitutes all 
listed manufacturing firms (excluding firms in the cement sector) prior to the 
reclassification of sectors in 2007. Hence, the proposition is that there would be 
a negative relationship between leverage and profitability in the context of Saudi 
manufacturing firms. 




Table 2.4: Studies on the relationship between profitability and leverage  
Al Ajmi et al. (2009) The authors examine the determinants of capital structure for 53 listed Saudi companies during 
the period 2003-2007. The authors find that leverage is negatively related to profitability.  
Al Sakran (2001) The author studies the determinants of capital structure for 35 listed Saudi firms between 1993-
1997. The author reports inconclusive results on the market level but finds that profitability is 
negatively related to leverage in the industrial sector.  
Booth et al. (2001) The authors study a sample of firms from 10 developing countries between 1980 and 1990 in 
order to assess the portability of capital structure theories across countries. They find that 
capital structure decisions are affected by approximately the same variables as in developed 
countries. Profitable firms in developing countries have less leverage.  
Cassar and Holmes (2003) The authors analyse the capital structure determinants for a sample of 1,555 small- and 
medium-sized Australian firms for the period 1995-1998. They find a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage.  
Chang (1999) The author presents a model in which the optimal financial contract is based on factors such as 
taste, endowments and technology. The author postulates that projects that are more profitable 
can easily meet an investor’s required return, and the investor, in turn, would be willing to supply 
the funds that the firm needs. The conclusion drawn is that profitable firms should carry less 
debt.  
Fama and French (2002)  The authors analyse the trade-off and pecking order theory using a cross-sectional regression of 
firms from COMPUSTAT from 1965 to 1999. They find that more profitable firms have less debt, 
which indicates that there is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage.  
Huang and Song (2006) The authors analyse the characteristics of a sample of 799 Chinese firms from 1994 to 2000.  
Their findings reveal a negative relationship between profitability and leverage.  
Kester (1986) The author compares the ownership structure and corporate finance between US and Japanese 
firms and also assesses the determinants of capital structure for these firms. The sample 
consists of 344 and 452 Japanese and US firms, respectively, covering the period April 1, 1982 
to March 31, 1983. The authors find a negative relationship between leverage and profitability 








Table 2.4: Studies on the relationship between profitability and leverage – continued  
Myers and Majluf (1984) The authors argue that pecking-order theory implies that firms are more likely to use internal 
financing to reduce information asymmetries and avoid costly external financing. Hence, 
profitable firms are more likely to use retained earnings than debt, which suggests that there is a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage.  
Omet and Mashharawe (2003) The authors analyse the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 51 Jordanian, 30 
Kuwaiti, 28 Omani and 29 Saudi firms during the period 1996-2001. The authors find that 
leverage is negatively related to profitability.  
Prasad et al. (2001)  The authors conducted a critical survey on the influence of ownership structure, taxation and 
corporate strategy on the firms’ capital structure decision. They find that there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and profitability. The reason is that the low profit implies higher 
risk for banks and, as such, the market might not be willing to provide funds to less profitable 
firms. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995)  The authors investigate the determinants of capital structure by analysing the financing 
decisions made by public firms in the G7 countries, using a sample of 2,583 non-financial firms. 
They find that profitability has a negative impact on leverage.  
Tong and Green (2005) The aim of the study is to test the pecking order and trade-off theory of firms’ financing 
decisions, using a sample of listed Chinese companies. The authors used a sample of 44 non-
financial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange from 2001 to 2002. 
The authors find a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The authors find 
evidence that supports the pecking-order theory over the trade-off theory. 
  




2.2.4 Size  
The size of the firm can impact the level of leverage the firm can assume. 
Pecking order theory suggests that large firms have less information asymmetry 
and are capable of issuing more equity than small firms, which makes equity 
more favourable than debt (Kashefi-Pour et al, 2010). This would imply a 
negative relationship between size and leverage.  
Nevertheless, corporate finance literature shows mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between firm size and the level of debt. According to Heshmati 
(2001), listed companies enjoy easier access to the equity market than smaller 
companies, due to lower fixed costs. Therefore, the author finds a negative 
relationship between firm size and leverage. Since larger firms have lower 
transaction costs and less information asymmetry than smaller firms, they prefer 
to raise funds through equity, rather than debt, which implies that they would 
carry less debt than smaller firms (Wald, 1999).  
In spite of the above, others find a positive relationship between leverage and 
the size of the firm. According to Cassar and Holmes (2003), banks focus on 
the ability of the company to provide appropriate tangible assets as collateral, 
which is either costly or limited for small firms. The authors therefore find that 
small firms are often forced to use internal resources and short-term debt, due 
to their limited access to long term financing. Fama and French (2002) find a 
positive relationship between a firm’s leverage and its size. Hall et al. (2004) 
show that there is a significant negative correlation between firm size and the 
probability of bankruptcy. Larger firms, therefore, increase their leverage, since 
their expected bankruptcy cost is smaller (Rajan and Zinglales, 1995). 8 
Accordingly, larger firms are likely to use more leverage than smaller firms. 
Chittenden et al. (1996) suggest that moral hazards and adverse selection 
problems are reasonably reduced in large firms, and the cost of monitoring is 
significantly less than in small firms. Hence, listed firms are more likely to use 
external financing than small firms, which suggests a positive relationship 
between leverage and company size. From a UK perspective, Lasfer and Levis 
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 Rajan and Zingales (1995) refer to size as an inverse proxy for the probability of default.  




(1998) find evidence of a positive relationship between size and leverage. One 
explanation for higher leverage for larger firms is that these firms have more 
access to debt and equity markets (Ferri and Jones, 1979).  
The results from Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) suggest that size has a positive impact on 
leverage in the Saudi market. The authors attribute this result to the fact that 
large firms face less information asymmetry with lenders because of their heavy 
reliance on bank loans and their lower risk of bankruptcy, which enables them 
to raise debt from banks more easily (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). The results are in 
line with those found by Omet and Mashharawi (2003), who demonstrate a 
positive relationship between size and leverage. Al-Sakran (2001), however, 
reports mixed results, with the relationship between size and leverage being 
positively significant in the industrial and agricultural sectors, negatively 
significant in the electrical sector and insignificant in all other sectors. Therefore, 
the proposition is that large Saudi manufacturing firms are likely to carry more 
debt. 




Table 2.5: Studies on the relationship between size and leverage  
Al Ajmi et al. (2009) The authors examine the determinants of capital structure for 53 listed Saudi companies during 
the period 2003-2007. They report a positive relationship between size and leverage. The  
results are attributed to the fact that large firms face less information asymmetry and have a 
lower risk of bankruptcy. 
Al Sakran (2001) The author studies the determinants of capital structure for 35 listed Saudi firms between 1993 
and 1997. The author reports inconclusive results regarding the effect of size on leverage on the 
market level and a positive relationship in the industrial and agricultural sectors.  
Cassar and Holmes (2003) The authors analyse the capital structure determinants for a sample of 1,555 small- and 
medium-sized Australian firms for the period 1995-1998. They find that size has a positive effect 
on leverage. Larger firms are more likely to use debt than smaller firms.  
Chittenden et al. (1996) The authors investigate the financial structure of a sample of small firms by focusing on growth 
and access to capital markets. Using a sample of data collected for both listed and unlisted 
small firms in the UK, the authors find that there is a significant relationship between the 
financial structure (leverage) of small firms and profitability. 
Fama and French (2002) The authors analyse the trade-off and pecking order theory using a cross-sectional regression. 
They find that there is a positive relationship between leverage and size.  
Heshmati (2001) The author studies the relationship between leverage and a set of explanatory variables using a 
sample of 2,261 Swedish micro and small firms covering the period 1993-1997. Using a 
dynamic adjustment model, the author finds that size has a negative impact on leverage. This 
suggests that Swedish SMEs adopt debt financing to finance initial growth, but later use 
internally-generated equity to finance future expansion and reduce leverage.  
Kashefi-Pour et al. (2010) The test the determinants of capital structure in the context of UK firms. By examining pecking 
order and dynamic trade-off theories, they find that size has a negative impact on firms’ leverage 
position.  
Lasfer and Levis (1998) The authors analyse the determinants of the leasing decisions of small and large firms in the 
UK. Using a sample of 3,000 UK firms from 1982 to 1996, they find a positive relationship 
between leverage and size of the firm. 
Omet and Mashharawe (2003) The authors analyse the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 51 Jordanian, 30 
Kuwaiti, 28 Omani and 29 Saudi firms during the period 1996-2001. They report a positive 
relationship between size and leverage.  




Table 2.5: Studies on the relationship between size and leverage – continued  
Rajan and Zinglales (1995) The authors investigate the determinants of capital structure by analysing the financing 
decisions made by public firms in the G7 countries, using a sample of 2,583 non-financial firms. 
The authors state that size is a proxy for the inverse probability of default. They find that there is 
a positive relationship between leverage and the size of the firm for most of the countries, 
except for Germany, where size has a negative impact on leverage.  
Wald (1999)  The author analyses the determinants of the capital structure of 4,404 firms from the UK, 
France, Germany, Japan and the US in 1991-1992. The author finds that size is negatively 
related to leverage. The results are attributed to the fact that large firms have lower transaction 








2.2.5 Risk  
Both pecking order and trade-off theories predict that risk negatively impacts a 
firm’s leverage. According to pecking order theory, investors are less able to 
predict the future earnings of a firm with variable earnings, which increases the 
cost of debt (Minton and Schrand, 1999). Trade-off theory suggests that the 
more firms are exposed to bankruptcy costs, the larger the incentive is to 
reduce their debt level. Firms with variable earnings are more prone to missing 
their debt commitments and thus have a higher probability of default (Minton 
and Schrand, 1999). Hence, lenders are disinclined to lend to firms with high 
earning variability and tend to charge a higher premium to such firms because 
of the higher probability of default (Minton and Schrand, 1999). In addition, 
Bradley et al. (1984) argue that the variability of a firm’s value negatively 
influences the debt ratio when the costs of bankruptcy are significant. 
Consequently, the authors note a negative relationship between risk and 
leverage. In addition, the empirical results of Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
suggest that SMEs’ risk and leverage are negatively related. However, Booth et 
al. (2001) find mixed evidence regarding the relationship between risk and 
leverage, reporting a negative correlation between business risk and leverage 
for six countries and a positive relationship for four.9 Other empirical studies find 
a positive link between risk and leverage (Jordan et al., 1998; Huang and Song, 
2006). Huang and Song (2006) suggest that firms with high levels of leverage 
tend to engage in riskier investments.  
In the Saudi context, Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) report a negative relationship 
between risk and leverage. Al-Sakran (2001) and Omet and Mashharawe 
(2003) do not include risk in their respective studies. While theories of capital 
structure suggest a negative correlation between risk and leverage, empirical 
studies find mixed evidence in this regard. The general mixed results regarding 
the relationship between risk and leverage could be attributed to the 
inconsistency in the measure of risk and definition used to capture the 
                                                                            
9
 A positive relationship is found for Mexico, India, Jordan and Malaysia, and a negative relationship is 
found for Brazil, South Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey and Zimbabwe.  




relationship between risk and leverage.10 Therefore, the proposition is that the 
relationship between leverage and risk would be negative. 
                                                                            
10
 Bradley et al. (1984) and Wald (1999) investigate business risk by considering the standard deviation of 
earnings over total assets. Studies by Booth et al. (2001) and Huang and Song (2006) use the standard 
deviation of earnings before interest and tax to measure business risk. Other studies use the Beta 
coefficient to capture the relationship of risk and leverage, arguing that it provides a more accurate 
prediction of a firm’s systematic risk (Heinkel, 1982; Harris and Raviv, 1991, Achaya et al., 2010). 




Table 2.6: Studies on the relationship between risk and leverage  
Al Ajmi et al. (2009) The authors examine the determinants of capital structure for 53 listed Saudi companies during 
the period 2003-2007. The authors report a negative relationship between size and leverage.  
Minton and Schrand (1999)  The authors use quarterly data in their sample of firms from COMPUSTAT between 1989 and 
1994. They find that cash flow volatility increases the probability of firms’ need to access 
external finance and the costs of debt.  
Booth et al. (2001) The authors analyse a sample of firms from 10 developing countries during the period 1980-
1990, in order to assess the portability of capital structure theories across countries. The authors 
find a mixed result regarding the relationship between risk and leverage. The relationship is 
negative and significant for three countries (South Korea, Turkey and Zimbabwe) and positive 
and significant for two countries (Mexico and Jordan). 
Bradley et al. (1984) The authors examine a sample of 851 firms in the US from 1962 to 1981 and use cross-
sectional and firm-specific data in order to test for the existence of an optimal capital structure. 
The authors find that the volatility of earnings is an important factor in determining the firms’ 
leverage position. Firms with high earnings volatility have lower leverage. Hence, the authors 
find a negative relationship between risk and leverage. 
Huang and Song (2006) The authors analyse the characteristics of a sample of 799 Chinese firms from 1994 to 2000.  
The authors find that there is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The 
authors find a positive relationship between risk/volatility and leverage for a sample of Chinese 
firms.  
Jordan et al. (1998)  The authors assess the link between strategy, financial policy and capital structure for a sample 
of SME firms from 1989 to 1993, using a combination of primary and secondary data sources. 
The authors find that risk has a positive impact on leverage.   
Petersen and Rajan (1994)  The authors look at how the relationship between a firm and its creditors will affect the firms’ 
leverage, availability and costs of funds. Using a survey conducted in 1988 and 1989 for a 
sample of 4,504 non-financial and non-firm small businesses, the authors find that firms with low 
earnings volatility (less risky firms) are more likely to have high debt ratio. Hence, there is a 








2.3 Capital Structure and Stakeholders 
Capital structure decisions can also relate to a firm’s corporate strategy through 
its stakeholders. These decisions assume strategic importance when market 
imperfections are present (La Rocca et al., 2008). Barton and Gordon (1986) 
argue that corporate strategy theories complement, rather than contradict, 
corporate finance theories and help deepen the understanding of financial 
decisions. Therefore, although finance and strategy are traditionally studied 
separately, examining the way in which these two disciplines function and 
interrelate is both relevant and important, due to the many connections they 
share (La Rocca et al., 2008). A theoretical integration between capital structure 
and corporate strategy can be made by studying the way financial stakeholders, 
managers and non-financial stakeholders interact.  
2.3.1 Financial Stakeholders  
The financial stakeholders of a firm have direct financial stakes in the firm. They 
comprise the equity and debt holders in a company. Equity holders can be 
family members, institutions, individuals and/or the government. Debt holders, 
on the other hand, can be commercials and investment banks 11  and/or 
government-backed lending/financing institutions. Accordingly, the analysis of 
the literature examines the manner in which different equity and debt holders 
and their interactions affect corporate attitudes towards leverage.  
2.3.1.1 Equity and Debt holder Conflicts12 
Equity and debt holder conflicts arise under the assumption that a firm’s 
manager acts in the interest of his or her shareholders (La Rocca et al., 2008). 
Myers (1977) argues that high leverage causes managers to reject positive Net 
Present Value (NPV) investments, therefore decreasing a firm’s value. 
Shareholders will not seek projects that exclusively benefit debt holders without 
benefiting them, even if they have positive NPVs. This leads managers to 
underinvest in positive NPV projects. The author refers to this as the “debt 
                                                                            
11
 In the thesis ‘banks’ refers to either commercial banks, investment banks, or both.  
12
 Henceforth, the terms ‘shareholders’ and ‘equity holders’ are used interchangeably and are therefore 
switchable. 




overhang” problem. This “debt overhang” problem causes leveraged firms to 
reject profitable growth opportunities (Phillips, 1995). Moreover, Brito and John 
(2002) demonstrate that the existence of risky debt causes “underinvestment” in 
risky projects and, therefore, risk avoidance. Firms with high growth 
opportunities can eradicate their underinvestment problem by avoiding 
excessive risk. 
 
In contrast, debt could cause overinvestment in risky projects. According to 
Brander and Lewis (1986), managers may overinvest in risky projects due to the 
limited liability of equity. Limited liability implies that, in the event of bankruptcy, 
shareholders generally receive zero payoffs. Conversely, when investments are 
successful, they are entitled to any profits that remain after creditors have been 
paid (Brander and Lewis, 1986). The limited liability of shareholders implies 
that, when a firm goes bankrupt, their liability is limited only to their contributed 
capital. As owners of the company, the priority rule states that they are the last 
to be paid (Brander and Lewis, 1986). Less stringent bankruptcy rules that fail 
to penalise excessive risk-taking encourage overinvestment, as both managers 
and shareholders benefit when the payoffs are greater than the costs. The 
payoff structure, therefore, determines the investment strategy of a firm 
(Brander and Lewis, 1986). It implies that shareholders can transfer the costs of 
unsuccessful projects to debt holders and gain most of the benefits of risky 
projects if they are successful (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is, therefore, in 
the interest of both managers and shareholders to engage in risky projects.  
 
Debt overhang theory states that high leverage results in the rejection of 
positive NPV projects, which implies underinvestment (Myers, 1977). However, 
it is more plausible that, because shareholders have limited liability and 
bankruptcy rules are less stringent in the Saudi market, the existence of risky 
debt causes overinvestment. Accordingly, managers of leveraged Saudi 
manufacturing firms are expected to engage in risky projects that benefit the 
shareholders if the project is successful and transfer the cost of unsuccessful 
projects to debt holders, if the pay-off structure in Saudi Arabia is similar to that 
assumed by Brander and Lewis (1986). 




Table 2.7: Studies on equity and debt holder conflicts 
Brito and John (2002) The authors re-evaluate the risk shifting model proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to 
include unrealised growth opportunities in the final period. They demonstrate that growth 
opportunities may lead to the elimination of underinvestment and a reduction of risk-shifting 
behaviour. They extend this argument further by claiming that growth opportunities may 
sometimes even lead to risk avoidance.   
Jensen and Meckling (1976) The authors develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm using elements from the 
theory of property rights, agency theory and the theory of finance. The authors postulate that, 
when shareholders have limited liability, managers could overinvest in risky projects. 
Myers (1977) The author states that the firm’s assets can be viewed as a call option that depends on the 
future investments by the firm. Risky debt has the potential to reduce the present market value 
of the firm because debt induces a sub-optimal investment strategy. Managers that act in the 
interest of shareholders can reject positive NPV projects when leverage is high. Hence, debt is 
inversely related to the proportion of the value of the firm that is accounted for by real options.  
Phillips (1995) The author investigates changes in firms’ production and pricing decisions in four industries 
where there has been an increase in firms’ leverage. The author shows that competitive 
decisions are related to leverage. In three industries, output is negatively associated with 
leverage. Leverage provides a commitment not to invest in the future, as the firms pay out a 
significant part of their free cash flow to service debt. Leveraged firms can reject profitable 








2.3.1.2 Manager and Equity Holders’ Conflicts  
Conflicts between managers and equity holders arise when managers are 
assumed to act in their own best interests. Agency theory examines the role of 
debt in the conflict between shareholders and managers, especially when there 
is a separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Managers, as the agents of shareholders, may have interests that conflict with 
those of the shareholders because they favour perks, power and empire 
building (Jensen, 1986). Managers may therefore use their firm’s free cash 
flows for opportunistic purposes (Jensen, 1986). Degryse and De Jong (2006) 
argue that, in order to maximise firm size, managers might invest in negative 
NPV projects. The presence of debt discourages over-investment of free cash 
flows, since managers have to cover their debt obligations in order to avoid 
bankruptcy (Hart and Moore, 1995). Therefore, shareholders would find debt to 
be a significant disciplinary device. 
In addition to the aforementioned disciplinary function, debt can be used to 
signal to the market, even in the absence of conflict, that a company can 
systematically meet its cash flow obligations and does not object to being 
supervised by creditors when making debt decisions (Ross, 1977). This signal 
can be valuable to shareholders and lenders in uncertain market environments 
and is one of the significant influences on leverage decisions (Diamond, 1991).  
 
Accordingly, managers seek to maximise their utility, rather than align their 
interests with the shareholders. In so doing, they tend to invest in projects that 
increase their satisfaction, status and power. Managers are in a position to use 
their firm’s free cash flows for self-serving purposes. The existence of debt is 
crucial because it prevents free cash flows from being wasted. It also signals to 
shareholders and lenders that the firm can meet its cash flow obligations to 
banks. Hence, Saudi manufacturing firms could use debt as a strategic 
disciplining tool for managers. 




Table 2.8: Studies on manager and equity holders’ conflicts  
Degryse and De Jong (2006) In their 1993-1998 sample of non-financial publicly listed Dutch firms, the authors find that debt 
is a significant disciplining mechanism for managerial agency problems.  
Hart and Moore (1995) The authors provide an analysis of the benefits and costs of debt, especially long-term debt. 
Their model considers a public company with assets in place and new investment opportunities. 
Assuming that managers have strong empire-building tendencies, the authors show that, with 
little or no debt, it is easy for management to invest in negative NPV projects (overinvestments). 
Hence, debt can discourage overinvestments of free cash flows.  
Jensen (1986) The author develops a theory that explains the benefits of debt in reducing the agency costs of 
free cash flows, including the process where firms can substitute debt for dividends. The author 
argues that the agency conflict is severe in firms with significant free cash flows. There is a 
further postulation that the firm’s free cash flows can be used for projects that generate negative 
NPV. 
Ross (1977) The author develops an incentive-signaling model that provides a theory for the determination of 
the financial structure of the firm. In this model, firms use debt to signal their ability to meet their 
cash flow obligations (interest payments) and their openness to supervision from creditors.  
 
  




2.3.1.3 Family Ownership   
Family ownership can constitute a significant portion of equity, especially for 
firms that start out private before going public. This is usually regarded as 
emotional ownership, and it describes the degree to which individuals perceive 
that resources belong to them as a result of a personal relationship that was 
established in the creation process (Björnberg and Nicholson, 2012). When 
there is significant family control, the amount of equity that is freely available to 
other investors (free floating) is reduced because of the desires of family 
members to maintain control of the firm. Several studies have shown that firms 
with large family ownership have significant shareholder control (Stulz, 1988; 
King and Santor, 2008). In order for family owners to maintain their control, they 
are likely to prefer debt to equity financing (Stulz, 1998). Empirical studies 
support this contention. King and Santor (2008) demonstrate that family 
ownership has a positive impact on the level of leverage of the firm. Others 
have also found the relationship between family ownership and leverage to be 
positive (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; Mehran, 1992). As a result, firms with 
significant family ownership are more likely to prefer debt to equity financing, as 
the latter has the potential to dilute the family’s ownership stake and, thus, its 
control over the firm.  
 
Moreover, family ownership and its impact on leverage could also be viewed 
from an information asymmetry and agency cost perspective. Lopez-Garcia and 
Sanchez-Andujar (2007) argue that family-owned firms have a greater level of 
confidentiality with regard to information than non-family-owned companies. 
They find the debt-to-equity ratios of family-owned enterprises to be lower than 
their non-family-owned counterparts. In addition, agency theories suggest that 
managerial ownership can act as a substitute for debt in reducing agency 
problems (Jensen, 1986). If this is the case, the relationship between leverage 
and family ownership should be negative. Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) and 
Villalonga and Amit (2004) do indeed find a negative relationship between 
family ownership and leverage. Their findings could be attributed to the fact that 
family-owned companies, with owners assuming more active managerial roles, 




have less incentive to use debt to reduce agency problems, since managerial 
and shareholder interests are aligned.  
 
Accordingly, family ownership can be significant in shaping the capital structure 
of the firm. Family owners tend to be actively involved in the management of 
their firms, thereby reducing agency problems. Moreover, significant 
shareholder control is associated with family ownership. Additionally, to 
maintain this control, firms will prefer debt to equity to avoid the dilution of their 
control. However, Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) find a negative relationship between 
family ownership and leverage. This result, in accordance with agency theory, 
could be attributed to the fact that family owners actively monitor the firm and do 
not need to use debt to monitor and discipline their managers. Nevertheless, 
the proposition follows the theoretical prediction of a positive relationship 
between family ownership and leverage.  




Table 2.9: Studies on family ownership influence on capital structure  
Al Ajmi et al. (2009) The authors examine the determinants of capital structure for 53 listed Saudi companies during 
the period 2003-2007. The authors report a negative relationship between family ownership and 
leverage.  
Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990) The authors look at family ownership among top management. They find that top managers in 
an all-equity firm with family ownership have greater control of voting rights than those without 
family involvement. Hence, managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among 
managers are important in reducing leverage. Thus, the authors find a negative relationship 
between family ownership and leverage. 
Bianco and Nicodano (2006) The aim of the authors is to determine when a holding company should take out debt on behalf 
of its subsidiaries. The authors look at the pyramid structure of Italian holding companies, using 
a sample of 86 and 117 holding companies and 728 and 700 group-affiliated companies. There 
is a positive relationship between control-enhancing mechanisms of family owners and financial 
leverage. Holding companies do most borrowing against assets and lend to subsidiaries.  
King and Santor (2008) The authors examine how family ownership affects the capital structure and performance of a 
sample of 613 Canadian firms using a dataset from 1998 to 2005. The authors find that 
freestanding family-owned firms with a single share class have higher leverage. Hence, there is 
a positive relationship between family ownership and leverage. 
Lopez-Garcia and Sanchez-Andujar (2007) The authors look at the determinants of the financial behaviour of small family businesses and 
how they differ from non-family small businesses. They used as a sample 422 Spanish family 
businesses and 436 non-family businesses from 1997 to 2004. The leverage ratios of family-
owned companies are lower (55.5%) than non-family owned companies (57.5%). The high level 
of confidentiality implies that family-owned companies ignore debt financing. 




Table 2.9: Studies on family ownership influence on capital structure – continued  
Stulz (1988) The author assesses how managerial control of voting rights affects firm value and financing 
policies. Firms that have a significant proportion of their equity capital in the hands of family 
owners have significant shareholder control. Hence, firms are more likely to use debt than equity 
to raise funds.  
Villalonga and Amit (2004) The authors use a panel sample of 52,787 shareholder-firm-year observations, which represents 
2,808 firm-years from 508 Fortune 500 firms during the period 1994-2000, to assess whether 
family-owned firms are more or less valuable than non-family owned firms based on ownership, 
control and management. The authors find a negative relationship between family ownership 
and leverage. 




2.3.1.4 Government Ownership  
Governments can also have substantial equity ownership of firms. Borisova et 
al. (2012) argue that governments are similar to other large investors. However, 
the motives of their investments might be different. The authors argue that a 
government’s equity participation is sometimes pursued for social and political, 
rather than economic, objectives. This leads investors to question the motives 
behind the financial decisions of such firms. Moreover, Bortolotti et al. (2010) 
argue that governments are passive shareholders and do not actively engage in 
the monitoring of the firm. This implies that state-owned enterprises (SOE) are 
more likely to benefit from the monitoring and disciplining effect of debt. Faccio 
et al. (2006) argue that government owned firms are more likely to be bailed out 
in the event of financial distress than their non-SOE counterparts. If they have a 
direct monetary stake in the firm, governments will not allow them to fail (Faccio 
et al., 2006). Therefore, lenders are more likely to extend credit because they 
view such firms as having lower risk relative to their non-SOE counterparts. 
 
In addition, Allen et al. (2005) argue that SOEs receive preferential treatment in 
credit terms and amounts, especially from state-owned banks and financing 
institutions. The authors find that Chinese SOEs receive more lending from 
large state-owned banks than their non-government-owned counterparts. Their 
results indicate a positive relationship between leverage and state ownership. 
Other studies support this positive relationship between government ownership 
and leverage (Li et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011).  
 
Accordingly, the theoretical prediction is that the relationship between 
government ownership and leverage would be positive. Yet, empirical findings 
on the effect of government ownership on leverage in the Saudi market are 
mixed. For example, Al-Sakran (2001) finds a positive effect of government 
ownership on leverage, while Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) reveal a negative 
relationship. Notwithstanding these contradictions, most research findings do 
indicate a positive relationship between the two. Hence, the proposition is that 




government ownership in the sample of Saudi manufacturing firms used in this 
thesis would be positively related to leverage. 




Table 2.10: Studies on government ownership and capital structure  
Al Ajmi et al. (2009) The authors examine the determinants of capital structure for 53 listed Saudi companies during 
the period 2003-2007. The authors report a positive relationship between size and leverage. The 
authors attribute this result to the fact that large firms face less information asymmetry and have 
a lower risk of bankruptcy 
Al Sakran (2001) The author studies the determinants of capital structure for 35 listed Saudi firms between 1993 
and 1997. A positive relationship is revealed between government ownership and leverage.  
Allen et al. (2005)  The authors examine the effect of government ownership on leverage in a panel data sample of 
1,163 Chinese listed firms from 1992 to 2000. Chinese SOEs are found to carry much higher 
leverage than their non-SOE counterparts.  
Borisova et al. (2012)  The authors investigate the effect of government ownership on corporate debt or leverage using 
a sample of 43 countries in the period 1991-2010. They postulate that government ownership 
could increase the cost of debt if there are social and political goals imposed by the state 
owners, which could reduce profitability.  
Bortolotti et al. (2010)  The authors analyse a sample of 802 investments by 18 Sovereign Wealth Funds in November 
2009. The authors find that SWFs play a limited role in the corporate governance of firms.  
Faccio et al. (2006) The authors investigate the likelihood of government bailouts in a sample of 450 politically 
connected firms from 35 countries during the period 1997-2002. The authors find that politically 
connected firms are more likely to be bailed out than their non-connected counterparts.  
Li et al. (2009)  The authors uses a unique data set to examine the role of ownership structure and institutional 
development in debt financing, using a sample of Chinese firms that are not publicly traded. The 
authors use a sample of 417,068 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2004. They find that 
ownership structure and institutions explain approximately 6% of the variation in the firms’ 
leverage. The average leverage ratio for the sample firm is 57%, and about 35% of these firms 
employ long-term debts. The authors show that state ownership has a positive impact on 








2.3.1.5 Institutional Ownership  
Institutional ownership could have considerable effects on capital structure 
through mitigating agency costs, reducing information asymmetry, and 
increasing the speed of adjustment of capital structure (Michaely and Vincent, 
2012). Several studies show that institutional investors actively monitor the firm,  
enhancing its value and reducing agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Huson et al., 2001). Chen et al. (2007) examine the monitoring activities of US 
institutional investors and find that institutional investors actively engage in 
monitoring and influence the decisions of the firm’s managers. Therefore, 
institutional ownership can act as a substitute for debt in reducing agency 
conflicts.  
 
In addition, these investors devote resources to collecting information (which 
reduces information asymmetry) in order to adhere to fiduciary and prudency 
standards. They are, therefore, better informed than other types of investors 
(Del Guercio, 1996; Allen et al., 2000). Institutional investors can mitigate the 
adverse selection problem by reducing information asymmetries (Michaely and 
Vincent, 2012). Pecking order theory states that, when information asymmetry 
is reduced, the cost of equity falls. Subsequently, firms with institutional owners 
would issue more equity.  
 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional 
ownership and leverage is mixed. Berger et al. (1997) and Chen and Steiner 
(1999) find a positive correlation between institutional ownership structure and 
leverage. Other empirical studies find a negative effect (Crutchley and Jensen, 
1999; Tong and Ning, 2004; Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008). Tong and Ning (2004) 
attribute the negative relationship to the fact that institutional investors prefer 
firms with low leverage ratios to avoid future financial distress. Therefore, even 
though Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) demonstrate a positive relationship between these 
variables in the Saudi market, agency and pecking order theories point to a 
negative relationship. This is due to institutional investors replacing the 
monitoring role of debt, along with the reduction of information asymmetry and 




ultimately the cost of equity. Hence, the proposition is that firms with institutional 
ownership are less likely to issue debt.  




Table 2.11: Studies on institutional ownership and capital structure 
Al Ajmi et al. (2009) The authors examine the determinants of capital structure for 53 listed Saudi companies during 
the period 2003-2007. In this study a positive relationship is shown between institutional 
ownership and leverage.  
Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) The authors investigate the relationship that exists between ownership and capital structure for 
firms in Jordan. They show that firms in Jordan follow determinants of capital structure similar to 
those in developed markets. A negative relationship between institutional investors and leverage 
is identified.  
Berger et al. (1997)  The authors studys the relationship between the capital structure of the firm and managerial 
entrenchment. Their sample consists of 452 industrial companies from 1984 to 1991. They 
argue that entrenched managers have discretion over the level of leverage choices. Their 
results indicate that entrenched CEOs avoid leverage. However, in relation to institutional 
ownership, the authors find that leverage increases when there is a significant “blockholder” with 
5% or more stake in the company. Firms with “blockholders” have leverage levels that are 1 to 4 
percent higher than other firms. Hence, managers take on more debt when an influential monitor 
is present.   
Chen et al. (2007) The authors identify the characteristics of institutional investors that monitor the firms’ assets. 
Using a sample of all acquisition decisions covering 2,150 bids and focusing on the 1,815 
completed acquisitions during January 1984 and December 2001 of US firms, the authors find 
independent long term institutions with large blocks of shares showing a higher activity of 
monitoring a related firm. Furthermore, monitoring has a greater effect from 1990 onwards.  
Michaely and Vincent (2012) The authors investigate the relationship between institutional holdings and capital structure 
using 122,859 firm-year observations from 1979 to 2009. Institutional shareholders impact 
capital structure because they alleviate agency costs, reduce information asymmetry and 
increase the speed of adjustment of capital structure. Institutional holdings have a significant 
effect on capital structure because a change in institutional holdings is negatively related to a 
change in capital structure. Firms tend to lower their leverage in response to an increase in 
institutional holdings by issuing equity, rather than debt. Hence, there is a negative relationship 
between the presence of institutional investors and leverage. 
Tong and Ning (2004) The authors use a panel data set of S&P 500 firms from 1997 to 2001 in order to examine the 
relationship between capital structure and institutional investors’ choices. The authors find that 
leverage is negatively related to the number of institutional investors. 




2.3.1.6 Relationship Banking  
Bank loans are the main source of external finance for companies, regardless of 
their jurisdiction. These loans can be of a short or long-term nature. It is thus 
relevant to consider the nature of the banking environment when studying the 
capital structure decisions of a firm. Several studies attest to the significance of 
commercial banking concentration on capital structure (Petersen and Rajan, 
1995; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; and Gonzalez and Gonzalez, 2008). In a 
perfect and efficient market there would be an inverse relationship between 
bank concentration and firm leverage (Gonzalez and Gonzalez, 2008). 
However, when market imperfections (such as information asymmetries) exist, 
Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2008) find a positive relationship between banking 
concentration and leverage. Similarly, Boot (2000) demonstrates that 
relationship banking with the borrowing firm reduces information asymmetries 
and facilitates a firm’s access to finance.  
 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) and Peterson and Rajan (1995) demonstrate that, 
in markets with low competition in the banking sector and a high banking 
concentration, relationship banking is significant. According to Petersen and 
Rajan (1995), firms in more concentrated credit markets can more easily access 
finances, due to relationship banking. Fan et al. (2010) find that legal and tax 
systems, as well as the preferences of lenders, help explain variations in 
leverage. The authors report that ‘relationship banking’ has a positive impact on 
leverage. Therefore, the proposition is that relationship banking would have a 
positive impact on leverage when banking concentration is high. The effect of 
relationship banking on leverage is largely unexplored in the Saudi 
manufacturing industry. Hence, by controlling for the effect of relationship 
banking, this thesis intends to contribute to the existent literature on the 
determinants of capital structure on Saudi manufacturing firms.  




Table 2.12: Studies on relationship banking and capital structure  
Boot (2000) The author provides a review of the contemporary literature on relationship banking. The author 
analyses how relationship banking fits with the services provided by banks, together with its 
costs and benefits. The author concludes that relationship banking is important because it can 
be a value-enhancing activity.      In an imperfect market, relationship banking reduces 
information asymmetry and increases leverage. Relationship banking has a positive impact on a 
firm’s leverage. 
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006)  The authors examine a sample of US firms from COMPUSTAT between 1980 and 1997. Their 
empirical findings demonstrate that access to credit is more difficult for potential entrants when 
credit markets are concentrated than when banking is competitive. The authors also show that 
lenders favor incumbent firms with strong and established relationships over entrant firms.  
Degryse and Ogena (2007) The authors empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch 
orientation, using a database that contained information on bank-firm relationships. Using a 
sample of 645 and 9,213 borrowers (from a ban in Belgium) for the period between January 
1995 and August 1997, the authors find that bank branches that face stiff competition are more 
engaged in relationship-based lending.   
Fan et al. (2010)  The authors examine the influence of the institutional environment and corruption on capital 
structure for a sample of 36,767 firms from 39 countries. The authors find that relationship 
banking has a positive impact on leverage in jurisdiction where property laws and creditor rights 
are upheld.         
Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2008) The authors provide evidence on how bank concentration and institutions affect capital structure 
for firms in 39 countries. They analyse a sample of 12,049 firms from 1995 to 2004. The authors 
find that leverage increases with bank concentration.  
Peterson and Rajan (1995) The authors provide a framework that shows that the effect of competition in the credit market is 
an important factor in determining the value of lending relationships. The authors show that 
creditors are more likely to provide finances to credit-constrained firms when the credit markets 








2.3.1.7 Government Finance  
Government loans play a key role in influencing the capital structure decisions 
of firms. Government intervention is sometimes necessary, especially when 
credit markets reject profitable projects due to informational asymmetries 
(Stiglitz et al., 1993). These loans are crucial in this context, because 
information asymmetry is one of the defining characteristics of the Saudi 
market. State-owned banks and development finance institutions can provide 
industries that are underdeveloped with cheap financing in the presence of 
market imperfections (Yaron, 2004). Nevertheless, government intervention is 
not necessarily dependent on the existence of market failure (Yaron, 2004). 
Intervention in the credit market could be politically derived (La Porta et al., 
2002). Benjamin et al. (2004) argue that development loan funds extend credit 
to businesses with the aim of furthering social objectives, such as economic 
growth, job creation and the promotion of businesses that do not harm the 
environment. However, Galindo and Micco (2004) demonstrate that private 
banks are more efficient than their state-owned counterparts at promoting 
growth and increasing leverage, especially for industries that have significant 
tangible assets that can be used as collateral, such as the manufacturing 
industry. Benjamin et al. (2004) contest such findings and emphasise that the 
overall benefits of such funds are sometimes difficult to quantify, due to their 
diversity.  
 
Hence, government development loans are considered to be significant in 
influencing the capital structure decisions of firms in developing economies, 
such as Saudi Arabia, regardless of the efficiency of such loans. Therefore, the 
proposition is that government lending would constitute a significant 
determinant of the capital structure in the Saudi manufacturing industry.  




Table 2.13: Studies on government finance and capital structure  
Benjamin et al. (2004) The authors investigate the implications of Community Development Financial Institutions 
(CDFIs), which include community development banks, credit unions, business and 
microenterprise loan funds and venture capital funds. The authors find that CDFI benefits differ 
between individual CDFIs. The authors report that CDFIs help promote economic growth, 
affordable housing, job creation and the overall health of companies.  
Galindo and Micco (2004) This study tests the efficiency of a different structure of bank ownership with regards to its ability 
to target manufacturing sectors that are in need of credit. More specifically, the authors look at 
the intervention of state-owned banks in the credit market, in order to deal with the problem of 
imperfect information. Using a sample of 652 observations from 1970 to 1990, the results show 
that government-owned banks do not help promote growth in industries that do not have 
collateral.   
La Porta et al. (2000)  The authors analyse government ownership of large banks in 92 countries and find evidence to 
support the political rationale for the resource allocation of state owned banks.  
Stiglitz et al. (1993) The author examines the role of the government in the financial market. The authors also 
identify seven major market failures, which provide a possible rationale for government 
intervention. The authors provide a catalogue of government intervention, the objective of each 
intervention and the instruments each employs. Governments intervene in financial markets 
when information asymmetry exists. However, the authors report mixed evidence on the 
success of government intervention in credit markets.  
Yaron (2004) The author examines the reasons for establishing State-Owned Development Finance 
Institutions (SDFIs) and highlights the difficulties in assessing their performance and efficiency. 
The author argues that SDFIs often face high risk in the recovery of their loans due to high 
information asymmetry and political motivations, such as prioritising underdeveloped industries.  
 




2.3.2 Non-Financial Stakeholders  
A firm’s non-financial stakeholder could influence the capital structure decision 
of a firm. Non-financial stakeholders, such as suppliers, customers and 
employees, do not have a direct ownership of the firm. However, they could 
play a crucial role in influencing capital structure decisions through their 
bargaining power and implicit claims. Further, governments could also have an 
influence on the value and capital structure of a firm through subsidies. 
Therefore, it is worth examining the possible considerations of non-financial 
stakeholders and their implications on capital structure decisions.  
2.3.2.1 Government  
The government, in terms of its influence on capital structure and corporate 
strategy, is not only limited to its role as a financial stakeholder. Rather, it could 
also exert influence through its role as a non-financial stakeholder. 
Governments often provide support in the form of subsidies to certain industries 
in order to protect and enable them to overcome initial competitive 
disadvantages and promote successful competition in the long run (Schwartz 
and Clements, 1999). Hence, government subsidies not only increase a firms’ 
competitive advantage but can also have an influence on its capital structure 
decisions (Mitra and Webster, 2008).  
 
Industries that are subject to subsidies face distorted competition in the product 
market (Chiang et al., 2008). According to Chiang et al. (2008), incumbents in 
some US industries, such as the telecommunication industry, receive 
favourable subsidies. Moreover, Mitra and Wesbster (2008) claim that the 
subsidies introduced to the US manufacturing industry that go to 
remanufacturers increase remanufacturing activities. Furthermore, Brander and 
Spencer (1985) demonstrate that export subsidies to firms in oligopolistic 
industries increase the profits of local firms. Accordingly, it can be argued that 
subsidies affect both firms’ capital structures and competitive advantage. The 
availability of subsidies reduces the need for finance and help in increasing 
competitive advantage. This is particularly relevant in the context of this thesis, 




as Saudi manufacturing firms receive fuel and land subsidies from the 
government (Peel, 2013). This implies that these firms would have lower fixed 
cost and that the need for finance would be reduced when subsidies are 
extended. Accordingly, subsidies are proposed to have a negative impact on 
leverage.  




Table 2.14: Studies on government influence as a non-financial stakeholder on capital structure 
Brander and Spencer (1985)  The authors assesses the effect of subsidies on the international markets. They argue that 
export subsidies can be an attractive tool for the nation that receives the subsidy, as they can 
improve the relative position of a domestic firm in non-cooperative rivalries with foreign firms, 
which enables the company to gain a market share and achieve higher profits.    
Mitra and Wesbster (2008) The authors examine the effect of government subsidies and analyse a two-period model 
involving a manufacturer who produces and sells a new product and a remanufacturer who 
competes with the manufacturer in the second period. The authors find that the subsidies 
increase remanufacturing activity. When 100% of the subsidy goes to the remanufacturer, its 
profits increase and the manufacturer’s profits fall. When some of the subsidy is paid to the 
manufacturer, it creates an incentive for the manufacturer to design products that are suitable 
for remanufacturing.   
Schwartz and Clements (1999) The authors address a problem relating to the definition and measurement of subsidies, in 
addition to the reasons why government subsidies are used as a fiscal policy tool. The authors 
discuss the general economic effect and distributional implications. The authors use general 
government subsidy data for 60 countries from the United Nations’ System of National Accounts 
(SNA) from 1975 to 1990. Subsidies can protect domestic industries against competitive 
disadvantages and promote long-term competition for firms. They also affect domestic resource 








2.3.2.2 Suppliers  
Suppliers could influence a firm’s capital structure through their bargaining 
power. Suppliers’ bargaining power is measured by the amount of surplus that 
they can extract from the firm (Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993). Several studies 
demonstrate that firms could use debt to reduce the bargaining power of 
suppliers (Bronars and Deere, 1991; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Perotti and 
Spier, 1993; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). By issuing debt, the firm commits to 
paying out a proportion of its surpluses to lenders and is able to limit the 
amount of surpluses that suppliers can extract (Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993). 
Therefore, firms will carry more debt when the bargaining power of suppliers is 
strong (Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993).  
 
Perotti and Spier (1993) present a model in which a firm could use debt as a 
bargaining tool to reduce the claims of its suppliers by threatening to 
underinvest in projects that are essential for its survival if these contracts are 
not renegotiated. Kale and Shahrur (2007) relate the ability of a firm to use debt 
as a bargaining tool to supplier concentration. The authors suggest that, when 
supplier concentration is high, firms are at a bargaining disadvantage. However, 
when supplier concentration is low, firms can credibly threaten to forgo future 
relationship-specific investments and/or use debt to reduce the supplier’s 
bargaining power. Therefore, the authors find a positive relationship between 
firms’ debt levels and their degree of industry concentration, which supports the 
notion of debt being used as a bargaining tool. Similarly, Brown et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that leverage buyouts (LBOs) increase the bargaining power of a 
firm with its suppliers. 
 
However, Sarig (1998) assumes that a firm’s shareholders are more concerned 
about its financial health than its suppliers. Hence, they would not underinvest 
in projects that are essential for their survival. High debt would, therefore, 
reduce the bargaining power of a firm against its suppliers because of its 
weaker financial position. In this instance, a firm would adjust its capital 
structure by reducing leverage in order to be less vulnerable to threats by 




powerful suppliers. Lower leverage would limit the bargaining power of suppliers 
and increase the amount of surplus available to the firm. Therefore, the author 
predicts that, when supplier bargaining power is strong, firms carry less debt. If 
suppliers of Saudi manufacturing firms are concentrated and their bargaining 
power is strong, firms would issue more debt. Hence, the proposition is that 
suppliers would have a significant influence on the capital structure decisions of 
Saudi manufacturing firms.  




Table 2.15: Studies on suppliers’ influence on capital structure  
Brown et al. (2009) The authors examine the issue of leverage buyout (LBOs) and the bargaining power of firms 
with their suppliers. The authors use a sample of 221 highly leveraged transactions proposed 
from 1980 to 2001. They find a positive relationship between leverage buyouts (LBOs) and the 
bargaining power of the firm with its suppliers.  
Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993) The paper looks at how firms can optimally use their debt to affect the outcome of bilateral 
bargaining with suppliers. The authors argue that debt may ease the underinvestment problem 
associated with the inability to write pre-commitment contracts. Firms can use debt to reduce the 
bargaining power of suppliers; the revenue allocated to suppliers will fall as the firms’ leverage 
increases.  
Kale and Shahrur (2007)  The authors examine the link between leverage and the characteristics of a firm’s suppliers. 
Their research shows that relationship-specific investments with suppliers reduce leverage and 
demonstrate the positive relationship between debt levels and the degree of concentration of 
suppliers.  
Sarig (1998) The author examines the choice of capital structure and its effect on the bargaining position of 
its shareholders vis-à-vis its suppliers.  High debt levels weaken the firms’ bargaining power 








2.3.2.3 Customers  
Customers could also influence capital structure decisions through their 
bargaining power. Customers of highly leveraged firms become concerned 
about the level of quality and future products and services they receive, 
especially in periods of financial distress (Titman, 1984). The effect of 
bankruptcy is more pronounced for firms that market durable or unique goods 
as these firms impose certain irreversible costs on customers (Titman, 1984). 
One of the aims of the thesis is to test whether firms compromise the quality of 
their products during periods of economic downturn.  
 
Moreover, Frank and Huyghebaert (2004) posit that customers account for the 
fact that bankruptcy can impose costs on them. The authors argue that that 
those costs are dependent upon both the likelihood and the magnitude of the 
event. While the likelihood of bankruptcy is largely determined by the capital 
structure decisions of a firm and related aspects, such as debt ownership, 
maturity and covenants (Gilson et al., 1990), the scale of disruption to 
customers depends on direct switching costs and implicit costs (Cornell and 
Shapiro, 1987). Direct switching costs are related to the customer searching for 
a product or service that replaces the product or service provided by a bankrupt 
firm. Implicit costs, on the other hand, refer to aspects such as high quality or 
reliability provided by a firm’s products that are not specified contractually but 
nevertheless are a very important part of the sale contract (Cornell and Shapiro, 
1987). Titman (1984), therefore, argues that firms may want to avoid lower 
product pricing by actually adopting a more conservative leverage ratio. Hence, 
Saudi manufacturing firms that are concerned about customer bargaining power 
may carry lower leverage in order to avoid price concessions.  




Table 2.16: Studies on customer influence on capital structure  
Cornell and Shapiro (1987) The authors examine the effect of implicit claims of non-financial stakeholders, including 
customers who expect continued services from the firm. The authors argue that customers 
would be reluctant to deal with highly leveraged firms due to the higher probability of bankruptcy 
and the discontinuation of services that they extend to customers.  
Hillier et al. (2008) The authors examine the impact of different non-financial stakeholders on capital structure. The 
authors argue that the probability for customers of highly leveraged firms to receive low quality 
products increases as the level of financial distress also increases.   
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) The authors analyse the effect and the implication of financial policy on the incentive of the firm 
to maintain its reputation as a producer of high quality products. The authors propose a model 
which shows that, in certain situations, the presence of debt will affect the firm’s ability to offer 
high quality products, which will reduce its value. When firms have assets with high salvage 
value, the presence of debt may have a positive impact on their ability to offer high quality 
products. 
Titman (1984) The author models the impact of a firm’s liquidation on its non-financial stakeholders. The author 
argues that customers will anticipate a reduction in the level of quality products/services in the 










2.3.2.4 Employees  
Capital structure decisions can also affect the employees of a firm (Hillier et al., 
2008). Highly leveraged firms are more likely to lay off employees than 
comparable firms with lower leverage (Hillier et al., 2007). In turn, employees of 
such firms would bargain for higher wages in order to compensate for the higher 
probability of lay off. Therefore, firms that are highly leveraged would have 
higher labour costs, as skilled employees can bargain for better contracts than 
in firms with low leverage (Sarig, 1998). Berkovitch et al. (2000) demonstrate 
that leverage is positively related to employee compensation. Hence, there will 
be a disincentive for the firm to increase its leverage if these labour costs are 
larger than the benefits of debt. Supporting this notion, Berk et al. (2010) point 
out that the human capital costs of financial distress are sufficient in 
discouraging leverage. The authors demonstrate that highly leveraged firms 
compensate their employees for the costs of financial distress by increasing 
their wages. Accordingly, it can be argued that there is a positive relationship 
between labour costs and leverage.  
 
Contrary to the above, Bronars and Deere (1991) demonstrate that, when 
bankruptcy costs are assumed, the share of profits received by employees is 
negatively related to the firm’s debt. Thus, the firm can use debt to reduce its 
surpluses and protect itself from the threat of union actions (Perotti and Spier, 
1993). Several studies attest to the benefits of debt in strengthening the 
bargaining power of the firm against employees and reducing union threats 
(Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Cavanaugh and Garen, 1997).  
 
The literature concerning the impact of employees on capital structure assumes 
the existence of labour unions (Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). 
However, labour unions do not yet exist in Saudi Arabia (Mellahi, 2007). Under 
Saudi labour law, it is unlawful to form or be a member of a labour union, and 
collective bargaining is illegal (Mellahi, 2007). Hence, this thesis aims to 
examine the influence of employees on capital structure in the absence of 
labour unions.  




Table 2.17: Studies on the influence of employees on capital structure.  
Berk et al. (2010) The authors derive an optimal labour contract for a leveraged firm where perfect competitive 
labour and a capital market exist. In this model, the authors show that employees become 
entrenched and therefore face high human costs of bankruptcy. The authors postulate that 
wages should have significant explanatory power for firm leverage. In their model, the authors 
state that employees pay for the insurance provided by the labour contract by accepting lower 
wages. Hence, if all else remains equal, firms with higher leverage should be associated with 
higher wages. Thus, a firm’s labour costs have a positive impact on its level of leverage. 
Berkovitch et al. (2000)  The authors investigate the relationship between financial structure and managerial 
compensation. The authors consider a three-period model and show that managers of firms with 
risky debt are promised lower “golden parachutes” than those of firms that do not have risky 
debt. In addition, risky debt has an impact on the manager’s wage if a labourer is retained by the 
firm. Employees of highly leveraged firms are more likely to be highly compensated than those 
with conservative leverage.   
Bronars and Deere (1991) The authors analyse the use of debt to protect the wealth of shareholders from the threat of 
unionisation. The presence of debt reduces the funds available for a potential union. Hence, the 
authors find that, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, employee compensation is negatively 
related to the firms’ leverage. In addition, firms in more unionised industries use more debts.    
Hillier et al. (2007) The authors study the financial performance of UK listed companies adjacent to the 
announcement of permanent employee layoffs. They find that firms that have significant 
leverage are more likely to lay off employees than those with lower leverage.  
Istaitieh and Rodriguez Fernandez (2006) The authors present an overview of the literature that links factor product markets and capital 
structure. They relate modern financial theory to industrial organisation, stakeholder theory and 
firms’ strategic management. The authors find that union wages have a negative impact on the 
level of leverage a firm assumes. The higher the debt level, the lower the union optimal wage. 
The authors argue that more debt increases the chances of bankruptcy and could affect wage 
standards. This would put pressure on unions to lower their wage demands.   
 
  





2.4 Capital Structure and Competitive Environment  
Stakeholder theory implies that the overall competitive environment in which a 
firm operates affects its capital structure and corporate strategy (Hillier et al., 
2008). Therefore, after considering non-financial stakeholders, it is important to 
consider the effect of competition on capital structure and corporate strategy.  
2.4.1 Signalling Strategy  
Adequate disclosure rules are required in order for firms to signal their financial 
and competitive position to the market. Studies postulate that the imposition of 
more stringent disclosure rules by governments can significantly reduce agency 
costs and information asymmetry and can protect unsophisticated investors 
(Leftwich, 1980; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Disclosure rules are sometimes 
reflected in financial statements through accounting standards, which help 
reduce the agency costs of the firm.13 According to Healy and Palepu (2001:412), 
“accounting standards regulate the reporting choices available to managers in 
presenting the firm’s financial statements”. The authors argue that stringent 
disclosure rules reduce information asymmetry and help protect unsophisticated 
investors. Similarly, Kothari (2001) demonstrates that regulated financial reports 
offer that is reflected through audited financial reports enables financial 
institutions to decide more accurately whether to advance a loan to the firm or 
decline it. Therefore, stringent disclosure rules are essential in reducing 
information asymmetry and enabling lenders and investors to accurately predict 
the value of a firm.  
 
Moreover, disclosures about a firm’s capital structure could enable it to signal its 
financial position not only to creditors and investors, but also to competitors, 
especially when information asymmetry is significant (Klein et al., 2002). Istaitieh 
and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) suggest that information that is revealed to 
capital markets through actions such as dividend payments is simultaneously 
                                                                            
13
 Financial statements are regarded as public goods because shareholders pay for their production while 
outside investors and competitors are given a ‘free ride’ regarding the use of such information. 





revealed to uninformed agents, such as competitors. The authors argue that 
uninformed agents adapt their behaviour in accordance with the information that 
is revealed. Rival firms could take into account information that is revealed and 
adjust their capital structure decisions accordingly (Gertner et al., 1988). Firms 
are, therefore, cautious about revealing information that would adversely affect 
their competitive position. Moreover, Daves and Tucker (1993) find that more 
signalling occurs when market competition is high. Hence, when market 
competition and information asymmetry is high, the signalling function of debt 
assumes importance. In addition, Poitevin (1990) argues that the capital structure 
of highly leveraged incumbent firms is an effective deterrent to market entry, due 
to the signalling role of debt contracts. Accordingly, this thesis aims to contribute 
to the literature on the signalling function of debt in two ways. First, it tests 
whether disclosure rules are adequate in transmitting signals about a firm’s value 
and financial position and establishes the level of information asymmetry that is 
present in the Saudi market. Second, it tests whether Saudi manufacturing firms 
actually use debt as a signalling tool in the presence of information asymmetry.





Table 2.18: Studies on financial signalling strategy 
 
Daves and Tucker (1993) The authors develop a model of a firm’s decision to disclose information that affects its 
capital structure and competitive advantage. They posit that financial signals are 
positively related to market competition. The authors indicate that, in the presence of 
abnormal returns and information asymmetry, market competition may have a small 
effect on a firm’s financial signals.  
Healy and Palepu (2001) The authors provide a framework for analysing managers’ reporting and disclosure 
decisions in a capital market setting. They also review current literature on disclosure 
regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinant of corporate disclosure. They 
find that voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetries among informed and 
uninformed investors. Also, stringent disclosure rules help in reducing agency costs and 
information asymmetry.  
Klein et al. (2002) The authors present a review of information asymmetry and the choice of debt vs. 
equity. They argue that information asymmetry is one of the main factors that influences 
a firm’s choice between debt and equity. The authors emphasise the importance of debt 
as a signalling tool in the presence of information asymmetry by reviewing classical 
signalling models and extending them to pecking order models.  
Leftwich (1983) The author provides evidence of accounting measurement rules that are negotiated in 
private lending contracts. For some transactions, the negotiated rules are different from 
the regulated rules, which are based on generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). For transactions that are not specifically mentioned in the privately negotiated 
rules, the regulated rules are acceptable. Hence, audited financial reports can enhance 
the credibility of the firm in negotiating private lending contracts. 
Gertner et al. (1988) The author analyses an informed firm’s choice of financial structure when both capital 
markets and competitors observe the financial contract. Using a two-audience (informed 
and uninformed) signaling model, the authors show that rival firms take the actions of 











Table 2.18: Studies on financial signalling strategy – continued  
Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) The authors present an overview of the literature that links factor product markets and 
capital structure. They relate modern financial theory to industrial organisation, 
stakeholder theory and firms’ strategic management. The authors find that competitors 
can use the information that firms reveal to the market and adjust their behaviour in the 
market place accordingly. Disclosure can have an adverse effect on competitive 
position.





2.4.2 Market Timing  
Market timing includes combatting competition when firms are vulnerable. It 
relates to different ways to attain cheap finance by assessing the economic 
cycle or the historical market values of the cost debt and equity (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). In combatting 
competition, it relates to how firms with conservative capital structures 
reposition their strategy to try and drive out firms that are heavily leveraged, 
especially during economic downturns. This is particularly relevant when other 
companies are trying to enter the industry. Market timing also relates to how 
firms can assess whether the debt or equity market is more favourable and 
which will have an impact on their capital structure.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggest that the capital structure decisions of firms 
are not determined by pecking order theory but instead originate from repeated 
attempts to time the markets. They find that the current capital structure is 
significantly related to historical market values. Hillier et al. (2008) argue that 
firms tend to issue equity when market valuations relative to book valuations are 
high and issue debt when market valuations relative to book valuations are low. 
Therefore, managers simply take advantage of market conditions to derive the 
maximum market value in the short term from their financing decisions (Welch, 
2004; Huang and Ritter, 2009). In this way, external market shocks that affect 
the market value of a firm could influence capital structure decisions. 
 
Moreover, Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) posit that financially strong 
(unleveraged) firms take advantage of economic downturns to position and 
price their products aggressively, thus driving their financially weaker 
(leveraged) competitors out of the market. This illustrates how market timing 
can be a channel through which debt relates to corporate strategies. Supporting 
this notion, Opler and Titman (1994) demonstrate that firms with high leverage 
are more prone to lose market share and have lower operating profits during 
recessions than their conservatively financed peers. Similarly, Chevalier and 





Scharfstein (1995) and Dasgupta and Titman (1998) indicate that highly 
leveraged firms are vulnerable to predation from more conservatively financed 
peers during recessions.  
 
Furthermore, Lambrecht (2001) finds that, in a market with bankruptcy costs 
and no taxes, the entry of firms into the market would depend on the financial 
position of incumbent firms. If incumbent firms were financially vulnerable, 
entrant firms would enter the market earlier. Firms exhibiting wisdom and 
foresight would thus evaluate market conditions carefully and time their capital 
structure decisions appropriately (Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, different contractual arrangements can be used as a response to 
predatory strategies. Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Dewatripont (1988) argue 
that contractual relationships with non-financial stakeholders (such as 
employees, customers and suppliers) can be used to discourage the entry of 
new firms. In addition, Snyder (1996) suggests that contractual relationships 
with creditors can be used as a defence mechanism by entrant firms against the 
predatory practices of incumbent firms. Therefore, contractual relationships can 
be used as a defence mechanism for predation by both incumbent and entrant 
firms.  
 
The two broad issues regarding market timing are summarised herein. First, 
firms with a conservative capital structure tend to reposition their strategy with 
the aim of driving out highly leveraged firms, especially in economic crises. In 
addition, new entrants will have easy access to the industry when incumbents 
have capital structures that are heavily leveraged. Secondly, market timing 
could be related to the economic cycle, historical market values and the 
relationship between market-to-book values. In timing the market, firms are 
more likely to issue equity when market-to-book valuations are high (leading to 
lower leverage) and issue debt when they are low (leading to higher leverage). 
This implies that the capital structure decisions may not be driven by pecking 
order theory but by the ability to time the markets. Accordingly, the thesis 





intends to examine whether leverage exposes Saudi manufacturing firms to 
market volatility and predation in periods of economic downturn. 





Table 2.19: Studies on market timing and capital structure  
Baker and Wurgler (2002) In their sample of COMPUSTAT firms from 1968 to 1999, the authors investigate the market 
timing decisions of firms and their relation to capital structure. The authors argue that the 
pecking order theory is irrelevant in deciding a firm’s capital structure. Firms time their market 
when making capital structure decisions. They issue common stocks when the market values 
are high relative to both their past values and book values. Hence, the authors find that capital 
structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.  
Dasgupta and Titman (1998) The authors develop a model to investigate the relationship between leverage and prices and 
how capital structure affects competition in the product market. Their two-period model assumes 
that demand for a firm’s product depends on its success in the first period. The authors state 
that firms that want to increase their leverage also consider the reactions of their competitors. A 
firm will be less willing to increase leverage if it believes that its competitor will respond by 
cutting prices. If, on the other hand, the competitor reacts by increasing their prices, the firm 
would increase its leverage.  
Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) The authors present an overview of the literature that links factor product markets and capital 
structure. They relate modern financial theory to industrial organisation, stakeholder theory and 
firms’ strategic management. They find that, during economic downturns, unleveraged firms that 
are financially strong aggressively position and price their products to drive out leveraged firms 
that are financially weak.  
Lambrecht (2001)  The authors investigate the relationship between market entry, foreclosure and capital structure 
in a duopoly. The author finds that incumbent firms that are financially vulnerable make it easier 
for new entrant to enter the industry.  
Opler and Titman (1994)  The authors analyse the impact of leverage on firms’ market share and profitability. The authors 
find that firms that are in the top leverage decile in industries that experience a fall in output 
realise a reduction of 26 percent more than those in the bottom leverage decile. Thus, the 
indirect costs of financial distress are significant and positive. Moreover, during economic 
downturns, highly leveraged firms are more likely to generate lower profits and lose market 
share than firms with lower leverage.  
 
 






2.4.3 Investment Strategy  
The leverage decision of a firm has both direct and indirect influences on its 
asset acquisition and investment decisions, which in turn strongly influence its 
strategy (Hillier et al., 2008). Debt could induce under-investment or over-
investment effects, which (both directly and indirectly) influence such strategic 
decisions (Hillier et al., 2008). In anticipation of an increase in investment by 
rival firms, a firm would increase its own leverage. Chevalier (1995) 
demonstrates that rivals react to the leverage decisions of their competitors by 
increasing their own leverage. Similarly, Kovenock and Phillips (1997) find a 
positive and significant relationship between the increase in leverage of a 
recapitalising firm and its rival firms’ investment.  
 
Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that the limited liability of shareholders implies 
that, if a firm declares it is bankrupt, then these shareholders get zero pay-off, 
but if the firm can make a fixed payment to creditors, then these same players 
are entitled to all the remaining profits. A direct consequence of this reasoning 
is that a leveraged firm’s shareholders have an incentive to compete more 
aggressively and increase output soon after raising more debt. This, in turn, 
results a reduction in rivals’ output (Clayton, 1999; Istaitieh and Rodriguez-
Fernandez, 2006). Hence, Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) postulate 
that wise, foresighted firms anticipate these effects and choose debt contracts 
optimally prior to an investment decision, taking these factors into account. 
Therefore, prior to making an investment decision, a firm must consider its 
rivals’ reaction to it and adjust its capital structure accordingly. This illustrates 
the inherent endogeneity characterising the capital structure-competitive 
environment linkage. Therefore, the thesis aims to investigate whether 
managers of Saudi manufacturing firms take their rival’s investment decisions 
into account and appropriately adjust their capital structures. 





Table 2.20: Studies on investment strategy 
Chevalier (1995) The author analyses the impact of prices after a leveraged buyout (LBOs). The author finds that 
prices are more likely to rise following LBOs in markets where the LBO firm’s rivals have higher 
leverage. However, prices tend to fall following LBOs in markets in which rival firms have low 
leverage.  
Clayton (1999) The author develops a model that analyses the relationship between capital structure, 
investments, and product market decisions. The author shows that firms can use debt and 
investments as substitutes, especially when firms rationally increase their leverage. In addition, 
when firms compete on the basis of price in the product market, an increase in the leverage 
levels leads to lower investments and higher prices (less aggressiveness). Also, debt commits 
the firm to an aggressive output decision, which causes the firm’s output to increase and the 
rival’s output to decrease.    
Kovenock and Phillips (1997) The authors assess the capital structure and product market behaviour of firms. Their research 
focuses on whether an increase in leverage, through a leveraged buyout and recapitalisation, 
influences the investment decisions of recapitalising firms relative to their rivals. Using plant-
level data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) from 1979 to 1990 and 8,214 total 
firm years, the authors find that capital structure affect a firm’s behaviour because it conveys 
information about future investments made by the firm. Leverage increases the probability of 
closure by recapitalising firms and also leads to more aggressive behaviour by rival firms. 
Hence, rivals react to the leverage decision of the firm. As a firm increases its leverage, the 
investment of its rival also increases.  
Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) The authors present an overview of the literature that links factor product markets and capital 
structure. They relate modern financial theory to industrial organisation, stakeholder theory and 
firms’ strategic management. They find that shareholders of leveraged firms have a good reason 
to be more aggressive (by increasing output after raising non-negotiable long-term debt).  This 









2.4.4 Competitive Aggressiveness  
Overall, theories pertaining to the effect of debt on competitive aggressiveness 
cluster around two main views (Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). The 
first is that, under certain conditions, debt will cause greater competitive 
aggression in firms in three main ways: output increases, due to Cournot 
competitive interactions; price-cutting moves in Bertrand-style competition; and 
increases in investment, leading to tougher competition (Brander and Lewis, 
1986; Showalter, 1995, 1999). However, under certain other conditions, debt 
will cause less aggressive behaviour among firms for these reasons: output 
decreases, due to Cournot competitive interactions; price-rising moves in 
Bertrand-style competition; and a decrease in investment, leading to softer 
competition (Chevalier, 1995; Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1995, 1996; Glazer, 
1994; Lambrecht, 2001; Phillips, 1995). 
 
Hillier et al. (2008:618) posit that, “a firm’s leverage ratio will also affect the 
strategies of its competitors”, which could lead to more aggression through 
predatory pricing behaviour. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) suggest that, in 
many product-market situations, a highly leveraged firm may be vulnerable to 
predation from its more conservatively financed peers. It is thus asserted that 
the latter might deliberately lower prices to levels that drive the margins of the 
leveraged firm so low that it is forced to declare bankruptcy or quit the market. 
Campello (2003) investigates whether debt leads to losses in certain periods of 
the business cycle, determining that, during demand busts, firms that are highly 
leveraged lose market share in relatively low-debt industries. Therefore, these 
firms are more exposed to predation. However, the author claims that these 
competitive dynamics are unnoticed in highly leveraged industries. This implies 
that, if firms in the Saudi manufacturing industry were highly leveraged, strategy 
would be of no relevance. However, if they were conservatively leveraged, 
competitive considerations would assume importance.  
 
According to Maksimovic (1990), firms that obtain favourable loan commitments 
from lenders have greater incentives for more aggressive competition. A bank 





loan commitment might increase the value of the borrower firm and send a clear 
strategic signal about its ability to respond more aggressively to a rival firm’s 
increase in output (Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). This implies that 
firms that have strong relationships with creditors and are able to obtain loan 
commitments are less vulnerable to predation.  
 
Chevalier (1995) studies the impact of rival leverage on capital structure and 
pricing decisions, as well as predation. The author suggests that, post LBO 
(leveraged buy-out), a firm’s prices are higher than those of less leveraged rival 
firms. The author also finds that prices fall for low leveraged rivals, but they 
increase for highly leveraged rivals. 14  Accordingly, conservatively leveraged 
rival firms react to an increase in leverage of another firm by competing more 
aggressively, Conversely, highly leveraged rival firms respond to an increase in 
leverage of another firm by competing less aggressively. Therefore, if higher 
leverage leads to a situation where a Saudi manufacturing firm is more exposed 
to bankruptcy, it would choose to compete less aggressively.  
 
Accordingly, the relationship between capital structure and competitive 
aggressiveness is two-directional (Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). In 
a one-directional effect, higher leverage increases the vulnerability of firms and 
encourages them to follow a less aggressive competitive behaviour, leading to 
softer competition. In the other effect, when firms determine their leverage, they 
consider the softness of the competition and decide to have high levels of debt. 
Therefore, the thesis intends to address the two-directional relationship 
between capital structure and competitive aggressiveness for Saudi 
manufacturing firms.  
                                                                            
14
 Higher leverage reduces the probability of survival (Zingales, 1998) and makes firms less aggressive 
(Khana and Tice, 2000).  





Table 2.21: Studies on competitive aggressiveness and capital structure  
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) The authors present a theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. 
They argue that optimal financial contracts must take into account the predatory threats of rival 
firms by balancing the benefits of deterring predation and agency costs.  
Campello (2003) The author provides evidence of the effect of capital structure on product market outcomes, 
using a panel of 128,133 firm-quarters distributed across 71 three-digit SIC industries during the 
period 1984-1996. The author finds that leverage has a negative impact on sales growth in 
industries in which rivals are relatively unleveraged during recession but not during boom 
periods. However, for firms that compete in high-debt industries, no such effects are observed.   
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)  The authors analyse the link between capital-market imperfections and countercyclical markups. 
They also analyse how liquidity constraints can impact pricing behavior. Using a sample of 100 
observations from 1985 to 1987, the authors find that, during recession, output prices increase 
relative to wages and raw material input prices. This illustrates that imperfectly competitive firms 
compete less aggressively during recessions. Also, firms that are financially constrained raise 
their prices relative to less financially constrained firms.    
Dotan and Ravid (1985)  The authors study the interaction between optimal leverage of investment and debt financing. 
Their research develops a model in which firms facing an uncertain price must decide on their 
optimal level of debt and investments. They also show that firms make decisions on investments 
strategy and optimal financing simultaneously. The authors show that an increase in price would 
cause investment to increase and optimal debt to decrease.    
Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) The authors present an overview of literature that links factor product markets and capital 
structure. They relate modern financial theory to industrial organisation, stakeholder theory and 
firms’ strategic management. Firms that obtain favourable loan commitments from lenders are 
more likely to respond to the action of their rivals’ aggressive behaviour.   
Khanna and Tice (2000) The authors study how firm and market specific characteristics influence incumbent firms’ 
response to new firms that enter their local market in the retail industry. Using data from 
discount department stores in the US, they find that larger and more profitable incumbents 
respond more aggressively to new entrants. Incumbents that are highly leveraged respond less 
aggressively to new entrants.     





Table 2.21: Studies on competitive aggressiveness and capital structure – continued  
Lambrecht (2001) The author investigates the relationship between market entry, foreclosure and capital structure 
in a duopoly. The author also investigates market entry and finds that incumbents that are 
vulnerable due to their leverage level create a situation in which new entrants can quickly come 
into the industry. 
Maksimovic (1988)  The author analyses the effect of competitive environments on capital structures in the context 
of a model of repeated oligopoly. The author produces a model that explains how capital 
structure determines the type of equilibrium (Cournot or collusive) in the product market. The 
author shows that the debt-to-equity ratio is likely to be high for firms in a concentrated industry, 
and leverage is expected to be low in a moderately concentrated industry.  
Maksimovic (1990) The author shows a model of competitive banks that demonstrates that the characteristics of 
loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the industry of the borrower. The 
model explains the value of loan commitments to the firm. The author shows that loan 
commitment permits the firm to be more aggressive by producing more quantity than is 
necessary in response to a rival’s output decision.  
Poitevin (1989)  The author assesses the financial signaling and the “deep-pocket” arguments between the 
incumbent firm and new entrant. The author looks at a model in which the entrant’s and the 
incumbent’s financial structures are endogenous. The model stipulates that both firms have to 
finance a fixed expenditure before production starts, assuming that, in equilibrium, the 
incumbent is equity financed, but the new entrant must issue debt to signal its quality to 
investors. The author shows that the difference in the capital structure between these two firms 
would provide an incentive for the incumbent to engage in aggressive predatory practices, such 
as price wars, in order to exhaust the finances and cause the entrant to be bankrupt.   
Showalter (1999) The authors analyse the use of strategic debt and price competition, using a sample of 1,641 
manufacturing firms obtained from COMPUSTAT from 1975 to 1994. The author uses a cross-
sectional firm-level linear regression model and finds that the average debt-to-asset ratio is 
approximately 25% percent. The maximum value of debt-to-asset is 236.3%, which implies that 
some firms have more debt than assets in their capital structure. Hence, the author concludes 
that strategic debt use and price competition is widespread in their sample of manufacturing 
firms. Demand uncertainty has a significant effect on leverage, and cost uncertainty has a 
significant negative impact on leverage.   





Table 2.21: Studies on competitive aggressiveness and capital structure – continued   
Stenbacka (1994)  The author uses a model to investigate the effect of debt on reducing tacit collusion in the 
oligopolistic industry (in the context of infinitely repeated Bertrand competition) and how debt 
can be used as a strategic tool by incumbents. The author shows that the optimal financial 
structure of an oligopolistic industry greatly depends on the relationship between the negative 
incentive effect and the tax savings effect of debt financing relative to equity financing. Debt 
reduces the ability to sustain tacit collusion due to the negative incentive effect of debt. To 
overcome this incentive, an oligopolistic industry must reduce prices. This, in turn, will reduce 
profits. The author also shows that debt could be used as a strategic mechanism by an 
incumbent cartel to make it difficult for potential entrants to penetrate the market.     
Zingales (1998) Using a sample of all Interstate Commerce Commissions (ICC) filing in the US from 1976 to 
1985, the author looks at the effect of pre-deregulation levels of leverage and their impacts on 
the survival of firms in the trucking industry.  After controlling for various measures of inefficiency 
in the industry, highly leveraged firms are less likely to survive the de-regulation shock. The 
author finds the mean leverage level to be 40%, with a median of 35%.  High levels of leverage 
have a negative effect on a firm’s survival because of price reduction and a decline in 
investments. In addition, the author finds that, from 1982 to 1984, higher leverage resulted in an 
aggressive reduction in the price.     
 
  





2.5 Summary  
The analysis of the literature began by examining different determinants of 
capital structure. The literature pointed to the significance of taxation in 
influencing capital structure decisions. Studies emphasised the importance of 
tax regimes in impacting firms’ leverage positions (Ozkan, 2001; Gaud et al., 
2005; Faulkender and Petersen; 2006). Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) demonstrate that 
zakat is, in fact, a significant determinant of capital structure in their sample of 
Saudi Arabian firms. In addition, capital structure decisions are influenced by 
the nature of the industry in which a firm operates. This review demonstrated 
that firms in the same industry have similar debt levels (Van de Wijst et al., 
1993, Hall et al., 2000).  
 
However, other scholars argue that industry effects are irrelevant. Instead, firm-
specific characteristics better explain capital structure decisions (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Myers, 2001; Aivazian, 2010). Accordingly, firms in industries 
with significant tangible assets, such as the manufacturing industry, tend to 
carry more debt. Pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Studies on the 
Saudi market have demonstrated that firms with higher profitability have lower 
leverage (Omet and Mashharawe, 2003; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Moreover, 
according to pecking order theory, larger firms exhibit lower information 
asymmetry and risk of bankruptcy and are therefore able to carry more debt. 
Studies on the Saudi market report a positive relationship between size and 
leverage (Omet and Mashharawe, 2003; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Additionally, 
based on the analysis of the literature, the prediction is that risk would have a 
negative impact on leverage (Minton and Schrand, 1999; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009).  
 
Following this, the review then examined the literature that relates corporate 
strategy to capital structure. The analysis indicated that debt could lead to 
conflicts between equity and debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 
1977). The thesis intends to address whether debt would cause manufacturing 
firms to overinvest in risky projects. In contrast, others have argued that debt 





can be used to mitigate agency problems that arise between managers and 
equity holders (Brander and Lewis, 1986; Jensen, 1986). Accordingly, the 
thesis aims to assess whether the use of debt is motivated by Saudi 
manufacturing firms’ need to discipline management. 
 
Further, the review indicates that the different ownership structures of the firm 
could impact corporate attitudes towards leverage. The thesis intends to 
address how different ownership structures relate to manufacturing firms’ 
capital structure decisions. The literature points to family-owned firms seeking 
debt in order to avoid diluting their equity shareholding (King and Santor, 2008). 
Studies on the Saudi market, however, show that the relationship is negative 
(Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). In addition, the prediction is that government ownership 
would have a positive relationship with leverage, as banks and government 
lending institutions arguably favour such firms (Allen et al., 2005). Nonetheless, 
while Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) demonstrate a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and leverage, the prediction is that firms with institutional 
ownership are likely to carry less leverage since they reduce information 
asymmetry and replace the monitoring effect of debt (Michaely and Vincent, 
2012).  
 
One of the aims of the thesis is to address the gap in the current literature on 
the determinants of capital structure by incorporating the impact of relationship 
banking and government lending on manufacturing firms’ leverage positions. 
Through the examination of studies on lending environments, the review 
indicated that firms with strong banking relationships are more likely to carry 
debt (Gonzales and Gonzales, 2008). The credit market could also include 
government lending institutions. Studies on the significance of government 
lending institutions on capital structure indicate that governments extend more 
loans to underdeveloped industries when credit market imperfections penalise 
these industries, due to information asymmetry (Yaron, 2004). Thus, 
government lending could positively impact firms’ capital structures.  
 





However, the government has an influence on capital and corporate structure 
both as a financial and non-financial stakeholder. One of the aims of the thesis 
is to address the gap in the literature on the determinants of capital structure by 
accounting for non-financial stakeholder influences on capital structure. 
Government subsidies extended to firms in the Saudi manufacturing industry 
help reduce their need for external finance and promote their competitive 
advantage (Mitra and Webster, 2008; Peel, 2013). Other financial 
stakeholders—such as suppliers, customers and employees—could also 
influence a firm’s capital structure through their bargaining powers (Titman, 
1984; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). However, labour unions do not exist in Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, it would be of interest to test the applicability of this theory in 
this context.  
 
The literature finally examines studies on capital structure and corporate 
strategy in the product market. The thesis aims to examine the extent to which 
competitive environments relate to the capital structure decisions of Saudi 
manufacturing firms. The review emphasises the importance of disclosure rules 
and the signalling function of capital structure decisions in the presence of 
information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Klein et al., 2002; Istaitieh 
and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). Accordingly, this thesis aims to contribute to 
the literature on the signalling function of debt in two ways. First, it tests 
whether disclosure rules are adequate in transmitting signals about a firm’s 
value and financial position. Second, it tests whether Saudi manufacturing firms 
actually use debt as a signalling tool.  
 
Studies on market timing influences on capital structure show that capital 
structure decisions may not be driven by pecking order theory, but by the firm’s 
ability to time the market (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Other studies indicate that 
firms time the markets in order to take advantage of periods of economic 
downturns, during which highly leveraged firms are vulnerable (Istaitieh and 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). The thesis aims to test whether managers of 
Saudi manufacturing firms take their rival’s financial and investment decisions 





into account and appropriately adjust their capital structure. Further, Istaitieh 
and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) indicate that the relationship between capital 
structure and competitive aggressiveness is two-directional. The analysis of the 
literature demonstrates that manufacturing firms with strong banking 
relationships are more able to obtain loan commitments (Maksimovic, 1990). 
Hence, they are less vulnerable to predation and more likely to respond to 
aggressive competitive behaviour from their rivals. However, higher leverage 
leads to a situation where a Saudi manufacturing firm is more exposed to 
market volatility, and the anticipation of this would lead to softer competition. 
Therefore, the thesis aims to assess whether managers of Saudi manufacturing 
firms recognise the implications of capital structure decisions of rival firms and 
whether it leads to higher or lower aggressiveness in competition.  
Figure 2.1 provides the conceptual theoretical framework to illustrate the 
relationship between corporate strategy and capital structure that was adapted 
from La Rocca et al. (2008). The developed theoretical framework, which 
relates to Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms, is illustrated in Figure 3.1 in 
Chapter 3.  
Figure 2.1 shows a line under the main headers and single or double arrowed 
lines. The framework shows that corporate strategy and capital structure are 
influenced by financial stakeholders (equity and debt holders) and non-financial 
stakeholders (government, suppliers, customers and employees). In addition, 
the determinants of capital structure (tax, nature of assets, size, industry target, 
profitability and risk) are also included in the theoretical framework. 
The single lines show the composition of the key factors. For instance, the two 
single lines under financial stakeholders indicate that the equity holders and 
debt holders are the two financial stakeholders considered in the theoretical 
model. The same applies to non-financial stakeholders and determinants of 
capital structure.   
The double arrows illustrate that the variables are correlated (even though there 
is also the possibility of a one-directional relationship), and one can influence 





the other, and vice versa. The double lines between financial stakeholders and 
capital structure imply that the levels of debt and equity determine the firms’ 
capital structure. However, the capital structure decision of the firm, influenced 
by the firm’s corporate strategy, could affect a firm’s debt and equity 
proportions. For instance, a corporate strategy that calls for a change in product 
aggressiveness could imply that the level of debt has to change, which would 
affect the capital structure of the firm. 
In addition, the double arrows between corporate strategy and non-financial 
stakeholders imply that non-financial stakeholders, if influential, can have a 
direct impact on the firms’ corporate strategy. However, if the firms’ corporate 
strategy, via management, is influenced by financial stakeholders, then this 
















Figure 2.1: Theoretical Conceptual Framework  
 
Adapted from La Rocca et al. (2008) 





Chapter 3: Saudi Context  
3.1 Saudi Arabian Background  
The Saudi Arabian economy is oil-rich, with oil revenues accounting for 58% of 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 (SAMA, 2013). The Kingdom 
possesses around 18% of the world’s proven oil reserves (OPEC, 2013). It is 
also the world’s largest exporter of oil. The Kingdom’s GDP in 2011 was $557 
Billion, the highest of all OPEC members (OPEC, 2013). The rise in oil prices in 
recent years and government stimulus policies for the non-oil sector have 
played a key role in strengthening the Kingdom’s economic position, with GDP 
growing by 7.1% in 2011 (SAMA, 2013).  
 
Table 3.1: Fact Sheet on The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Population (million inhabitants) 
Land area (1,000 sq. km) 
Population density (inhabitants per sq. km) 
GDP per capita ($) 
GDP at market prices (billion $) 
Value of exports (billions $) 
Current account balance (billion $) 
Proven crude oil reserves (billion barrels) 
Proven natural gas reserves (billion cu. m.) 
Crude oil production *(1,000 b/d) 
Marketed production of natural gas (billion cu. m.) 
Refinery capacity (1,000 b/d) 
Output of petroleum products (1,000 b/d) 
Oil consumption (1,000 b/d) 
















Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012 
 
With government policies that aim to stimulate the non-oil sector, the Kingdom’s 
non-oil sector grew by 5.1% in 2011 (SAMA, 2013). Table 2.2 provides a 
summary of the outlook from OPEC in 2012. According to the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) in its 2013 annual report, the contribution of the 
private sector to GDP was 25.6% in 2011, while the contribution stemming from 
the government sector to GDP was evaluated at 16.4%. The manufacturing 
industry rose by 4.4%, contributing as much as 12.6% to GDP (SAMA, 2013). 





This highlights the significance of the manufacturing industry in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Manufacturing firms are defined for the purposes of this thesis as firms listed in 
the Saudi Arabian stock market (Tadawul) that are manufacturing-based or 
have a manufacturing arm (see Appendix 1 for list of manufacturing companies 
used in this thesis). Manufacturing firms are chosen from different sectors 
(petrochemical, food, industrial investment and cement), owing to the fact that 
these companies receive substantial government support through financing 
institutions, such as the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and the Saudi Industrial 
Development Fund (SIDF). The government has sought to provide further 
incentives for this industry in lower growth cities, which are as follows. 
Table 3.2: Summary of SIDF Classification of Economic Cities   





Including the major cities of Riyadh, 
Jeddah, Dammam, Jubail, Makka, Yunbo 
and Ras Al-Khair 
15 years 50% 
Second Category 
Including the cities of some economic 
advantages, namely Qassim, Al-Ihssa, 
Rabigh, Taif, Kharj Industrial City, Sudair 
Industrial City and Madinah, (except 
Yunbou) 
20 years 60% 
Third Category 
Including economically less developed 
cities, such as Hail, Northern boarders, 
Tabouk, Jizan, Najran, Al-Baha and Assir 
20 years 75% 
Source: sidf.gov.sa 
 
The capital provided by the SIDF can account for as much as 75%, with a 
maximum loan term of up to 20 years. Manufacturing projects established in 
lower growth (third category) cities receive up to 25% more SIDF financing than 
those established in major cities (first category). These figures indicate, 
strongly, that the location of manufacturing projects would have a significant 
bearing on, and relevance to, capital structure formations. Firms that take full 
advantage of SIDF loans, by locating their projects in economically less 
developed cities, tend to benefit from greater access to government finance. 
This, they are able to reduce the cost of debt accrued, while achieving higher 





leverage. The above account is central to the thesis hypothesis and offers a 
basis on which to assess and explore (with reference to empirical support) the 
manner and extent to which Saudi manufacturing firms can be shown to be 
heavily debt-financed, with government loans dominating their capital 
structures.  
 
Moreover, the government of Saudi Arabia has set further incentives to the 
manufacturing industry in the form of government investment funds. Particularly 
relevant to the manufacturing industry is the Public Investment Fund (PIF). The 
PIF provides support either through lending or through equity participation. 
Furthermore, the PIF has established new companies, which are fully owned by 
the fund, including the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). Government support 
can therefore take the form of equity ownership of the firm. Beyond this, the 
government provides manufacturing firms with fuel subsidies that help enhance 
and promote their competitive advantage. However, in 2013, the government 
rolled back this program due to an increase in government subsidy bills. 
Importantly, the government has begun to revise its fuel subsidies, particularly 
in the context cement and petrochemical sectors (Peel, 2013). This thesis, 
therefore, aims to investigate, assess and address the manner in which 
government support influences capital structures, as well as the corporate 
strategies of Saudi manufacturing firms, principally (for the purposes of this 
thesis research focus) through the use of loans, equity participation and 
subsidies.  
 
In addition to government finance and support, firms can seek external funds 
from commercial banks. The banking system in Saudi Arabia represents a 
mixture of conventional banking and Shari’a compliant Islamic banking (Al-Ajmi 
et al., 2009). Bank finance dominates the debt market and can be contrasted 
with the secondary market for sukuk (Islamic bonds) which, to date, remains 
minimal and underdeveloped (Al-Sayari, 2003; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). The 
banking sector has, nonetheless, shown considerable growth, reflecting 
broader trends in the Saudi economy during the period of 2008-2011 (SAMA, 





2013). The banking sector also managed to insulate itself from the broader 
shocks of the global financial crisis, including the debt crisis of the Eurozone 
(SAMA, 2013). According to SAMA (2013), the growth in bank deposits (for the 
private and public sectors) is mainly attributed to the increase in net domestic 
government expenditure. There were 23 commercial banks operating in the 
Kingdom as of 2011 (SAMA, 2013). This implies a high level of commercial 
banking concentration. When considering the lending behaviour of banks, the 
SAMA (2013) report shows that short-term, medium and long term lending have 
increased, but the increase is significantly larger for long-term lending. This 
provides evidence to support the claim that banks are more willing to provide 
loans, especially long-term loans to private sectors. The report also shows that 
the manufacturing industry received 13.5% of total bank credit extended to the 
private sector as of 2011, which is the second highest share of credit (the 
commerce industry is the first highest) (SAMA, 2013). The above findings 
indicate that, while industries with tangible assets are more likely to obtain 
significant loans from banks, those with fewer tangible assets (such as the 
services industry) obtain relatively more meager amounts.    
 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) is responsible for regulating and developing 
the Saudi capital market. A total of 150 firms were listed in the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul) by the end of 2011 (SAMA, 2013). Such listed firms are 
obliged to abide by the disclosed rules of the Saudi Organization for Certified 
Public Accountants (SOCPA). Pertinently, Iqbal (2012) contends that, compared 
to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the disclosure rules 
in Saudi Arabia are relatively less stringent and onerous. The objective of 
SOCPA is full convergence with the IFRS and, currently, SOCPA is modelling 
its accounting standards on those of the IFRS. The global financial crisis has 
further strengthened the case for greater convergence of global financial 
reporting standards. However, it should be noted that differences still exist 
between the two in major areas. For instance, under the IFRS, there is a 
presumption that application of IFRS would lead to fair presentation, but that is 
not the case under SOCPA accounting standards. Also, International 





Accounting Standards 1 (IAS 1) require companies to make specific disclosures 
for departures from the IFRS, but this is not required under SOCPA. In addition, 
IAS 1 requires disclosure of critical judgments made by management in 
applying accounting policies, another requirement that is absent under the 
terms of the SOCPA. Therefore, this thesis aims to address the consequences 
of less stringent disclosure rules and their implications on capital structure 
decisions and, additionally, the strategies of manufacturing firms.  
 
Capital structure considerations are also influenced by the Islamic finance 
culture that drives the Saudi economy (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Saudi Arabia is 
characterised as an Arab Islamic state. Therefore, the Holy Qur’an and the 
traditions of the Prophet Mohammed (peace and blessings upon him) define its 
constitution. Islamic Shar’ia law governs Saudi Arabia’s legal system. 
Bankruptcy laws based on the Bankruptcy Preventive Settlement Law (1996) 
remain, to many observers, uncertain and unclear (Markaz Research, 2013). 
Debtors and creditors are expected to settle any disputes with each other. 
When a consensual resolution to a given dispute cannot be achieved among 
the parties, a court will decide on the settlement based on Shari’a laws (Markaz 
Research, 2013). Therefore, the absence of strict bankruptcy laws could have 
significant implications on firms’ attitudes towards risk. Additionally, unclear 
bankruptcy laws make it difficult to assess the costs associated with financial 
distress (Markaz Research, 2013). In addition, the Saudi legal system prohibits 
the formation of labour unions, and collective bargaining is illegal (Mellahi, 
2007).  
 
The Islamic financial system is dedicated to the elimination of payments and 
receipt of interest (or riba, in all its forms) (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). In this 
way, it differs significantly from the main financial tools and instruments on 
which western financial systems are typically founded. As a consequence, the 
concept of “Islamic banking” was born. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) is responsible for monitoring and regulating financial institutions in 
Saudi Arabia. The banking system in Saudi Arabia constitutes a complex 





combination of conventional banking and Shari’a compliant Islamic banking, the 
latter stipulating that interest is prohibited. There are five strict rules that define 
Shari’a compliance or compliance with Islamic Law (Lewis and Algaoud, 2001). 
These are summarised in Table 3.3 below.  
 
Table 3.3: Rules of Shari’a Compliance 
1. Riba is prohibited in all transactions, which implies the prohibition of interest.  
2. Business and investment must comprise solely halal (legal, permitted) activities. Therefore, 
Islamic banks cannot finance activities or items that are haram (forbidden), such as the 
trade of alcohol and pork meat.  
3. Maysir (gambling) is prohibited, and transactions must be free from gharar (speculation or 
unreasonable uncertainty). Moreover, the element of speculation, gharar, involving 
excessively risky activities, is strictly prohibited. Examples of this include short-selling, 
speculative businesses and trading in futures on the stock market.  
4. Zakat is a compulsory levy that constitutes one of the five basic pillars of Islam and 
amounts to 2.5% on assets held for one full year; it is to be paid to benefit society.  
5. All activities should be in line with Islamic principles, and a Shari’a board is to be appointed 
to supervise and advise on the propriety of transactions.      
 
All Islamic banks and banking practices must conform to the aforementioned 
rules. Accordingly, Islamic banks provide financing through equity-participation 
structures and short-term facilities, thus helping to align the interests of 
stakeholders. This, in turn, assists in the reduction of agency costs (Mirakhor 
and Zaidi, 2007). There are a certain number of basic financial contracts that 
are acknowledged to be Shari’a compliant by most Shar’ia boards. These 
structures include profit and loss sharing contracts, such as musharaka 
(partnership) and mudaraba (joint venture); rent contracts, such as ijara 
(leasing); deferred payment or sales structures, such as murabaha (cost-plus 
financing); bai al salam (advanced purchase); and bai bi-thamin ajil (deferred 
payment financing) (Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007). Examples of such contracts are 









Table 3.4: Financial Contracts that are Shari’a Compliant 
1. Musharaka (partnership) contracts are the preferred mode of financing, due to their close 
adherence to the principles of profit and loss sharing. In these contracts, partners contribute 
capital to projects and profits are shared between partners on a pre-agreed-upon ratio, 
whereas losses are shared in the exact proportion to the capital invested by each party.  
2. Mudaraba (finance by way of trust) is a partnership agreement in which one partner (rab al-
mal) finances the project, while the other (mudarib) manages it. Profits are distributed 
according to a fixed, predetermined ratio.  
3. Murabaha (cost-plus financing) contracts are observed to be very close to conventional 
banking operations. In such contracts, the bank agrees to buy goods or assets from a third 
party and then resells them to its client with a mark-up.  
4. Ijara (leasing) is like a conventional lease. It is the sale of manfa’a (the right to use goods) 
for a specific period. In this contract, the bank buys and leases out an asset for a rental fee, 
and the ownership risk and responsibility of maintenance and insurance rests with the bank 
for a predetermined period.  
5. Bai Al Salam (advance purchase) is the purchase of goods for forward payment.  
6. Bai bi-thamin ajil (deferred payment financing) is a contract that involves a credit sale of 
goods on a deferred payment basis. The bank purchases a contract to buy goods on a 
deferred payment basis and sells the goods back to the customer at an agreed-upon price.  
7. Istisnaa (commission manufacture) is a contract that is similar to bai bi-thamin ajil. However, 
in this contract, one party agrees to buy the goods, and the other undertakes to 
manufacture them according to agreed-upon specifications. According to Mirakhor and Zaidi 
(2007), this type of contract is frequently used to finance construction and manufacturing 
projects.  
8. Sukuk (participation securities) are the Islamic banking alternative to a bond. While the 
interest rate is at the core of the bond issuance and trading in conventional banking 
systems, sukuk are structured in such a way that the issue is based on the exchange of an 
asset for a specified financial consideration.     
 
The aforementioned contracts provide an example of different ways in which 
Islamic banks can operate in a Shari’a compliant manner, even in the absence 
of interest. Mirakhor and Zaidi (2007) posit that the profit-sharing concept of 
these contracts promotes greater stability in financial markets. In addition to 
providing finance, the structure of these contracts helps to reduce and mitigate 
agency problems. Specifically, agency theory argues that debt might be useful 
to the extent that it mediates and tempers agency conflicts. Relevant reasons 
for this tempering function may be attributed to a variety of factors, including: 
the role debt palys in binding the firm (by compelling it to make periodic 
payments, both of interest and principal); constraints on managers from 
consuming perks; and the need for organisations to become more efficient, 





thus, reducing the probability of bankruptcy (Jensen, 1986). Along these lines, 
Mirakhor and Zaidi (2007) argue that an extension of this concept could be 
drawn from Islamic finance contracts, specifically through invocation of relevant 
principles, such as ijara sukuk, based on leased assets. The ijara sukuk are 
securities of equal domination of each issue, representing physical durable 
assets tied to an ijara, or lease contracts. Similarly, the authors claim that 
mudaraba or murabaha sukuk can be structured to reduce the ‘gambling for 
resurrection’ attitude that some managers have, especially when close to 
bankruptcy, by aligning the interests of both parties. Accordingly, Shari’a 
compliance provides a strategic advantage in reducing agency costs.  
 
Moreover, one of the key elements in Islamic finance is the payment of ‘charity 
tax’ or zakat.15 In the Kingdom, there are no income taxes levied on local firms. 
Instead, these firms pay a 2.5% ‘charity tax’ or zakat on unused wealth over an 
Islamic calendar year (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). The Department of Zakat and 
Income Tax (DZIT) is responsible for managing and enforcing the payment of 
zakat and income tax. The tax due must be paid within three months of the 
taxpayer’s year-end. Penalties are imposed for non-registration, failure to file a 
tax return, delays in payment, and evasion (KPMG, 2012). Saudis pay the zakat 
on their share of the zakat base, while non-Saudi shareholders pay income tax 
on their share of taxable income (Al Sakran, 2001). If the zakat base is negative 
or lower than the adjusted net income for the year, zakat is imposed on the 
adjusted net income. However, if both are negative, no zakat is due (Al Sakran, 
2001; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009).  
 
In the presence of a minimal tax advantage of debt, corporate finance theories 
suggest that there would be no appreciable difference in terms of choosing 
between debt and equity (Barakat and Rao, 2004). The manner in which zakat 
                                                                            
15
 According to Al Sakran (2001), the Zakat Base = (share capital + retained earnings or accumulated 
deficit + Saudi Industrial Development Fund and Public Investment Fund loans + long term loans + notes 
payables and advances if used to finance fixed assets + adjusted net income for Saudi income tax and 
zakat) - (net fixed assets + properties under construction + dividends distributed during the year not 
exceeding retained earnings at the beginning of the year + investments in other Saudi companies + Saudi 
government bonds + adjusted deficits). 





is calculated implies that long-term loans are included in the zakat base and, 
therefore, do not provide a tax advantage. The unique tax structure in Saudi 
Arabia provides grounds for testing the applicability of corporate finance 
theories in the context of the Saudi manufacturing industry.  
3.2 Summary 
The characteristics of the Saudi economy and its manufacturing industry 
provide a unique context for testing corporate finance theories on capital 
structure, as well as theories that relate capital structure to corporate strategies. 
The distinct features that have come to characterise the Saudi manufacturing 
industry offer the ‘contextual’ grounds for testing the above discussed 
theoretical framework. Table 3.5 provides an overview of these characteristics. 
It is important to note, however, that while Table 3.5 refers and relates, 
primarily, to the manufacturing industry in Saudi Arabia, such finding may also 
be applicable to other Saudi industries, particularly those that receive similar 
forms of government support.  
 
Table 3.5: Main characteristics of the Saudi Manufacturing industry 
Government support in the form of equity, subsidies or SIDF loans (up to 75% of capital). 
Low interest rates.   
High banking concentration. 
Significant tangible assets. 
Significant information asymmetry due to less stringent disclosure rules.  
Unclear bankruptcy laws. 
Dual mix of conventional and Islamic banking.  
Low taxes levied on local firms (2.5% zakat). 
 
The required payment of zakat implies that leverage would increase a firm’s tax 
liability. Accordingly, if zakat were found to be a significant determinant of 
capital structure, profitable firms would also opt to carry less leverage, precisely 
in order to reduce their tax liability (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Moreover, the SAMA 
(2013) report demonstrates that the manufacturing industry received 13.5% of 
total bank credit extended to the private sector as of 2011. Therefore, industry 
effects are accounted for as possible determinants of capital structure.  
 





Shari’a compliant contracts that characterise Islamic banking can provide 
further support in reducing agency problems, emphasising the role of debt as a 
disciplining device in this context (Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007). Accordingly, the 
thesis intends to assess whether, and the extent to which, the use of debt is 
motivated by Saudi manufacturing firms’ need to discipline management. In 
addition, according to SAMA (2013), the Saudi banking sector is highly 
concentrated, with just 23 commercial banks operating in the Kingdom as of 
2011. Gonzales and Gonzales (2008) demonstrate a positive relationship 
between banking concentration and leverage. Hence, it can be argued that 
relationship banking assumes greater importance in this context. The thesis, 
therefore, also aims to assess the influence of relationship banking on capital 
structure. The analysis also accounts for the possibility of obtaining debt from 
international sources. 
 
In addition, studies on the significance of government lending institutions on 
capital structure indicate that governments extend more loans to 
underdeveloped industries when credit market imperfections penalise these 
industries (i.e. in the event of information asymmetry) (Yaron, 2004). Thus, the 
Saudi government lending through SIDF is predicted to be particularly 
significant in the Saudi manufacturing industry. However, government support 
can occur in the form of equity participation, reducing the need for external 
finance. The government can also be a non-financial stakeholder of a firm. If 
government subsidies provide an advantage that reduces a firm’s need for 
finance, this would also impact its capital structure decisions. The thesis also 
endeavours to assess, and account for, the bargaining power of customers, 
employees and suppliers. However, the absence of labour unions may well 
suggest that employee influence is less prevalent in this context.  
 
Furthermore, given the existence of significant information asymmetry in the 
manufacturing industry, a consequence of less stringent disclosure rules than 
those enforced under the IFRS, one might more plausibly argue that pecking 
order theories offer a better rationale and explanation of the capital structure 





decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms. The thesis also aims to assess whether 
SOCPA disclosure rules are adequate in transmitting information about a firm’s 
value and financial positions. Additionally, it aims to test whether Saudi 
manufacturing firms do, in fact, rely upon and use debt as a signalling tool. It is 
also important to note that capital structure decisions may not be adequately 
captured or explained by pecking order. Rather, decision making might be more 
appropriately comprehended and evaluated with reference to the ability of 
managers to time the market, thus enabling them to take advantage of 
favourable costs of debt or equity (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The thesis will, 
accordingly, seek to examine whether Saudi manufacturing firms take strategic 
advantage of economic downturns when deciding whether to avail themselves 
of debt and equity or when considering whether to engage in predatory 
behaviour. The relationship between debt and competitive aggressiveness is 
also accounted for. Hence, the thesis aims to test the Saudi-specific theoretical 
framework shown below.  
 
The specific theoretical framework is shown in Figure 3.1 below. The framework 
is divided into three categories—determinants of capital structure, capital 
structure and stakeholders, and capital structure and competitive environment. 
The determinants of capital structure focuses on the relationship between 
(zakat, industry target, nature of assets, profitability, size and risk) and capital 
structure.  
 
In general, Saudi manufacturing firms are more likely to be debt oriented, with 
the cost of serving debt insignificant to the capital structure decisions of firms. 
Zakat is a significant consideration in the firms’ capital structure decision, and 
these firms have an industry-specific capital structure. The nature of firms’ 
assets has a positive impact on leverage, and profitable firms have less debt. 
The larger the firm, the higher the leverage. In addition, there is a negative 
relationship between the firm’s business risk and its level of debt.   
 
 





Capital structure and stakeholders investigate the relationship between financial 
(equity and debt holders) and non-financial (government, suppliers, customers, 
and employees) stakeholders16 and capital structure.  
 
In general, highly leveraged Saudi manufacturing firms are more likely to 
overinvest in risky projects in the absence of strict bankruptcy laws, and these 
firms are likely to be shari’a compliant. Debt is used as a tool to discipline 
management. In conclusion, debt can have an impact on the actions of 
management (debt as a discipline tool), or management can have an impact on 
debt (shar’a compliance and weak bankruptcy laws). This accounts for the 
double arrow between capital structure and management.  
 
Financial stakeholders can have an influence on a firm’s capital structure. 
Different types of shareholders can influence the capital structure of a firm. 
Family-owned firms and those with significant government ownership are likely 
to have high levels of debt. However, firms with large institutional ownership are 
less likely to have high levels of debt. As a general characteristic, Saudi 
manufacturing firms are more likely to have high levels of debt when it is easily 
accessible and available. The firms are also more likely to have access to 
international funding. When there is strong banking relationship between the 
banks and the firms, the level of debt will increase. Firms with access to 
government loans will have high levels of debt. 
 
Non-financial stakeholders are also expected to have an impact on a firm’s 
capital structure. Government support, in the form of subsidies, has an impact 
on leverage. Suppliers and customers are also likely to have an impact on the 
capital structure of firms. The quality of a firm’s product is compromised during 
periods of economic downturn, and employees are less likely to have an impact 
on the capital structure decisions of firms. Capital structure and competitive 
                                                                            
16 A firm’s management can have a financial stake (as shareholders) and can also be classified as non-financial 
(employees) stakeholders. Management can influence the firm’s direction via its capital structure decision and the 
corporate strategy that the firm adopts. Hence, it is appropriate to have management in-between capital structure and 
corporate strategy in both the general theoretical framework and the specific theoretical framework.  





environment assess the impact of the product strategy the firms adopt (market 
timing, investment strategy, aggressiveness and signaling strategy) on the 
firms’ capital structure.   
 
There is a gap in the existing literature between corporate strategy and capital 
structure in which existing the framework does not consider the financial 
determinant of capital structure (La Rocca et al., 2008). Rather, it only focuses 
on explaining the capital structure decision from a strategic perspective. This 
framework contributes to academic literature by considering both financial and 
strategic components that define the capital structure decisions of firms. 
Moreover, the Saudi-specific framework is – to my knowledge – the first to take 
into account the unique characteristics that define the Saudi economy and its 
manufacturing industry. 
 
The proposed developed theoretical framework can be generalised to other 
Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries, (such as UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, and Qatar) and can be applicable to them as these countries share the 
same professional, managerial and organisational structure and other 
characteristics as Saudi Arabia. Like Saudi Arabia, GCC countries are non-tax 
paying economies which make these countries as a whole, an interesting case 
in assessing the determinants of capital structure of firms that operating in 
these countries (Sbeiti, 2010). Modigliani and Miller (1963) conclude that in the 
presence of tax there is an optimal capital structure. Hence, the GCC countries 
provide the ideal environment within which to test the impact of market 
imperfections such as taxation on the determinant of capital structure.  
 
Moreover, GCC countries have distinct characteristics compared to other 
emerging market economies. For instance, the level of development of the 
capital market in Saudi and the remaining GCC economies is low, with low 
bankruptcy costs as equity capital is mainly controlled by influential and wealthy 
private individual/sector (Sbeiti, 2010). Sbeiti, (2010) also finds that firms in the 
GCC generally have lower leverage compared to those in developed 





economies. In addition, the macroeconomic structure is largely similar in the 
GCC economies (Aleisa and Shotar, 2002). These countries also have similar 
Islamic and Arab culture and the practice of Islamic banking is a common trend 
in the GCC. As a result of these similarities, it is relevant to extend it to other 
industries within the Saudi context as well as other GCC countries as 
mentioned above.   
 





3.3 Theoretical Framework 
Figure 3.1: Developed Theoretical Framework for Saudi Arabia  
 







In order to understand the relationship between corporate strategy and capital 
structure, the thesis aims to address both the quantitative hypotheses and the 
qualitative propositions in Table 3.6. In the mixed methods research question, 
the qualitative data is used to help explain or support the initial quantitative 
phase (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Houtz (1995) starts with the 
quantitative hypotheses and uses the qualitative interviews to explore the 
quantitative results in more depth. Hence, the qualitative research tries to 
develop theories based on what is observed in a specific situation.  
 
Qualitative propositions do not require the need of a hypothesis prior to the start 
of the investigation process. Nevertheless, they allow the researcher to study 
subjective experience directly. This results in the use of hypothesis-generating 
research using grounded theory methodology. The grounded theory allows the 
researcher to begin research without the need to test a hypothesis. Hypotheses 
are developed based on what the participants discuss in the interview. The 
methodology questions participants about their subjective experience and 
generates a hypothesis from the answers provided. In this thesis, hypotheses 
about corporate strategy and capital structure were developed based on the 
answers provided by participants in the semi-structured interview.  






Table 3.6: List of Qualitative Propositions and Quantitative Hypotheses  
Part A: The Determinants of Capital Structure  
 Justification 
Proposition 1. Saudi 
Arabian manufacturing firms 
are more likely to be debt-
oriented. 
  
Booth et al. (2001) demonstrate that the total debt ratio for their sample of firms from developing countries is 
significantly lower than that of developed countries. Omet and Mashharawe (2003) report even lower debt ratios in their 
sample of Saudi Arabian firms, with an average of 9% leverage. Beck et al. (2002) attribute the empirical observation of 
low leverage ratios in developing countries to the difficulties companies in such economies face when accessing 
external funds. In the context of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms, government loans in the form of SIDF dominate the 
capital structure decision. These loans can constitute up to 75% of the capital structure of manufacturing firms. 
Therefore, the prediction is that firms in the manufacturing industry would have a more debt-oriented capital structure 
than is empirically observed at a market level. 
 
Proposition 2. The cost of 
servicing debt is insignificant 
to the capital structure 
decision  
 
Market timing theory suggests that managers actively time the markets when deciding on their capital structure, 
examining both debt and equity markets and basing their decision on whichever market seems more favourable (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). If the cost of debt were low, firms would choose to carry more debt. Low interest commercial loans, 
as well as government loans (in the form of SIDF that characterise the Saudi capital market), imply that the cost of debt 
is less important in this context than in other jurisdictions. 
 
Proposition 3. Zakat is a 
significant consideration for 




The trade-off theory of capital structure highlights the importance of taxation in determining the capital structure of the 
firm (Frank and Goyal, 2007). The theory states that the firm’s optimum leverage ratio is a trade-off between the tax 
advantage of debt and the costs of financial distress. Studies attest to the complexity of these “tax-regime” based 
influences on capital structure decisions (Ozkan, 2001; Gaud et al., 2005). The tax structure of the Saudi Arabian 
market suggests that local companies are obliged to pay 2.5% tax on idle wealth in the form of zakat. Regardless of the 
fact that taxation within the context of Saudi Arabia is minimal, trade-off theory suggests that it is, nonetheless, one of 
the main factors that has traditionally influenced capital structure decision(s).  
 
Proposition 4. There exists 
an industry-specific target 
optimal structure.  
 
 
Trade-off theory suggests that a firm gradually moves towards a target leverage ratio (Myers, 1984). Empirical studies 
attest to the importance of industry effects in shaping the capital structure of a firm (Lev, 1969; Van der Wijst et al., 
1993). Graham and Harvey (2001) provide empirical evidence to suggest that managers have target leverage ratios in 
mind when making the capital structure decision.  
 
Proposition 5. The nature of Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) argue that capital structure is not confined to an industry average, as firm-specific needs 





the assets in the Saudi 
manufacturing industry has a 
positive impact on leverage. 
are more significant. Studies indicate that there is a positive relationship between high levels of tangible fixed assets 
and leverage (Rajan and Zingales; 1995; Myers, 2001). The high level of tangible fixed assets that characterise the 
Saudi manufacturing industry could therefore have a positive impact on leverage.  
Hypothesis 1. Firms that are 
profitable are likely to carry 
less debt. Hence, ROA has a 
negative impact on leverage. 
 
Pecking order theory argues that profitable firms depend more on internal financing to reduce information asymmetries 
and avoid costly external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory predicts a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) demonstrate that profitability has a negative impact on leverage in their 
sample of Saudi Arabian firms. Hence, the prediction is that profitable firms are likely to carry less debt.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Larger firms 
are likely to carry more debt. 
Hence, the natural logarithm 
of total assets has a positive 
impact on leverage. 
Pecking order theory suggests that large firms exhibit lower information asymmetry and, therefore, equity is more 
favourable than debt (Kashifi-Pour et al., 2010). However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that large firms increase 
their leverage, since their expected bankruptcy cost is smaller. Omet and Massharawe (2003) and Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) 
demonstrate that the relationship between size and leverage is positive in the Saudi market. Therefore, the proposition 
is that firms that are large in size are likely to carry more debt.  
Hypothesis 3. Firms with 
high business risk are more 
likely to carry less debt. 
Hence, beta has a negative 
impact on leverage. 
According to pecking order theory, the future earnings of firms with higher business risk are difficult to predict. 
Therefore, the cost of debt increases for such firms (Minton and Schrand, 1999). Thus, firms with high business risk are 
more likely to carry less debt.  





Part B: Capital Structure 
and Stakeholders  
 
Proposition 6. In the 
absence of strict bankruptcy 
laws, highly leveraged firms 
would overinvest in risky 
projects. 
 
Bankruptcy laws would result in managers overinvesting in risky projects, transferring the costs of unsuccessful projects 
to debt holders while benefiting from the gains of successful projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Brander and Lewis, 
1986). Therefore, in the absence of strict bankruptcy laws, higher leverage would lead to overinvestment in risky 
projects.  
 
Proposition 7. Saudi 
Arabian manufacturing firms 
are more likely to be Shari’a 
compliant. 
Saudi Arabia is characterised as an Islamic nation, with the rule of Shari’a law at the centre of its constitution. Shari’a 
compliance implies that there is a strict cap (33%) on the level of debt that firms can obtain from conventional loans. 
When the 33% conventional debt ceiling is violated, firms risk being excluded from Shari’a compliance (Al-Ajmi et al., 
2009). Mirakhor and Zaidi (2007) argue that the profit sharing concept of Shari’a-compliant contracts promote greater 
stability in financial markets, while helping to mitigate agency problems by aligning the interest of the financial 
stakeholders of the firm. Hence, the proposition is that Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms are more likely to be Shari’a 
compliant.  
Proposition 8. Debt is used 




Agency theorists argue that conflicts may arise between managers and equity holders when managers use the firm’s 
free-cash flows for opportunistic purposes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers may therefore over-invest in 
negative NPV or risky projects for self-serving purposes, such as perks, power and empire building (Jensen, 1986). 
Debt can serve as a disciplining device that discourages managers from over-investing the firm’s free-cash flows, since 
managers have to meet their debt obligations and are monitored by financial institutions (Jensen, 1986; Hart and Moore, 
1995). 
 
Proposition 9. The 
shareholders of the firm 
significantly influence the 
capital structure decision. 
The ownership structure of a firm can have significant implications on its capital structure decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998; Booth et al., 2001). In the context of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms, shareholders can influence capital 
structure decisions through their appetite for debt and their preference for Shari’a compliance. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Family-owned 
firms are likely to carry more 
debt. Hence, family 
ownership has a positive 
impact on leverage. 
Family-owned firms would carry more debt in order to avoid the dilution of their equity stake and control of the firm (King 
and Santor, 2008). The proposition follows the general empirical findings and theoretical prediction of a positive 
relationship.  
 





Hypothesis 5. Firms with 
significant institutional 
ownership are likely to carry 
more equity. Hence, 
institutional ownership has a 
negative impact on leverage. 
Institutional ownership could lead to lower information asymmetry and replace the disciplining role of debt. Chen et al. 
(2007) demonstrate that institutional investors actively monitor the firm’s activities. In this way, institutional ownership 
can act as a substitute for debt in reducing agency problems. Michaely and Vincent (2012) assert that institutional 
owners devote considerable resources to collecting information, which, in turn, reduces informational asymmetries and 
the cost of equity. The proposition follows the theoretical prediction of a negative relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 6. Government-
owned firms are likely to 
carry more debt. Hence, 
government ownership has a 
positive impact on leverage.  
In Saudi Arabia, government financial institutions, such as the SIDF, provide loans to manufacturing firms, regardless of 
their ownership structure. However, Allen et al. (2005) argue that governments tend to prioritise government loans to 
SOEs. Therefore, the predication is that the relationship between government ownership and leverage would be 
positive.  
Proposition 10. Saudi 
manufacturing firms are more 
likely to carry more debt 
when debt is easily 
accessible or available.  
Capital market imperfection can influence capital structure decisions. Studies argue that firms would rely on internally 
generated funds rather than debt—if external credit were costly or difficult to access (Beck et al., 2002; Cassar and 
Holmes, 2003). Therefore, if debt is easily accessible in this market, Saudi manufacturing firms would carry more debt.  
 
Proposition 11. Saudi 
manufacturing firms are more 
likely to have access to 
international funding. 
The multinational nature of some Saudi manufacturing firms implies that credit is not restricted to the local market. The 
prediction is that they would have access to international funding but would prefer local finance.  
 
Hypothesis 7.  
Saudi manufacturing firms 
with strong banking relations 
are more likely to carry more 
debt. Hence, relationship 
banking has a positive impact 
on leverage. 
Banking relationships can significantly affect the capital structure decisions of a firm in markets with concentrated 
banking (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; and Gonzalez and Gonzalez, 2008). The Saudi 
Arabian banking sector is highly concentrated with only 23 banks operating in the kingdom as of 2011 (SAMA, 2013).  
Therefore, it can be argued that relationship banking resumes importance in this context. 
 
Proposition 12. Saudi 
manufacturing firms that 
have access to government 
loans are more likely to carry 
more debt. 
Galdino and Micco (2004) contend that government intervention, through the provision of loans and other forms of 
assistance, helps to promote growth and increases leverage. This is especially true for industries that have significant 
tangible assets that can be used as collateral. This feature characterises the manufacturing industry. In the context of 
Saudi Arabia, the SIDF provides manufacturing firms with low interest loans of up to 75% of capital paid over 20 years. 
Therefore, the availability of government loans is predicted to have a positive impact on leverage.  





Proposition 13. Government 
subsidies significantly 
influence capital structure 
decisions of Saudi 
manufacturing firms. 
Schwartz and Clements (1999) contend that governments extend subsidies to domestic industries to enable them to 
overcome initial competitive disadvantages and promote successful long-run competition. In Saudi Arabia, land and fuel 
subsidies play a major role in the manufacturing sector, particularly in the petrochemical and cement sectors (Mahdi, 
2011a; Mahdi, 2011b; Peel, 2013). Accordingly, government subsidies are proposed to have a significant influence on 
the capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms. 
Proposition 14. Suppliers 
are more likely to influence 
the capital structure of Saudi 
manufacturing firms. 
 
Several studies suggest that firms can use debt to reduce the bargaining power of suppliers (Bronars and Deere, 1991; 
Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993; Perotti and Spier, 1993; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). By issuing debt, the firm commits to 
paying out a proportion of its surpluses to lenders. It is, thereby, able to limit the amount of surpluses that suppliers can 
extract through their bargaining power (Bronars and Deere, 1991; Dasgupta and Sengupta, 1993). Therefore, supplier 
bargaining power could potentially impact the capital structure of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
 
Proposition 15. The quality 
of products of Saudi 
manufacturing firms is 
compromised in periods of 
economic downturn.  
 
 
Hillier et al. (2008) argue that, in periods of financial distress, customers may receive inferior products. Therefore, the 
prediction is that Saudi manufacturing firms would compromise the quality of their products during periods of economic 
downturn.  
 
Proposition 16. Customers 
are more likely to influence 
the capital structure of Saudi 
manufacturing firms. 
 
Customers of highly leveraged firms bargain for price concessions due to the higher likelihood of bankruptcy associated 
with leverage. Titman (1984) argues that customers are unwilling to deal with firms that have a high probability of 
bankruptcy. In turn, a firm would reduce its leverage in order to avoid price concessions resulting from the bargaining 
power of its customers. The prediction is that customers of a highly leveraged Saudi manufacturing firm would impact 
the firm’s leverage through their bargaining power.  
Proposition 17. Employees 
are less likely to have an 
influence on the capital 
structure decisions of Saudi 
manufacturing firms.  
 
 
Highly leveraged firms are more likely to lay off employees in the event of financial distress (Hillier et al., 2008). In turn, 
employees of highly leveraged firms bargain for better contracts in order to compensate for the implicit costs of financial 
distress (Sarig, 1998). Perotti and Spier (1993) argue that the firm can respond to the bargaining power of trade and 
labour unions by increasing its leverage, thereby reducing its surpluses and protecting the firm from the threat of unions. 
Labour unions, however, do not exist in the context of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the prediction is that employees would 
have little influence on the capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
 
  









Proposition 18. Leverage 
exposes Saudi 
manufacturing firms to 
market volatility and 
predation in periods of 
economic downturn. 
 
Deesomak et al., (2004) and Kashefi-Pour et al., (2010) claim that there is an inverse relationship between risk and 
leverage during economic downturns. Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) posit that financially strong 
(unleveraged) firms can time the market and take advantage of economic downturns to position and price their products 
aggressively to drive their weaker (leveraged) competitors out of the market. Hillier et al. (2008) state that firms tend to 
issue equity when market valuations relative to book valuations are high. They also tend to issue debt when market-to-
book valuations are low. Therefore, highly leveraged manufacturing firms are more exposed to market volatility and 
predation during periods of economic downturn.  
Proposition 19. Competitors 
influence the capital structure 
and investment strategies of 
Saudi manufacturing firms.  
 
Kovenock and Phillips (1997) assert that firms adjust their capital structure in response to the leverage decisions of rival 
firms. Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) argue that farsighted firms would take this into account and adjust their 
capital structure accordingly. Therefore, the prediction is that Saudi manufacturing firms would take into account rival 
firms’ capital structure decisions and adjust their capital structure and investments accordingly.  
 
Proposition 20. Debt 
induces greater competitive 
aggressiveness.  
Debt will cause greater competitive aggression in firms in three main ways: output increases due to Cournot competitive 
interactions; price-cutting moves in Bertrand-style competition; and increases in investment, leading to tougher 
competition (Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988; Showalter, 1995, 1999). Therefore, the prediction is that 
managers would recognise that debt.  
Proposition 21. Disclosure 
rules would affect the capital 
structure and competitive 
advantage of Saudi 
manufacturing firms. 
Stringent disclosure rules have significant implications in mitigating agency costs and reducing information asymmetry 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). In the context of Saudi Arabia, listed firms abide by the disclosure rules of the Saudi 
Organization for Certified Public (SOCPA). These are less stringent than the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) (Iqbal, 2012). Accordingly, more stringent disclosure rules would affect the capital structure and competitive 
advantage of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
Proposition 22. Saudi 
manufacturing firms use debt 
as a signalling tool. 
Klien et al. (2002) argue that debt can be used as an effective signalling tool for firms to convey their financial position to 
both creditors and competitors when information asymmetry is high. Therefore, the proposition is that debt would be 
used as a signalling tool in this context.  





Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter justifies the philosophical rationale for adopting a mixed 
methodology approach and describes the data sample, as well as the different 
data limitations and methodology issues. The chapter is sub-divided into five 
sections. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 outline the philosophical discussion of this 
research and the research design, respectively. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss 
the qualitative approach and quantitative technique, respectively. This will 
enable the reader to become acquainted with the data collection and analysis 
process. Finally, Section 4.5 considers the various ethical issues encountered 
during the data collection process.  
4.1 Philosophical Discussion 
The thesis combines both positivist and phenomenologist methodologies in 
order to adopt a pragmatic approach and provide evidence that addresses the 
concerns of practitioners (Shaw et al., 2010). The advantage of the pragmatic 
approach is that it is able to incorporate both the phenomenologist and positivist 
perspectives (Creswell 2003). It is therefore more flexible and responsive to the 
demands of a specific research question/problem. It is therefore more practical 
than either the phenomenologist or the positivist approaches.  
 
The positivist approach suggests that social reality is independent from human 
perception, and the phenomenologist approach takes the idea that social reality 
is a construct that is formed within people’s minds and is therefore subjective. 
Positivist research only records those facts that can be collected and analysed 
independently (May, 1997), whilst phenomenologist research focuses on the 
subjectivity of the individuals/groups participating in the study (Creswell, 2003). 
Both use different data sets; the positivist approach uses quantitative data 
analysis, whilst the phenomenological approach focuses on qualitative factors, 
such as the beliefs, perceptions and opinions of a study's participants, which 
may be subjective.  





There are advantages to both of these approaches. The positivist approach is 
useful for testing hypotheses and identifying causal relationships between 
variables, which can be used as predictive tools (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Phenomenologist research, by contrast, focuses on analysing individual human 
subjectivities and can be more responsive to the idiosyncrasies of the subjects 
involved in the research.  
Accordingly, this thesis adopts a pragmatic approach. It uses a combination of 
both qualitative (semi-structured interviews) and quantitative research methods. 
The qualitative research provides supports for the quantitative findings. Hence, 
the methods complement each other and provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the specific questions of the research.  
4.2 Research Design 
The design of the research that is followed in this study is illustrated in the figure 
below:  
Figure 4.1: Research Design 
 
The research design relates to the plan for conducting the study, and different 
books on qualitative research provide different designs that researchers can 
use. Hence, a thorough understanding of the broader issues would facilitate the 
research design (Morse and Richards, 2002)  





With regards to this thesis, the propositions and hypotheses are derived from 
the literature and contextual reviews in Chapters 2 and 3. This is in line with 
recommendations by Creswell (2003), whereby a mixed method approach deals 
with propositions and hypotheses using qualitative and quantitative data 
collection, testing and analysis. The research-hypothesised model is 
constructed by comparing and evaluating past studies in the general literature, 
along with those obtained from studies specifically related to Saudi Arabia 
(when relevant). The research follows the quantitative model outlined by Al-Ajmi 
et al. (2009), which uses panel data to combine cross-sectional data with time 
series information. Their approach utilises general models for panel data that 
enable the researcher to produce empirical estimates of the relationship 
between leverage (dependent) and firm-specific (independent) variables with 
versatility (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). A model that includes these effects can be 
estimated in one of two ways. The random effects model estimates the 
coefficient matrix under the assumption that the individual and/or group effects 
are uncorrelated with the other independent variables (Hausman, 1978). In 
contrast, the fixed effects model relaxes these restrictions. Since there is no 
justification for the effects to be treated as uncorrelated with the other 
regressors, the random effects model may suffer from inconsistency due to 
omitted variables (Hausman, 1978). In order to have an indication of the 
correlation between the effects and the independent variables, Hausman (1978) 
outlines a test concerning the relation between the effects and the regressors. 
The quantitative model is formulated as follows:  
 it  i  ̃ it  it (fixed effect model) 
 it  i  ̃ it ( it  i)(random effect model) 
Moreover, as per Al-Ajmi et al. (2009), the hypotheses were tested by pooling 
the data using the following model:  
 iy  i  ̃ it  it (pool model) 





where,     is the leverage measure of firm i in year t,  ̃ is a row vector of slope 
coefficients of the regressors, and     is a column vector of firm-specific 
variables for firm i in year t, which represents the explanatory variables.  
4.3 Qualitative Approach 
Shaw et al., (2010) argue that mixed methods research provides evidence that 
embraces real world concerns better than either quantitative or qualitative 
research approaches in isolation. Hence, in order to gain a greater conceptual 
framework and enhance the validation of this research, a mixed methodology is 
adopted. Moreover, the research creates measures and constructs that are 
related to the Saudi Arabian context, identifying the variables that relate to the 
research question and providing greater insight into the research objective, 
while permitting topics of significance to emerge (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). The 
research analyses the intricacies of capital structure formation in Saudi 
manufacturing firms and discusses the capital structure links with corporate 
strategies. The extent of the influence of both financial and non-financial 
stakeholders is examined. Additionally, this research analyses and discusses 
the manner in which corporate strategic considerations relate to the capital 
structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
4.3.1 Qualitative Sample 
The research uses semi-structured interviews for the qualitative sample. 
Thirteen manufacturing firms from the petrochemical, food, industrial investment 
and cement sectors were interviewed. 
Companies were obtained from the Saudi Arabia stock markets, and a list of top 
executives in these firms was made. Initially, getting these executives to commit 
to the interview process proved difficult, as top management—such as CEOs, 
CFOs, financial managers and board members—in the Kingdom are very wary 
of conducting interviews. In addition, I had no preview relationship with them, 
and this created difficulties getting assess to them. To increase my chances of 
getting more executives to commit to the interview, I resorted to using personal 





connections through an influential family member who helped in convincing 
theses executives to do the interviews.  
The interviews took place in two different cities: Riyadh and Jeddah. The 
difficulty in obtaining interviews with senior management in Saudi Arabia lies in 
both the sensitivity of their positions and the time constraints that these 
managers have. Obtaining interviews with firms in the cement sector was 
particularly difficult, as many were busy negotiating terms of fuel subsidies with 
Aramco, a controversial issue at the time (Mahdi, 2011b). 
Three managers from financial institutions were interviewed in order to get their 
perspective on the different issues that affect capital structures. This approach 
was employed with the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the factors 
that influence their lending decisions and assessing whether the theory could 
potentially be applicable to other industries. However, only the results obtained 
from the perspective of the manufacturing firms are used to confirm or refute the 
propositions.  
4.3.2 Semi-structured interviews  
In relation to the four qualitative semi-structured interview methods—face-to-
face, e-mail, telephone and online messenger services—Opdenakker (2006) 
argues that face-to-face interviews have a distinct advantage over the others 
because they can provide “social cues”, such as intonation, voice and body 
language, that send important signals and provide extra information to the 
interviewer. However, like Novick (2008), the author recognises that the 
importance of these cues depends on the research objectives. 
The interview program was not purely based upon the relatively rigid pre-
determined questions and prompts. Rather, the open-ended, discursive nature 
of the interviews permitted an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of 
thought identified by earlier interviewees could be taken up and presented to 
later interviewees. The entire process of collecting the data took approximately 
6 months. Each interview commenced with an introduction about the 
researcher’s personal background, the aims of the research and issues of 





confidentiality. The interviews, on average, lasted 30-60 minutes in length. 
During this time, senior managers were asked 20-30 questions about the 
company’s capital structure, the different stakeholders that influence the 
company’s capital structure decisions and the extent to which corporate 
strategy influences the company’s capital structure decisions. Apart from their 
knowledge and views on the questions asked, the interviewees were 
encouraged to elaborate on the process and complexities of the knowledge 
management experienced inside their companies (Saunders et al., 2009).  
The interviews were designed to facilitate memory recall. An interview protocol 
was adapted from Wengraf (2001) to guide the interviews. All interviews were 
conducted in English. All participants asked to remain anonymous for the 
purpose of the interview, and no recording was allowed, due to the sensitivity of 
their positions. However, to facilitate the process of analysis, careful notes were 
made during the interviews and transcribed verbatim immediately after the 
interview took place, in accordance with Saunders et al., (2009). After the post-
interview transcription was made, the interview respondents were provided with 
the opportunity to review their statements and return comments relating to any 
misrepresentation of their views. A total of five interview transcripts were 
returned. There were no amendments made by the interviewees.  
In addition, a contact summary form (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was adapted 
to summarise the main themes, concepts, issues or questions arising from the 
interviews. The use of this form allowed for adjustments to the interview 
protocol to be made, as new themes emerged while the data was collected. A 
sample of the contact summary form is attached in Appendix 2.  
The interviews were specifically designed to explore the corporate strategy and 
capital structure decisions. In the process, they sought to develop a deeper 
understanding of manufacturing firms in Saudi Arabia. The industry—sectors 
and respondents, together with respondents by sectors—are shown in Tables 
4.1 and 4.2 below. 
 





Table 4.1: Industry, Sectors and Respondents 
Industry  Sectors Represented  Respondents 
Manufacturing  Petrochemical 4 
Manufacturing  Food 2 
Manufacturing Industrial Investment 2 
Manufacturing  Cement 5 
Financial Institutions  Financial 3 
Sum   16 
 
Table 4.2 lists the respondents by sectors/industries. In the analysis, references 
will be made to respondents in their respective sectors.  
Table 4.2: Respondents by Sectors17    
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4.3.3 Qualitative Data Analysis Procedure 
Themes that emerged in the initial readings were helpful in providing future 
directions for organising a framework for approaching a deeper level of data 
reduction and analysis. In organising and managing the data analysis process, 
the decision was made to analyse the content of each interview under three 
separate themes. These themes were as follows:  
 Determinants of Capital Structure 
 Capital Structure and Stakeholders  
                                                                            
17
 CFO is the Chief Financial Officer, CRO is the Chief Risk Officer and CEO is the Chief Executive Officer. 





 Capital Structure and Competitive Environment  
Once the data was clustered under the four themes, the coding process began.  
In qualitative research, questions can be framed and analysed from a grounded 
theory approach, and most qualitative studies focus on this approach (Creswell, 
2012).  
The approach aims to avoid contaminating existing theoretical frameworks by 
discovering theories, concepts, hypotheses, and propositions that are 
‘grounded’ in the collected data. Emphasis is on generating theory, rather than 
verifying it. More particularly, the emphasis is on generating theory that will be 
relevant to the research being undertaken. The application of the grounded 
theory approach evolved through four different phases. These phases are as 
follows: 
Identifying critical instances: This stage involved highlighting key passages 
of transcripts. 
Open coding: This stage involved identifying, naming, categorising and 
describing phenomena found in the text. It was necessary to carefully work 
through all transcripts and to divide the data into meaningful categories. These 
categories were based on a theme or variable that isolated information given by 
the interviewee. The units of coding were individual statements given by the 
interviewees regarding their respective knowledge of management strategy, 
processes and culture, as well as the factors that affect knowledge creativity in 
those enterprises. Each statement in the interview data was individually coded 
and built into common themes.  
Axial coding: This stage involved refining the initial list of categories, deleting 
and then amalgamating some. It was necessary to make connections between 
the categories and to define their properties. Some categories emerged with 
high frequency. These were, in turn, connected to many of the other emerging 
categories. 





Selective coding: At this stage, three different categories were chosen as core 
categories. Thereafter, all the other smaller categories were related to the core 
ones. The essential idea was to develop a framework around which everything 
else was dropped. 
4.4 Quantitative Approach 
The quantitative approach aims to complement the findings of the semi-
structured interview. Using panel data, the analysis considers two measures of 
leverage to be dependent variables: total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) and 
long term debt to total assets (LTDTA). The independent variables use 
numerical parameters that proxy for profitability, size and risk. They also use 
dummy variables that proxy for ownership structure and relationship banking. 
4.4.1 Type of data and Sampling Technique  
This research utilises quantitative secondary financial data obtained from 
companies’ published financial statements, which are available on the Saudi 
Stock Exchange (Tadawul)’s official website. The study targeted all Saudi 
manufacturing listed companies available in the market for 5 years or more. It is 
a cross sectional investigation, where firms are studied to gain an 
understanding of their typical capital structure behaviour. The time horizon was 
chosen due to the absence of research that covers this period of global 
recession. Furthermore, there was a trade-off between sample size and the 
length of the sample period. Hence, the data was chosen in a way that 
optimises the number of observations and the length of the sample period.  
This research used systematic sampling, with three major parameters: the 
number of firms out of total selected population, the number of sectors and the 
contribution of market capitalisation. Under each of these, the primary objective 
was to include all manufacturing companies listed for more than five years from 
the total population as a sample. As a whole, a total of 150 firms were listed in 
the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) by the end of 2011 (SAMA, 2013). From 
these companies, only 62 firms are in the manufacturing industry. 43 of which 
were chosen, representing a considerable percentage of the total population 





(69% as of June 2012). The sample is based on quarterly data, which makes up 
a total of 20 observations for each variable. Furthermore, market capitalisation 
of the 43 companies used in the study represents 38% of total market 
capitalisation18. 
4.4.2 Data and Data collection 
Data has been collected directly from firms' financial statements available on 
the Saudi Stock Exchange’s (Tadawul) official website (www.tadawul.com.sa). 
The data was manually aggregated in Excel spread sheets for further 
calculations of the proposed variables. These variables included two measures 
of leverage (long-term debt-to-total assets and total liabilities-to-total assets) 
and other independent variables that account for size, profitability and risk, 
along with dummy variables for ownership structure (government, family and 
institution) and a dummy variable for relationship banking. Table 4.1 provides a 
summary of the variables used in the regression analysis. 
 
                                                                            
18
 Market capitalization data was obtained from the Saudi Stock Exchange’s (Tadawul) official website 
(www.tadawul.com.sa) in June 2012.  





Table 4.3: Variables Used   
 
Proxy/Source Symbol Expectations 
Dependent Variables    
 Total liabilities-to-total asset TLTA  
 Long-term debt-to-total assets LTDTA  
Independent Variables  
   Profitability Return on Assets ROA - 
Size Total Assets SIZE                          +    
Risk Beta Beta + 
Family Ownership Ownership Structure FAM + 
Government Ownership Ownership Structure GOV + 
Institutional Ownership Ownership Structure INST + 
Relations Banking Banking Behaviour RB + 
Definitions:    
Risk Beta estimated from the regression of stock returns with market returns. Quantitative  
    
Profitability (Net Income/Total Assets)*100  Quantitative  
    
Size Natural Logarithm (Total Assets) Quantitative   
    
Relationship Banking 
Dummy (1  If company’s board member is also in bank’s board,  
0=otherwise) Dummy  
    
Institutional Ownership Dummy (1= Institution present, 0=otherwise)   
    
Family Ownership  Dummy (1= Family present, 0=otherwise) Dummy 
     
Government Ownership Dummy (1= Government present, 0=otherwise) Dummy 
 
 
    
 





The two measures of leverage used in this thesis are long-term debt-to-total 
assets (LTDTA) and total liabilities-to-total assets (TLTA). These are shown in 
Table 4.1 above. These variables are consistent with those used by Al-Ajmi et 
al. (2009). According to Rajan and Zingales (1995:1429) “the use of total 
liabilities-to-total total assets fails to consider the fact that there are some assets 
that are offsets by specific non-debt liabilities”. However, to account for the 
deficiency in this variable, another measure (LTDTA) was also used as a 
dependent variable.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) point out that the purpose of the analysis should 
determine which measure is appropriate. Even though the firm’s total liabilities-
to-shareholder equity is widely regarded as the most general measure of 
leverage, this measure is not utilised in the analysis because it is not a good 
measure of default risk; the higher the ratio, the higher level of debt. Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) indicate that the inclusion of items used for transaction instead 
of financing purposes, like accounts payables and pension liabilities, could 
result in leverage being overstated. Thus, it is a more conservative measure of 
leverage.  
Various independent variables were used in this thesis; they are briefly 
described below.  
Profitability 
The static trade-off theory predicts the existence of a positive effect of 
profitability on capital structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984). However, the pecking 
order theory predicts a negative relationship between profitability and capital 
structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Studies by Al-Ajmi et al. (2009), Al-
Sakran (2001) and Omet and Mashharawe (2003) have measured profitability 
using a firm’s return on assets (ROA) in their study of the determinant of 
leverage.  
Size 
Financial theory suggests that larger firms are more diversified and less prone 
to bankruptcy, have better access to credit markets and hence tend to 





incorporate more debt in their capital structures (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
However, the pecking order theory suggests that large firms exhibit low 
information asymmetry in financial markets and are able to issue more equity 
than small firms, increasing their preference for equity relative to debt (Al-Ajmi 
et al., 2009). Studies by Al-Ajmi et al. (2009), Al-Sakran (2001) and Omet and 
Mashharawe (2003) use the natural logarithm of total assets as a measure for 
size.  
Risk 
The thesis uses beta as a measure of risk, rather than standard deviation of 
earnings scaled by total assets, as beta measures systematic risk, while 
standard deviation includes both systematic and unsystematic risk. This 
variable is obtained by regressing the return on the stock of the firm and the 
return on the market index. Hence, it is calculated as follows.  
   
    (     )
    (  )
 
    (     ) is the covariance of the return of the stock of the firm and the return 
on the market index.     (  ) is the variance of the return on the market index.  
Dummy Variables  
The ownership structure for family, government and institutional shareholders is 
represented by dummy variables, as described in Table 4.1 above. The 
methodology is similar to the one used by Al-Ajmi et al. (2009). In addition, 
relationship banking is also represented by a dummy variable, as described in 
Table 4.1 above. 
4.4.3 Measurement, Validity and Generalisability  
The quantitative data was collected from credible governmental sources. 
Because the sample represents a significant percentage of the total population 
(38% of market capitalisation and 69% of total listed manufacturing firms as of 
June, 2012), it could be stated that the findings can be generalised for firms in 
the industry. For the quantitative approach, corporate strategy is measured by a 





set of numerical variables, shown in Table 4.1, which captures factors such as 
risk, ownership structure and relationship banking. The variables were tested to 
ensure that there is no multicollinearity among the independent variables that 
would affect the significance of the variables in the regression. In addition, to 
avoid the possibility of heteroskedasticity, the pooled model was estimated 
using White-Corrected standard errors. These tests ensure that the coefficients 
of the independent variables are not biased, due to incorrect standard errors. 
However, for the qualitative semi-structured interviews, the responses were 
measured by stating whether the findings/impacts are mixed (implying that the 
response is evenly split among respondents) or have a majority impact (i.e., 
more than 50% of the respondents are in agreement on the issue). The 
qualitative approach was therefore used to gauge strategic considerations by 
directly engaging with the decision makers of the firm.  
In the UK, qualitative research has been accused of “being largely irrelevant, 
weak in validity and a waste of public funds” (Hammersley, 2008, p. 3). This 
therefore points to the fact that validity is important because it test how accurate 
the information is and how closely it matches reality. Internal generalisation is 
an important issue for qualitative research because the validity of the 
conclusion greatly depends on internal generalizability (Maxwell, 2010). From 
this perspective, relying on a single interviewee’s coding is highly problematic 
and creates significant problems for assessing the reliability and validity of the 
data.  
Generalisation is regarded as an act of reasoning; it involves making broad 
inferences from particular observations (Polit and Beck, 2010). It is a quality 
standard that is more related to quantitative than qualitative research. Polit and 
Beck (2010) state that generalization issues are sometimes 
ignored/misrepresented in both types of research.  
Therefore, decisions about data collection and analysis were reviewed with two 
university colleagues and the researcher’s supervisor. The reliability of the 
categories developed in the data analysis was further measured by having 
others read the interview transcripts to see if they would classify them in the 





same way. The results were considered to be reliable by the three independent 
readers.  
4.4.4 Data Analysis procedure 
For the purpose of the data analysis, data has been moved through different 
stages before being imported and used in the data analysis program. Firstly, 
data collected from financial statements has been entered manually in the 
Microsoft Excel sheet. Then the independent variables have been calculated 
using Excel as proposed above. In this stage, the data was ready for the 
regression and was thus moved to the data analysis econometric software 
(Eviews).  
Despite the identification of the parameters and their influence on the capital 
structure literature, there is no single model that is appropriate for such 
research. Yet, most studies have regressed a ratio of debt-to-equity against 
several variables (Al-Sakran, 2001; Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). A pooled cross 
sectional estimation is conducted, since the study contains observations over a 
certain time period for different firms. In addition, the Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method is used to accomplish this step as it allows for the 
investigation of unique dynamics by a time order and reveals unobserved 
heterogeneity. Bevan and Danbolt (2004) indicate that an issue of over-
estimate biasness and, thus, misspecification of the significance of coefficients, 
may arise when using Pooled OLS due to failure in controlling time-invariants. 
However, this has been taken into consideration when indicating the 
significance of variables. The model used is a pooled panel regression of the 
firm’s leverage against the return on assets, size, beta and ownership structure 
and relationship banking dummies:  
               ̃         ̃        ̃         ̃              
 ̃                ̃           ̃                            (         )  
The regression analysis is conducted for the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(Pooled OLS) and the Pooled OLS using White-corrected standard errors. The 





reason for this is that, because the data is time series data, there is a higher 
probability that there exists heteroscedasticity19 in the error terms. This is a 
violation of the Classical Linear Regression Model assumption (White, 1980). 
Heteroscedasticity stipulates that the variance of the error terms is not constant 
as the dependent variables change. To correct for this, the research followed a 
correction technique called the White method (it was proposed by White) 
(1980). The regressions were tested for the overall significance of the model 
using the F statistic and its probability value (P-value), as well as for individual 
variables using T-Statistic and P-values. In addition, the correlation between 
variables is shown in the correlation matrix that assesses whether 
multicollinearity 20  is present in the variables. The Hausman test was also 
conducted for both independent variables, and the fixed effects model was 
rejected in favour of random effects.   
4.5 Ethical Issues 
Certain ethical issues may arise with respect to this study. Firstly, data was 
entered manually from firms' financial reports, and the variables were then 
calculated using Excel. This means that human error could yield misleading 
results, despite the fact that the data has been inspected three times. Only 
published financial data is used, hence, it is assured that the analysed data is 
used only for the research purpose and is not discussed with third parties for 
the purpose of commercial transactions or any other purpose. In addition, 
keeping the required level of confidentiality has been ensured in all aspects of 
research in accordance with the ethical guidelines of Brunel University, and 
interviewees were presented with a “Participants Information Sheet” (See 
Appendix 2). The participants were informed about the research aims and 
objectives and the scope of the interviews and were sent a confirmation of 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
                                                                            
19
 Heteroscedasticity is a violation of the OLS assumptions. It states that the error terms are not constant 
as the independent variable moves (White, 1980).  
20
 Multicollinearity is a violation of the OLS assumptions. It states that the independent variables are highly 
correlated in the regression model. (O’Brien, 2007). 





Chapter 5: Results and Findings 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a preliminary description of the main findings of the 
research on capital structure and corporate strategy in the context of Saudi 
Arabian manufacturing firms. An in-depth analysis and discussion will be made 
in Chapter 6. The findings are divided into two parts. Section 5.1 will highlight 
the main semi-structured interview results, and Section 5.2 will outline the main 
quantitative regression results (using several numerical and dummy variables).  
The semi-structured interview results are divided into three main parts –
determinants of capital structure, capital structure and stakeholders and capital 
structure and competitive environment. The quantitative analysis uses two 
measures of leverage: long-term debt-to-total asset (LTDTA) and total debt-to-
total asset (TDTA). The above-mentioned measures were used as dependent 
variables, and several independent variables were used in a Pooled Ordinary 
Least Squared (OLS) regression model.  
5.1 Semi-Structured Interview Results 
The semi-structured interview assessment was made from two perspectives: 
the firms’ perspective and the lenders’ perspective. The firms’ perspective, 
which is represented by the sample of manufacturing firms, provides the results 
for four main sectors: petrochemicals, food, industrial, and cement. To obtain 
the lenders’ perspective, a sample of three respondents from different financial 
institutions was used. However, only the results obtained from the perspective 
of respondents from manufacturing firms are used to confirm or refute the 
propositions.  
5.1.1 Determinants of Capital Structure  
Respondents were questioned on the impact of different market, industry and 
firm-specific factors that could influence a firm’s capital structure decisions. 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the semi-structured interview results that 
relate to the determinants of capital structure.  





Table 5.1: Interview results on the determinants of capital structure21 
Propositions Petrochemical Food Industrial 
Investment 
Cement Financial Result  
1. Saudi Arabian 
manufacturing firms 
are more likely to be 
debt- oriented. 
More debt than 
equity. Use of 
right issue to 
increase equity. 
Debt and equity 
equal. Use of right 
issue to increase 
equity. 
Mixed More debt than 
equity. Majority 
have at least 50% 
leverage. 
More debt than 
equity. Little use of 
bonds and capital 
market issues.  
Accept 
2. The cost of 
servicing debt is 
insignificant to the 
capital structure 
decision. 
Majority: it has 
influence  
All: it has no 
influence  
Mixed Majority: it has an 
influence  
Majority: it has no 
influence 
Reject 
3. Zakat is a 
significant 
consideration for the 
capital structure of 
Saudi manufacturing 
firms. 
All: important  Mixed  Mixed  Majority: it is not 
important  
Mixed Reject 
4. There exists an 
industry-specific 




Majority: Exists All: Exists Mixed Majority: Exists  N/A  Accept 
5. The nature of the 
assets in the Saudi 
manufacturing 
industry has a 











   
Accept 
                                                                            
21
 Majority implies more than 50% of the respondents, and mixed implies that the response is evenly split between the respondents.  
22
 Results are obtained from questions on the determinants of capital structure and optimal capital structure.  
23
 A total of four respondents did not address this question.  
24
 Only Respondent 3 provides an answer to this question.  





The results of Table 5.1 show that Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms are more 
likely to be debt oriented. The majority of respondents claim that the cost of 
debt is a significant influence on capital structure decisions, despite the 
relatively cheap financing options available to manufacturing firms. There is also 
considerable evidence to support the proposition that Saudi manufacturing firms 
are more likely to be Shari’a compliant. The importance of zakat is more 
prominent in the petrochemical industry. Nevertheless, the general findings do 
not support the significance of zakat in determining the capital structure of 
Saudi manufacturing firms. Moreover, the findings indicate that managers 
believe that there exists an optimal capital structure that consists of a mix of 
debt and equity. However, the optimum capital structure varies depending on 
the size of the project and the minimum equity level stipulated by creditors. 
Finally, the general findings point to a positive relationship between the nature 
of (tangible) assets in the manufacturing industry and leverage.  
5.1.2 Capital Structure and Stakeholders 
Respondents were questioned on the impact of different financial stakeholders 
on capital structure. Table 5.2 provides a summary of the semi-structured 
interview results.  





Table 5.2: Interview summary - financial stakeholders25 
Propositions Petrochemical Food Industrial 
Investment 
Cement Financial Result  
6. Without strict 
bankruptcy laws, highly 
leveraged firms would 
overinvest in risky projects.  
All: Bankruptcy 
laws insignificant  




law is not clear and 





7. Saudi Arabian 
manufacturing firms are 













use debt as 
disciplining tool 
All: respondents 
use debt as 
disciplining tool 
Mixed Majority: Do not 
use debt as 
disciplining tool 
All: respondents 
agree that debt is 
used as disciplining 
tool 
Accept 
9. The shareholders of the 
firm significantly influences 





Mixed  All: Shareholders 









influence. They are 
more effective for 
private companies 
Accept 
10. Government Owned 
firms are likely to carry 
more debt.  
Majority: no 
influence 





                                                                            
25 Majority implies more than 50% of the respondents, and mixed implies that the response is evenly split between the respondents.  
26 The first part of the proposition that relates to the absence of strict bankruptcy laws is supported. Overinvestment in risky projects is supported by the quantitative results on business risk.  





Table 5.2: Interview Summary - Financial Stakeholders – continued  
Propositions Petrochemical Food Industrial 
Investment 
Cement Financial Result  
11. Saudi manufacturing 
firms are likely to carry 
more debt when debt is 









All: Debt is easily 
available and has 
no influence on 
capital structure 
Mixed Majority: 







12. Saudi manufacturing 
firms are likely to have 




All: Not used Mixed Majority: Not used  Majority: Rarely 
used 
Accept 
13. Saudi manufacturing 
firms with strong banking 




state that it 
has effect on 
leverage 
All respondents: 
state that it has 
effect on leverage 
Mixed Majority: State 
that it has an 
effect on leverage 
All respondents: 
state that it has 




14. Saudi manufacturing 
firms that have access to 
government loans are likely 






















                                                                            
27
 While the majority of respondents claim that debt is easily available, the majorities state that the availability of credit has no influence on capital structure.  
28
 The result is further validated by the quantitative results on the relationship between relationship banking (dummy variable) and leverage.  
29
 Results are obtained from questions on capital structure formation and the effect of government support on capital structure.  
30
 The result is further validated by the quantitative results on the relationship between government ownership (dummy) and leverage.  





The results from Table 5.2 indicate that bankruptcy laws in Saudi Arabia are 
unclear and have little influence on the capital structure decisions of 
manufacturing firms. There is also considerable evidence to support the 
proposition that Saudi manufacturing firms are more likely to be Shari’a 
compliant. The results show that the majority of respondents claim to have used 
debt as a disciplining device, a finding that is in line with agency theories of 
capital structure. Moreover, the findings indicate that the shareholders of any 
firm have a significant influence on its capital structure decisions. Nevertheless, 
there is little evidence to support the proposition that government owned firms 
are likely to carry more debt. The results also indicate that the majority of Saudi 
manufacturing firms find that their capital structure decision does not depend on 
the availability of credit. The findings demonstrate, equally, that the majority of 
manufacturing firms have access to both local and international funding, with 
local funding being preferred. The results also support the significance of 
relationship banking in facilitating access to credit for Saudi manufacturing 
firms. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the most significant influence on 
the capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms is the availability of 
government loans in the form of SIDF loans. All respondents claimed that they 
have either used, or are currently using, SIDF loans to fund their projects.  
 
Respondents were also questioned on the influence of non-financial 
stakeholders on capital structure. Table 5.3 provides a summary of the semi-
structured interview results. 
 
 





Table 5.3: Interview Summary- Non-Financial Stakeholders31 
Propositions Petrochemical Food Industrial 
Investment 
Cement Financial Result  
15 Government Subsidies 
significantly influence the 
capital structure decisions 









16. Suppliers are more 
likely to influence the capital 




All: no influence Mixed: influence 






extension of lines 
of credit. 
Reject 
17. The quality of products 
of Saudi manufacturing 
firms is compromised 




Mixed All: no impact Majority: no 
impact 
N/A  Reject 
18. Customers are more 
likely to influence the capital 




All: no influence Mixed: influence 






extension of lines 
of credit 
Reject 
19. Employees are less 
likely to have an influence 
on the capital structure 
decision of Saudi 
manufacturing firms. 





                                                                            
31
 Majority implies more than 50% of the respondents, and mixed implies that the response is evenly split between the respondents.  
32
 The results are obtained from the responses on the effect of the government on capital structure. Respondents that do not mention subsidies are considered to find them 
insignificant.  






The results from Table 5.3 indicate that suppliers and customers have little 
influence on the capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing, unless they 
are extended lines of credit. Moreover, the findings do not support the 
proposition that the quality of products in the manufacturing industry is 
compromised in periods of economic downturn. The vast majority of evidence 
suggests that employees have no influence on the capital structure decisions of 
a firm. Finally, the results indicate that, although government subsidies are 
important to some firms, the majority of respondents point to government 
financial support (SIDF) as being significant in impacting capital structure 
decisions. Hence, the findings indicate that the stakeholder theory does not 
generally apply in the context of the Saudi manufacturing industry.  
  





5.1.3 Capital Structure and Competitive Environment  
 
Respondents were questioned on the manner in which the competitive 
environment relates to capital structure. Table 5.4 provides a summary of the 
semi-structured interview results.  






Table 5.4: Interview summary- capital structure and competitive environment33 
Propositions Petrochemical Food Industrial 
Investment 
Cement Financial Result  
20. Leverage exposes 
Saudi manufacturing firms 
to market volatility and 
predation during periods of 
economic downturn.  
Mixed Mixed All: has an impact  Majority: has an 
impact  









21. Competitors influence 
the capital structure and 
investment strategy of 
Saudi manufacturing firms. 
Majority: No 
impact 
All: No impact Mixed Majority: No 
impact 
Majority: Has impact. 





22. Debt induces greater 
competitive 
aggressiveness. 
Mixed Mixed All respondents: 
No impact 
Mixed Majority: has an 
impact 
Reject 
23. Disclosure rules affect 
the capital structure and 
competitive advantage of 
Saudi manufacturing firms.  
Majority: It has no 
impact  
Majority: It has an 
impact 
Majority: It has an 
impact 




Majority: It has an 
impact.  
Accept  
24. Saudi manufacturing 
firms use debt as a 
signalling tool. 
Majority: Debt 
used as a 
signalling tool.  
All: Not used as a 
signalling tool  
Mixed Majority: Debt is 
not used as a 
signalling tool.  
Majority: Debt is not 




                                                                            
33
 Majority implies more than 50% of the respondents, and mixed implies that the response is evenly split between the respondents.  
34
 None of the respondents refer to predatory behaviour in periods of economic downturn.  
35
 Only Respondent 2 from the industrial investment sector made reference to the positive relationship between rival firms’ leverage and investment strategy.  
36
 Respondent 3 rightly mentioned the need to follow CMA rules. However, the respondent failed to address the issue, directly or otherwise, of how transparency affects 
capital structure and competitive advantage.  





The findings from Table 5.4 illustrate that, while the majority of respondents 
agree that higher leverage exposes manufacturing firms to market volatility, no 
reference was made to the predatory behaviour of rival firms during periods of 
economic downturn. The results indicate that the majority of respondents do not 
consider competitors to have an influence on their capital structure and 
investment strategy. Moreover, while some respondents recognise the effect of 
higher leverage in inducing greater competitive aggression, the evidence 
indicates that the majority of respondents do not support the relationship 
between debt and competitive aggression. The results show that greater 
information transparency through more stringent disclosure rules would affect 
the capital structure and competitive advantage of manufacturing firms. 
Respondents fear that a greater level of transparency would hinder their 
competitive position. However, there is little evidence to support that debt is 
used a signalling tool to reflect the financial position of the firm to rival firms. 
Thus, there is little evidence to support the relationship between capital 
structure and competitive environment in the context of the Saudi 
manufacturing industry. 
5.2 Quantitative Findings  
The quantitative approach uses two definitions of leverage, (total liabilities-to-
total assets (TLTA) and long term debt-to-total assets (LTDTA), as dependent 
variables. In testing the determinants of leverage, three numerical independent 
variables were used to proxy for profitability, size and risk. To capture the 
impact of ownership structure (family, institutional and government) and 
relationship banking, four additional dummy variables were included in the 
regression. Table 5.5 outlines descriptive statistics, the correlation matrix of the 
two dependent variables (LTDTA and TLTA) and the seven (7) independent 
variables. 





Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  LTDTA TLTA ROA SIZE BETA GOV FAM INS RB 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 Mean 0.14 0.37 0.03 18.78 0.88 0.49 0.28 0.4 0.42 
 Sum 123.37 317.84 21.62 16154.33 756.98 420 240 340 360 
 Median 0.07 0.37 0.02 19.98 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Maximum 0.65 0.8 0.2 23.42 2.8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 -0.09 13.47 -1.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 41.17 154.61 1.33 310373.06 826.41 420 240 340 360 
 Std. Dev. 0.17 0.21 0.03 2.84 0.43 0.5 0.45 0.49 0.49 
 Skewness 1.19 0.1 2.17 -0.37 0.17 0.05 0.99 0.43 0.33 
 Kurtosis 3.47 1.87 11.62 1.6 5.11 1.00 1.97 1.18 1.11 
 Jarque-Bera 212.37 47.29 3333.61 90.02 163.89 143.33 177.08 144.54 143.76 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Observations 860 860 860 860 860 860 860 860 860 
 Cross sections 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 































TL/TA 0.64 1.00 -0.34 -0.32 0.24 0.00 0.30 0.38 0.34 
ROA  -0.28 -0.34 1.00 0.08 -0.24 0.19 -0.22 -0.02 0.04 
Size -0.08 -0.32 0.08 1.00 -0.08 0.12 -0.18 -0.21 -0.07 
Beta 0.30 0.24 -0.24 -0.08 1.00 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.03 
Govt. 0.12 0.00 0.19 0.12 -0.02 1.00 -0.09 -0.03 0.40 
Fam. 0.24 0.30 -0.22 -0.18 0.11 -0.09 1.00 0.03 0.21 
Inst. 0.29 0.38 -0.02 -0.21 0.05 -0.03 0.03 1.00 0.09 
RB 0.25 0.34 0.04 -0.07 0.03 0.40 0.21 0.09 1.00 
 





The findings indicate that profitability and size are negatively correlated with the 
two dependent variables. With the exception of size, all the variables have 
positive skewness. However, the Jarque-Bera tests show that the variables are 
not normally distributed. The mean values are all positive, with a mean leverage 
of 14% and 37% for LTDTA and TLTA, respectively. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) report 
slower leverage ratios of 10% and 28% for LTDTA and TLTA respectively. The 
minimum leverage is 0% for both measures, but the maximum leverage for the 
sample is 65% and 80% for LTDTA and TLTA, respectively. Overall, the 
correlations among independent variables are not too high and do not cause 
multicollinearity concerns. 
 





Table 5.6: Regression results with total liabilities to total assets (TLTA) as dependent variable 
  Pooled OLS 
Pooled OLS with 
White-Corrected 
Standard Errors 
Random Effect  Fixed Effect 
     
Constant 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.09 0.49*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) 
Profitability -1.85*** -1.85*** -0.33*** -1.78*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Risk 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01** 0.08*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 
Family Ownership  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.10** 0.05*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) 
Government Ownership  -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 
(0.46) (0.42) (0.42) (0.45) 
Institutional Ownership  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relationship Banking 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Adj. R-Square  0.43 0.43 
  
F-Statistics 93.37 93.37 
  





















The results in Table 5.6 outline the regression results for the dependent 
variable (TLTA) and the seven independent variables. The results show the 
pooled sample, the pooled sample using the White-corrected standard errors 
and adjustments for fixed and random period effects. The adjusted R-squared 
indicates that approximately 43% of the variation in leverage is explained by the 
variables in the equation. In addition, the F-statistics show that the overall 
regression is significant at the 1% level, as the P-values are less than 1%.  





Table 5.7: Regression Results with Total liabilities to total assets (LTDTA) as dependent variable 
  Pooled OLS 
Pooled OLS with White-
Corrected Standard 
Errors 
Random Effect  Fixed Effect 
     
Constant -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
 
(0.53) (0.50) (0.53) (0.16) 
Profitability -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.13*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Size 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.31) (0.32) (0.31) (0.29) 
Risk 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08** 0.11*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Family Ownership  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Government Ownership  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Ownership  0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Relationship Banking 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Adj. R-Square  0.28 0.28 
  
F-Statistics 49.87 49.87 
  




















Table 5.7 shows the regression results for the dependent variable (LTDTA) and 
several independent variables. The results show the pooled sample, the pooled 
sample using the White-corrected standard errors, and adjustments for fixed 
and random period effects. The adjusted R-squared indicates that 
approximately 28% of the variation in leverage is explained by the variables in 
the equation. However, the model with the dependent variable (TLTA) has a 
stronger explanatory power than the one with LTDTA. In addition, the F-
statistics show that the overall regression is significant at the 1% level, as the p-
values are less than 1%. 
Table 5.8: Summary of regression results  




Hypothesis 1. ROA has a negative 
impact on leverage 
Accept Accept 
Hypothesis 2. Natural logarithm of total 
assets has a positive impact on leverage 
Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 3. Beta has a negative 
impact on leverage 
Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 4. Family ownership has a 
positive impact on leverage 
Accept Accept 
Hypothesis 5. Institutional ownership 
has a negative impact on leverage 
Reject Reject 
Hypothesis 6. Government ownership 




The results shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that profitability is negatively 
related to leverage. The results in Table 5.6 show that a 1% increase in 
profitability results in a 1.85% decrease in leverage (TLTA) for the pooled OLS. 
When leverage is defined as LTDTA, as shown in Table 5.7, the decrease in 
leverage for a 1% increase in profitability is 1.24%. The results for the random 
and fixed effect were also negative and significant for both measures of 
leverage. These findings show that firms with higher profitability have lower 
leverage, and these results are significant at the 1% level. The results also 
show that Saudi manufacturing firms reduce their leverage as they become 





more profitable. In addition, the reduction in the leverage is more pronounced 
when leverage is defined as total liability-to-total assets (TLTA), rather than 
long-term debt-to-total assets (LTDTA). This finding is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, which states that ROA has a negative impact on leverage. It is 
also consistent with the pecking-order theory, which argues that profitable firms 
depend more on internal financing in order to reduce information asymmetries 
and avoid costly external financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory 
predicts a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
5.2.2 Size 
The results of the impact of size on leverage depend on the measure of 
leverage used. The results in Table 5.6 show that, for the pooled OLS and the 
White-corrected standard errors, leverage (TLTA) for larger firms is lower by 
approximately 1% than for smaller firms, and these results are significant at the 
1% level. Even though the results for the fixed effect are consistent with those 
of the pooled OLS, the findings of the random effect shows that size has a 
positive impact on leverage. However, when using the firms’ long-term debt-to-
total asset (LTDTA) as the dependent variable, the results in Table 5.7 show 
that the relationship between size and leverage is insignificant. Therefore, the 
proposition of large firms carrying more debt is refuted. Hence, the findings are 
not consistent with Hypothesis 2, which states that the natural logarithm of total 
assets has a positive impact on leverage.  
5.2.3 Risk  
The results shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 demonstrate a positive and significant 
relationship between risk and leverage. The results for the pooled sample and 
the pooled sample with White-corrected standard errors show that leverage 
(TLTA) is 6% and 8% higher for riskier firms when leverage is defined as total 
liability-to-total assets (TLTA) and long term debt-to-total assets (LTDTA), 
respectively. These results are significant at the 1% level and show that Saudi 
manufacturing firms with significant business risks are more likely to carry more 
debt. The results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, which states that Beta has 
a negative impact on leverage.  





5.2.3 Family Ownership  
Dummy variables were used to assess the effect of family ownership on 
leverage. Firms that have a family ownership structure that is greater than 10% 
are considered to be family-owned. The results for family ownership in Tables 
5.6 and 5.7 show that firms that have large family ownership blocks carry more 
debt than those that do not. The results for the pooled sample and the sample 
with White-corrected standard errors show that firms with family ownership 
carry 5% more debt on both measures of leverage than those that do not have 
family ownership, and these results are significant at the 1% level.  
Hence, for the sample of Saudi manufacturing firms, the result is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4, which states that family ownership has a positive impact on 
leverage. It is also consistent with the findings by Stulz (1988), who states that 
family-owned firms would carry more debt in order to avoid the dilution of their 
equity stake and control. 
5.2.4 Institutional Ownership  
Dummy variables were used to assess the effect of institutional ownership on 
leverage. Firms that have an institutional ownership structure that is greater 
than 10% are considered to be institutionally owned. The results for institutional 
ownership in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 for the pooled sample and the sample with 
White-corrected standard errors show that firms with family ownership carry 
13% more debt, when leverage is measured as total liabilities-to-total assets, 
and 9% more debt, when leverage is measured as long-term debt-to-total 
assets; these results are highly significant at the 1% level. Hence, the results for 
the sample of Saudi manufacturing firms do not support Hypothesis 5, which 
states that institutional ownership has a negative impact on leverage.  
5.2.5 Government Ownership  
Dummy variables were used to assess the effect of government ownership on 
leverage. Firms that have a government ownership structure that is greater than 
10% were considered to be government owned.  
 





The results shown in Table 5.6 indicate that, when leverage is measured as 
total liability-to-total assets, government ownership has no impact on firms’ 
leverage decisions. However, when leverage is measured as long-term debt-to-
total assets, as shown in Table 5.7, government ownership has a positive and 
significant influence on leverage. Firms with government ownership are, on 
average, 4% more levered than those without government ownership, and the 
result is significant at 1%. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 6, which 
states that government ownership has a positive impact on leverage. According 
to Booth et al., (2001), the effect of government ownership on capital structure 
largely depends on the jurisdiction in which the SOEs operate. However, in the 
context of Saudi Arabia, government financial institutions, such as the SIDF, 
provide loans to manufacturing firms regardless of their ownership structure. 
The mixed results imply that the impact of government ownership on leverage 
depends on the definition of leverage.  
5.2.6 Relationship Banking  
A dummy variable was used to represent relationship banking. This variable 
takes the value 1, if members of the firm’s board are also in the board of the 
banks, and takes a vale of zero in all other cases. The results in Table 5.6 show 
that, when leverage is defined as total liabilities-to-total assets (TLTA), firms 
that have a positive relationship with their banks have higher leverage than 
those that do not have such a relationship with their banks. The results for the 
pooled sample and the pooled sample with White-corrected standard errors 
show that firms with a good relationship with their banks are, on average, 12% 
more leveraged than their counterparts, and the results are significant at the 1% 
level. Moreover, when leverage is defined as long term debt-to-total asset 
(LTDTA), the results in Table 5.7 show that firms with strong relationship with 
their banks are, on average, 5% more leveraged than their counterparts, and 
the results are significant at the 1% level.  
 
The findings support Hypothesis 7, which states that relationship banking has a 
positive impact on leverage. In addition, several studies have shown that 





commercial banking concentration can significantly affect the capital structure 
decisions of a firm (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; and 
Gonzalez and Gonzalez, 2008). The Saudi Arabian banking sector is highly 
concentrated (SAMA, 2013). Thus, it can be argued that relationship banking 
resumes importance in this context. 





Chapter 6: Analysis and Discussion 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the findings of the semi-structured interviews and 
the results of the quantitative financial analysis on capital structure and 
corporate strategy. The results of the semi-structured interviews mainly focus 
on manufacturing firms from four main sectors: petrochemicals, food, industrial 
investment and cement. The perspective of financial institutions is also 
considered in order to provide greater insight into the different factors that affect 
a firm’s capital structure and corporate strategy. In addition, the quantitative 
analysis used two different independent variables as measures of leverage: 
long-term debt-to-total assets (LTDTA) and total liabilities-to-total assets 
(TLTA). There are two main types of independent variables: numerical variables 
that capture profitability, size and risk and dummy variables that capture family 
ownership, government ownership, institutional ownership and relationship 
banking.  
With the aim of testing the theoretical framework detailed in Chapter 3, the main 
focus of the analysis is on the quantitative findings and the qualitative results. 
Semi-structured interviews support the quantitative results. The analysis used a 
mix of qualitative and quantitative results to provide a holistic picture of the 
factors that influence capital structure and corporate strategy. Therefore, where 
appropriate, the results of the quantitative analysis are used to further validate 
the findings of the semi-structured interviews.  
The chapter is subdivided into three main sections. Section 6.1 analyses the 
findings on the determinants of capital structure. Moreover, Section 6.2 
examines the results on capital structure and corporate strategy. Finally, 
Section 6.3 discusses the findings on capital structure and the competitive 
environment.  
  





6.1 Determinants of Capital Structure   
Proposition 1: Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms are more likely to be debt 
oriented. 
Saudi Arabian firms are generally more equity oriented than firms in developed 
countries. Booth et al. (2001) demonstrate that the total debt ratio for their 
sample of developing countries is significantly lower than that of developed 
countries. In their sample of Saudi Arabian firms, Omet and Mashharawe (2003) 
report an average of 9% leverage. Beck et al. (2002) attribute the empirical 
observation of low leverage ratios in developing countries to the difficulties 
companies face in such economies in accessing external funds. In the context 
of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms, government loans in the form of SIDF 
dominate capital structure decisions. These loans can constitute up to 75% of 
the capital structure of manufacturing projects. Accordingly, the proposition is 
that firms in the manufacturing industry would have a more debt-oriented capital 
structure than is empirically observed on the market level. 
In the petrochemical sector, the majority of the respondents found that a typical 
capital structure is made up of 70% debt and 30% equity [R1PQ7; R3PQ1; 
R4PQ6]. Respondent 1 stated that his company’s methods of financing include 
bank loans, sukuk and SIDF loans [R1PQ3]. Respondent 4 stated that rights 
issues are sometimes used to generate equity in addition to internally 
generated equity (retained earnings) [R4PQ1]. However, according to 
Respondent 3, the method of finance depends on the age of the project. 
Successful and established projects are more likely to attract bank loans than 
new and untested projects [R3PQ3]. Respondent 2 suggested a more 
conservative 1:1 debt to equity ratio [R2PQ6]. This indicates that the methods of 
financing available to petrochemical firms are not restricted to debt. However, 
the findings demonstrate the significance of debt in the capital structure 
formations of petrochemical firms.  
In the food sector, the level of leverage is lower than that observed in other 
sectors. Respondent 2 stated that his company’s “capital structure is typically 





1:1 equity to debt with 10-15% of debt from the SIDF” [R2FQ1]. Similarly, 
Respondent 1 suggested a capital structure whereby a firm does not exceed 
1:1 debt to equity [R1FQ6]. The respondent claimed that his firm’s sources of 
finance include “SIDF soft loans, commercial loans, classical short term line, 
letters of credit (LC) and letters of guarantee (LG), as well as some funding from 
suppliers” [R1FQ3]. The respondent stated that his company typically uses the 
Islamic version of these loans [R1FQ3]. Both respondents in this sector 
reported using short-, long-, and medium-term bank loans that are Shari’a 
compliant [R1FQ3; R2FQ2; R2FQ3]. The results demonstrate that 
manufacturing firms in the food sector carry more conservative leverage ratios 
than those in the petrochemical sector. However, debt still constitutes a 
significant part of the capital structures of manufacturing firms in this sector. 
In the industrial investment sector, Respondent 1 underlined that his company 
relied mainly on equity and SIDF as their main sources of capital [R1IIQ1]. The 
company’s main sources of debt financing are overdraft facilities, including 
SIDF and other bank loans. [R1IIQ2]. However, once the SIDF loans were 
repaid, they were not sought again [R1IIQ1]. Respondent 1 claimed that, 
although it was not optimal, his company was currently entirely equity oriented 
[R1IIQ6]. This result indicates that debt is not necessarily a permanent 
component of capital structure. Instead, it is used to finance projects only when 
needed. In contrast, Respondent 2 claimed that typical capital structure “ranges 
between 60:40 and 65:35 debt to equity” [R2IIQ1]. All respondents asserted 
that they have used SIDF as a source of debt financing, and half of the 
respondents affirmed they have used commercial bank loans [R1IIQ1; R2IIQ2]. 
The results indicate that the use of debt is significant in the industrial investment 
sector, particularly for funding new projects.  
In the cement industry, the interview results show that the majority of firms have 
a debt level that is at least 50% of their total capital [R2CQ2; R4CQ1; R5CQ2]. 
Respondent 5 opined that a typical capital structure for a manufacturing project 
would be made up of 50-75% of debt and 25-50% of equity, depending on the 
availability of SIDF loans [R5CQ6]. However, there are exceptions to the high 





debt-to-equity ratio. Respondent 3 stated that his company has a capital 
structure that is made up of 94% equity and 6% debt [R3CQ1]. The Respondent 
stated that his company had significant liquidity and did not need to resort to 
debt for financing [R3CQ2]. This suggests that firms in the cement sector follow 
pecking order theory in their choice of financing for their projects. The main 
sources of debt financing are commercial bank loans, letters of credits, short 
and medium term loans and SIDF loans. Sukuk has also been popularised 
recently [R1CQ3; R2CQ3; R3CQ3; R5CQ3]. Therefore, the results indicate that 
debt is a significant component of the capital structures of manufacturing firms 
in the cement sector, when retained earnings insufficiently cover a firm’s 
financing needs.  
The results from the perspective of financial institutions indicate that debt 
financing dominates equity financing and that a typical ratio of 2:1 (debt: equity) 
is common [R1BQ1; R2BQ1]. Respondent 2 suggested that, because the Saudi 
market is not yet mature, “plain vanilla” bank loans are dominant in the capital 
market, with very little bond and other capital market issuance [R2BQ1]. 
Moreover, the results show that the main sources of debt financing include 
SIDF loans, sukuk, short- and long-term overdrafts and syndicated loans 
[R1BQ2; R2BQ1; R3BQ2]. Creditors, hence, assert that it is common for 
manufacturing firms to carry high levels of debt.  
Accordingly, the general view is that the capital structure of firms in the 
manufacturing industry is (with a few exceptions) significantly propelled by debt 
financing. Further, the results of the quantitative analysis shown in Table 5.5 
indicate a mean leverage of 14% and 37% for LTDTA and TLTA respectively. In 
their sample of Saudi firms, Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) report lower leverage ratios of 
10% and 28% for LTDTA and TLTA respectively. The findings support the 
proposition that manufacturing firms are more debt oriented than firms in other 
industries. The majority of respondents in all sectors state that their respective 
companies have either used, or are currently using, SIDF finance for their 
projects. The interview results show that the companies in the food sector report 
the lowest use of SIDF loans. For other sectors, such as the petrochemical and 





cement sectors, SIDF loans account for 50% of the entire capital structure of 
the companies. Cheap SIDF loans imply that the benefits of debt outweigh the 
costs. Hence, firms are more likely to use debt products than external equity in 
raising funds for their projects. There are, however, some exceptions. 
Respondent 1 in the industrial investment sector, as well as Respondent 3 in 
the cement sector, claimed that their companies are equity-oriented, with 
minimal to no debt [R1IIQ1; R3CQ1]. The equity orientation of these firms is 
attributed to the personal preference for equity of the respective shareholders of 
the firms. In addition, according to pecking order theory, the preference is for 
firms to finance their projects through retained earnings and then debt (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). High levels of retained earnings replace the need for debt 
and help explain the equity orientation observed in the exceptional cases.  
Proposition 2: The cost of servicing debt is insignificant to the capital structure 
decision. 
One of the most important determinants of capital structure is the cost of debt. 
Market timing theory suggests that managers actively time the markets when 
deciding on their capital structure, examining both debt and equity markets and 
choosing whichever market seems more favourable (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
If the cost of debt were low, firms would choose to carry more debt, and vice 
versa. Nevertheless, as outlined in Chapter 2, low interest commercial loans, as 
well as government loans in the form of SIDF, which characterise the Saudi 
capital market, imply that the cost of debt is less important in this context than in 
other jurisdictions. Hence, the interview respondents were questioned on 
whether their capital structures depend on the cost of servicing debt.  
The results for the petrochemical sector showed that the majority of the 
respondents claimed that the cost of debt has an influence on a firm’s leverage 
[R1PQ8; R3PQ7; R4PQ9]. Respondents 1 and 3 suggested that the cost of 
servicing debt is important, as is tenor, growth and refinancing ability [R1PQ8; 
R3PQ7]. Respondent 4 claimed that his firm tries to optimise the return on its 
investments but also pays close attention to the costs of debt financing. 
However, Respondent 2 argued that the cost of debt is not important [R2PQ9]. 





The respondent claimed that the underlying risk of the asset is what influences 
capital structure [R2PQ9]. If the assets have high risk, then banks are less 
prepared to offer significant loans. This implies that, even with the availability of 
low cost financing options (such as SIDF), the cost of servicing debt remains an 
important consideration.  
In the food sector, both respondents suggested that the cost of servicing debt is 
not a significant factor in determining leverage or capital structure [R1FQ9; 
R2FQ7]. Respondent 2 claimed that, because his firm has had no problem in 
servicing its debts, the cost of debt is not an influential factor in the level of debt 
the company assumes [R2FQ7]. This implies that the cost of debt is not 
detrimental to firms’ capital structure decisions in the food sector. This result 
can be attributed to the fact that such firms generate enough profits to service 
their debts.  
The results for the industrial investment sector are mixed. While Respondent 1 
did not believe that the costs of servicing debt were significant in influencing the 
company’s leverage position [R1IIQ9], Respondent 2 stated, “interest cost of 
capital is an inevitable driver of capital structure” [R2IIQ9]. This can be 
attributed to the fact that Respondent 1’s firm is profitable enough to finance its 
projects through retained earnings and does not require additional debt 
financing. Respondent 2, however, is a manager of a unique business with no 
direct competitors [R2IIQ7]. This implies that the cost of capital assumes 
importance when manufacturing projects are new and untested.  
In the cement sector, the majority of respondents argued that the service cost of 
debt is a key variable that influences the capital structure decisions of firms 
[R1CQ8; R2CQ7; R3CQ9; R4CQ9; R5CQ9]. According to Respondent 4, his 
firm takes on more debt when the financial charges are low and credit terms are 
flexible [R4CQ9]. However, Respondent 2 stated that low interest rates and 
high profit margins imply that interest costs take on a less significant role in 
deciding the amount of leverage the firm assumes [R2CQ7]. Hence, the cost of 
debt financing is an important factor that determines the leverage of firms in the 





cement sector, despite the low cost of debt and the high profitability of firms 
operating in this sector.  
The results from the perspective of financial institutions suggest that the cost of 
debt is not very important [R1BQ6; R2BQ5]. Respondent 1 stated that the level 
of debt depends on the period of the loan and the company’s growth prospects 
[R1BQ6], while Respondent 3 claimed that it depends on many factors, 
including the nature of the firms’ assets, which is a crucial factor only from the 
lender’s point of view [R3BQ7]. Respondent 2 argued that the cost of debt “still 
remains cheaper than the cost of equity” [R2BQ5]. The respondent claimed that 
companies’ time their loan decisions on current market rates. As interest rates 
fall, the amount of debt assumed increases, and vice versa. The result shows 
some support for market timing theory. However, none of the respondents from 
the manufacturing firms interviewed contended that capital structure decisions 
are based on timing equity and debt markets. Accordingly, market timing might 
be relevant for firms that operate in other industries in Saudi Arabia.  
The results of the interviews support the importance of the cost of servicing debt 
in the context of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms, especially for new and 
untested projects. Even with the existence of high profits and considerably 
cheap financing available through government SIDF loans and commercial 
banks, the results reject the proposition of the insignificance of the cost of 
servicing debt to the capital structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
Proposition 3: Zakat is a significant consideration for the capital structure of 
Saudi manufacturing firms.  
The analysis on the determinants of capital structure begins by examining the 
effect of taxation on capital structure. The tax structure of the Saudi Arabian 
market outlined in Chapter 3 suggests that local companies are obliged to pay 
2.5% tax on idle wealth in the form of zakat. Respondents were, hence, asked if 
they take zakat and taxation into consideration when deciding on their 
respective firms’ capital structure.  





The interview results show that all of the respondents in the petrochemical 
industry consider zakat when deciding their debt levels [R1PQ5; R2PQ5; 
R3PQ5; R4PQ5]. Respondent 4 argued that the “taxation of foreign partners 
and zakat have an impact on the capital structure decision” [R4PQ5]. The firm 
assesses the total capital structure and tries to optimise return on investment. 
Thus; tax and zakat do have an influence on capital structure decisions 
[R4PQ5]. Moreover, Respondent 2 argued that, because zakat is paid on long-
term debt only, the DZIT has started to audit firms to make sure that they do not 
circumvent the payment of zakat by making sure that their short-term loans are 
“really short-term” [R2PQ5]. The results indicate that zakat considerations are 
prevalent in the petrochemical sector. 
In the food sector, the results are mixed. Respondent 1 considered zakat as 
one of determinants of the capital structure. The respondent stated that his 
“company tries to fund fixed assets mainly through equity (70%), and the 
remaining (30%) using debt… otherwise, [the firm] ends up paying more zakat” 
[R1FQ5]. This result is in line with Ozkan (2001) and Gaud et al. (2005), who 
stress the importance of tax optimisation in influencing capital structure 
decisions. However, Respondent 2 stated that zakat is not important because of 
the company’s high profitability [R2FQ4]. This indicates that some firms pay 
more attention to zakat than others in this sector.  
Similarly, the findings were split in the industrial investment sector. Respondent 
1 suggested that zakat is not an important factor, as the need for extra funding 
outweighs the incremental cost of zakat [R1IIQ5]. However, Respondent 2 
claimed that zakat is, in fact, an important consideration [R2IIQ5].   
Ultimately, the majority of the companies in the cement industry stated that 
zakat is not an important factor when deciding on the company’s capital 
structure [R1CQ5; R2CQ5; R5CQ5]. Respondents 1 and 2 attributed this result 
to the fact that zakat only represents 2.5% of the cost of debt, which is 
insignificant. However, Respondent 3 stated that zakat is one consideration, but 
other factors are more important, such as the level of retained earnings and 
reserves [R3CQ5]. Respondent 4 was the only exception in this sector that 





attested to the significance of zakat [R4CQ5]. The results indicate that, given 
the negligible amount of zakat, it is not an important consideration for the 
majority of cement companies. 
The perspective of financial institutions indicates that, even though zakat is a 
factor that is considered in leverage decisions [R3BQ4], some companies pay 
more attention to it than others [R1BQ4]. Nevertheless, Respondent 2 
contended that zakat is not important and, therefore, has no effect on 
determining the company’s leverage position [R2BQ3].  
The interview results on the importance of zakat in determining the capital 
structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms are mixed. The results point to 
the fact that some firms avoid issuing long-term debt (that is zakat payable) or 
reduce their leverage to avoid paying more zakat. Debt can increase the 
company’s zakat liability. Accordingly, profitable firms finance their projects 
through retained earnings in order to reduce their zakat liability. The results 
shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 in Chapter 5 show that profitability is negatively 
related to leverage. The results for the pooled sample with White-corrected 
standard errors show that firms with higher profitability have lower leverage on 
both measures of leverage, and these results are significant at the 1% level. 
Hence, manufacturing companies benefit from reducing their zakat liability by 
financing their projects through retained earnings. These results are in line with 
the findings of Al-Ajmi et al. (2009), who demonstrate the significance of zakat 
in determining the capital structures of Saudi firms.  
Proposition 4: There exists an industry-specific target optimal structure. 
One of the key considerations for capital structure decisions is industry 
structure. Empirical studies confirm the importance of industry effects in shaping 
the capital structure of a firm (Lev, 1969; Van der Wijst et al., 1993). Graham 
and Harvey (2001) provide empirical evidence to suggest that managers have 
target leverage ratios in mind when taking capital structure decisions. 
Therefore, in accordance with Graham and Harvey (2001), respondents were 





questioned on whether they believe that there exists an optimal capital 
structure.  
The interview results for the petrochemical sector show that the optimal capital 
structure is driven by the use of cheap debt and the nature of the project. The 
majority of the respondents in the petrochemical industry made reference to an 
optimal capital structure, which includes a minimum equity level of 25% 
[R1PQ7; R2PQ7; R3PQ1; R4PQ7]. The results show that the majority of the 
respondents in the sample have a capital structure that consists of not more 
than 30% equity capital, and debt of up to 70% is common in this industry 
[R1PQ7; R2PQ7; R3PQ1; R4PQ7]. However, Respondent 2 argued that a 
target of 1:1 debt to equity ratio is ideal, for “below this is not optimal, and 
above it is too risky” [R2PQ6]. It is also important to note that capital structure 
decisions are driven by a firm’s need to finance its projects. Respondent 4 
argued that his company has had a capital structure of “25% equity to 75% debt 
[in the past], but nowadays [the company] uses 30% equity and 70% debt” 
[R4PQ7]. Respondent 4 stated that his preference is “to have the least amount 
of equity” [R4PQ6]. The respondent stressed that the level of equity depends on 
the projects in question. Respondent 4 further maintained that “some projects 
were required to have 50% equity, and others require 100% equity. However, 
the norm in the industry is an equity level of between 25% and 30%” [R4PQ7].  
In the food sector, the optimal capital structure also depends on the size of the 
project. Respondent 1 claimed “A debt-to-equity of 50:50 is quite common. 
However, for larger projects, a ratio of 70:30—debt to equity—is expected 
[R1FQ7]”. Moreover, both respondents in the food sector asserted that the key 
determinants of debt are the level of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 
that the company generates and the existence of a target leverage ratio 
[R1FQ6; R2FQ5]. Hence, as was evident in the petrochemical sector, the debt 
level has some bearing on the target capital structure. However, only 
Respondent 2 in the industrial investment sector stated that an optimum capital 
structure in this sector is not relevant, since the business has no direct 
competitors [R2IIQ7]. Moreover, Respondent 1 suggested that low leverage is 





common, due to high Research and Development intensity in this sector 
[R1IIQ7].  
The majority of the respondents in the cement industry had mixed opinions on 
optimum capital structure. Respondent 2 stated that the level of debt does not 
typically exceed 50% of shareholder equity [R2CQ6]. Respondent 4 contended 
that “a good reference would be the structure frequently suggested/required by 
the lenders, i.e., 60/40 (debt/equity)” [R4CQ7]. However, Respondent 3 
suggested that a ratio of 60% equity and 40% debt is usually optimal in the 
industry [R3CQ7]. Respondent 5 argued that the optimal capital structure 
depends on the availability of SIDF loans and “the credit worthiness and 
standing of the sponsors” [R5CQ7].  
Generally, the results show that there is evidence to suggest that there exists a 
target optimal capital structure in the manufacturing industry, which is consistent 
with the proposition. However, this optimal capital structure largely depends on 
the nature of the project and the level of equity required by lenders. The capital 
structure formation is generally viewed to be project-specific. The evidence of 
the existence of an optimal capital structure supports the findings of Graham 
and Harvey (2001), who demonstrate that managers have target leverage ratios 
in mind when deciding on their capital structure.  
Proposition 5: The nature of the assets in the Saudi manufacturing industry has 
a positive impact on leverage.  
The nature of assets can affect the capital structure decisions of a firm (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). Supporting this notion, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) argue 
that capital structure is not confined by an industry average, as firm-specific 
needs are more significant. Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicate that a firm’s 
leverage increases with its level of fixed assets. While these studies support the 
semi-structured interview evidence that capital structure is project-specific, 
manufacturing firms generally possess significant tangible assets that can, in 
fact, be used as collateral (as opposed to firm-specific intangible assets). 





Respondents were questioned about the effect of the nature of their assets on 
their capital structure decisions.  
Respondents 2 and 4 in the petrochemical sector stated that the nature of the 
assets in their respective companies’ significantly determines their, level of 
leverage [R2PQ8; R4PQ8]. Respondent 2 stated that firms in the manufacturing 
industry are more likely to have higher leverage than in other industries such as 
the service industry [R2PQ8]. In addition, Respondent 4 pointed to the 
difference between industries with tangible assets and those with intangible 
assets as a key driver to the determinant of leverage [R4PQ8]. The respondent 
stated that his company operates in an industry that is capital intensive and 
can, hence, access more debt than industries with significant intangible assets 
[R4PQ8]. The results, therefore, support the findings of Rajan and Zingales 
(1995).  
In the food sector, both respondents claimed that the nature of assets positively 
impacts their respective companies’ leverage [R1FQ8; R2FQ6]. Respondent 1 
stated that the nature of assets has an impact on the level of leverage [R1FQ8]. 
Specifically, Respondent 1 stated that, in the industrial investment sector, even 
though a firm’s expansion and future acquisition policy affects the level of 
leverage, at the present time, most of its assets are financed with equity. 
Hence, the nature of the assets has no impact on leverage [R1IIQ8]. 
Accordingly, although the firm currently possess significant tangible assets, 
projects are funded through retained earnings. This is in accordance with 
pecking order theory. However, Respondent 2 stated that the nature of the 
assets does affect the level of leverage. The respondent argued that the nature 
of assets in the industrial investment business entails the provision of highly 
automated processes and operations, which requires significant financing 
[R2IIQ8]. This shows that capital-intensive projects require higher leverage.  
The majority of the respondents37 in the cement industry stated that the nature 
of their assets has a significant impact on the level of leverage [R3CQ8; 
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 Respondent 2 did not address the question.  





R4CQ8; R5CQ8]. Respondent 4 claimed “in heavy industries, the acquisition of 
assets (machineries and other equipment) requires a considerable amount of 
funds. In situations where funds for equity are not enough for investment 
purposes, the need for debt finance is a must, and therefore capital structure is 
affected accordingly” [R4CQ8]. Respondent 5 argued that the cement industry 
is capital intensive and, thus, huge capital injection is necessary; this capital 
can come from SIDF and commercial loans [R5CQ8]. Respondent 3 contended 
that the size of the capital expenditure in the cement industry affects the 
composition of the firms’ capital structure [R3CQ8]. Hence, the capital intensive 
nature of cement projects and the high levels of fixed assets help explain the 
debt orientations of these firms relative to those reported on the market level by 
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009).  
From the financial institution perspective38, Respondent 3 highlighted the fact 
that the presence of tangible assets can serve as collateral to lenders that will 
reduce their exposure in the event of default [R3BQ6]. Firms with high R&D and 
intangibles tend to have lower leverage, as there are not sufficient assets to 
serve as collateral [R3BQ6]. This further affirms the findings of Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), who suggest that creditors are more willing to fund firms in 
industries with high levels of tangible assets.  
Therefore, the results are in line with the proposition that the nature of the 
manufacturing industry is positively related to leverage. This positive 
relationship is demonstrated through two main channels. The first is the capital-
intensive nature of the manufacturing industry, which entails that significantly 
more funds are needed to fund the acquisition of assets. The second is the fact 
that the presence of such tangible assets reduces the risk to lenders, as these 
assets can be used as collateral, which in turn facilitates a firm’s’ access to 
finance. The presence of significant tangible assets could explain the higher 
levels of debt observed in this industry.  
Hypothesis 1: ROA has a negative impact on leverage. 
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Pecking-order theory argues that profitable firms depend more on internal 
financing in order to reduce information asymmetries and avoid costly external 
financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory predicts a negative relationship 
between profitability and leverage. The most common measure for profitability is 
the return on assets (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). 
The results shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 in Chapter 5 show that profitability is 
negatively related to leverage. The results for the pooled sample with White-
corrected standard errors show that firms with higher profitability have lower 
leverage on both measures of leverage. These results are significant at the 1% 
level and are consistent with the hypothesis that profitability has a negative 
impact on size. This is in line with the findings of Fama and French (2002), who 
argue that firms that follow pecking order theory are more inclined to use 
internal funding than external funding. The result is also consistent with the 
findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995), who find a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage, and Booth et al. (2001), who report that profitable 
firms in developing countries carry less debt. Moreover, studies on the Saudi 
Arabian market report similar results. Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) also show that there 
is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. Similarly, Omet 
and Mashharawe (2003) report a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage. In addition, while Al-Sakran (2001) reports mixed results on the 
relationship between profitability and leverage on the market level, his results 
on the industrial sector show a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage. Hence, the results are consistent with the empirical findings and the 
prediction of pecking order theory.  
Hypothesis 2. Natural logarithm of total assets has a positive impact on 
leverage. 
Another important determinant of capital structure is size. Pecking order theory 
suggests that large firms exhibit lower information asymmetry, making equity 
more favourable than debt (Kashifi-Pour et al., 2010). However, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) argue that large firms increase their leverage, since their 





expected bankruptcy costs are smaller. Therefore, the proposition is that firms 
that are large in size are more likely to carry more debt.  
The findings of the financial analysis are mixed. The results in Table 5.6 in 
Chapter 5 show that, for the pooled sample and the pooled sample with White-
corrected standard errors show that the leverage (TLTA) for larger firms is lower 
by approximately 1% compared to those of smaller firms, and these results are 
significant at the 1% level. This finding is not consistent with the proposition that 
size is positively related to leverage. The result is also similar to that reported by 
Kashefi-Pour et al. (2010), who show that, when information asymmetry exists, 
larger firms are likely to issue more equity than small firms. It is also consistent 
with the findings of Heshmati (2001), who argues that listed companies enjoy 
easier access to the equity market than smaller companies, due to lower fixed 
costs.  
Using the firms’ long-term debt-to-total asset (LTDTA) as the dependent 
variable, the results in Table 5.7 show that the relationship between size and 
leverage is insignificant. These results are consistent with the findings of Al-
Sakran (2001), who reports mixed results on the market level. They are, 
additionally, inconsistent with the positive relationship between leverage and 
size observed in the industrial sector. Moreover, both Omet and Massharawe 
(2003) and Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) demonstrate a positive relationship between 
size and leverage, which is inconsistent with the quantitative results.  
Hypothesis 3: Beta has a negative impact on leverage. 
Business risk is one of the most important determinants of capital structure 
(Huang and Song, 2006). Respondent 2 from the petrochemical sector stressed 
the importance of business risk as a determinant of capital structure. The 
relationship between risk and leverage is not clear-cut. According to pecking 
order theory, the future earnings of firms with higher business risk are difficult to 
predict and, accordingly, the cost of debt increases for such firms (Minton and 
Schrand, 1999). Lenders are wary of lending to such firms because they have a 





higher probability of default. Business risk (Beta) is included in the regression to 
account for the relationship between business risk and leverage.  
The results shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 in Chapter 5 demonstrate a positive 
and significant relationship between risk and leverage. The results for the 
pooled sample with White-corrected standard errors show that leverage (TLTA) 
is 6% higher for riskier firms and 8% higher on the second measure of leverage 
(LTDTA). The results are significant at the 1% level. The result is inconsistent 
with the proposition that firms with higher business risk carry less debt. 
Nevertheless, the result is consistent with empirical observations. Both Jordan 
et al. (1998) and Huang and Song (2006) find a positive relationship between 
risk and leverage. However, the result is inconsistent with the findings of Al-Ajmi 
et al. (2009), who report a negative relationship between risk and leverage in 
the Saudi market. The inconsistency can be attributed to two different factors. 
This study considers Beta as a measure of business risk, whereas the study of 
Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) use the standard deviation of earnings scaled by total 
assets as a measure of risk. Thus, Al-Ajmi et al. (2009) use a measure of risk 
that reflects both systematic and unsystematic risk. Moreover, Brander and 
Lewis (1986) argue that the limited liability of equity may cause managers to 
overinvest in risky projects. Highly leveraged firms overinvest in risky projects 
because shareholders can transfer the costs of unsuccessful projects to debt 
holders and gain the benefits of such projects if they are successful (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). It is both relevant and important to examine bankruptcy 
laws in Saudi Arabia in order to understand the order of pay-offs to 
shareholders and debt holders and analyse the conflicts that may arise between 
financial stakeholders.  
6.2 Capital Structure and Stakeholders  
Proposition 6: In the absence of strict bankruptcy laws, highly leveraged firms 
would overinvest in risky projects.  
Equity holder/debt holder conflicts arise when managers, acting in the interest 
of shareholders, prioritise the interests of those shareholders over the interests 





of debt holders. There are two relevant theoretical predictions in this context. 
Myers (1977) argues that a firm would underinvest in positive NPV projects if 
the pay-off of these projects solely benefits debt holders. The second prediction 
is that, due to the limited liability of equity, managers would overinvest in risky 
projects, transferring the costs of unsuccessful projects to debt holders, and 
keeping the gains of successful projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Brander 
and Lewis, 1986). Hence, the investments of the firm would depend on the pay-
off structure in the event of bankruptcy. It is therefore relevant to analyse how 
respondents of manufacturing firms view bankruptcy laws in Saudi Arabia, and 
whether these laws have implications on the pay-offs of financial stakeholders 
and capital structure decisions.  
The results of the interviews from the petrochemical sector show that the 
majority of respondents39 find that bankruptcy laws do not affect their capital 
structure decisions [R1PQ9; R2PQ10; R4PQ10]. Respondent 4 stated that, if 
the company were in a position in which leverage would bring it closer to 
bankruptcy, then this might have an impact. Generally, however, bankruptcy 
laws have no impact on capital structure [R4PQ10]. Hence, there is little 
evidence to support the significance of Saudi bankruptcy laws in influencing 
capital structure and investment decisions.  
In contrast, the results from the food sector are mixed. Respondent 1 claimed 
that bankruptcy laws affect his firm’s capital structure and, in preparation for 
this, his company pays close attention to the solvency ratio [R1FQ10]. This ratio 
indicates the company’s ability to survive in the long-term. Respondent 2 
claimed that bankruptcy laws are of no significance [R2FQ8].  
Similarly, the findings for the industrial investment industry are mixed, with 
Respondent 1 stating that bankruptcy laws do have an impact on the 
company’s capital structure, due to a high Research and Development (R&D) 
intensity [R1IIQ10]. Respondent 2 maintained that they do not have any impact 
                                                                            
39
 Respondent 3 did not address the question.  





on capital structure [R2IIQ10]. The findings indicate that firms with high R&D 
intensity are more concerned about bankruptcy than others.  
In the cement industry, the majority of respondents40 claimed that bankruptcy 
laws do not have an effect on capital structure [R1CQ9; R4CQ10; R5CQ10]. 
Specifically, Respondent 1 opined that bankruptcy laws do not have any impact 
on the company’s capital structure [R1CQ9]. Respondent 4 contended that “a 
strict bankruptcy law is always a deterrent [to the company] to opt for a higher 
level of leverage in the capital structure” [R4CQ10]. Thus, the lack of clear and 
strict bankruptcy laws in the Kingdom encourages firms to carry more debt.  
Nevertheless, the response from the perspective of financial institutions 
indicates that the bankruptcy laws in Saudi Arabia are insignificant and not very 
clear [R3BQ8]. Respondent 1 asserted that Saudi Arabia’s “bankruptcy laws do 
not protect a firm that is bankrupt, unlike the US” [R1BQ7]. Moreover, the pay-
off structure differs from other jurisdictions. Respondent 1 stated that 
employees are paid first, “which goes beyond limited liability, then trade 
payables, then debt holders. If a firm has assigned securities, which are 
pledged to the bank, then [those securities] have priority” [R1BQ7].  
Accordingly, the general perception is that bankruptcy laws in Saudi Arabia lack 
clarity and are rarely taken into consideration. The absence of strict bankruptcy 
laws entails higher levels of leverage. Moreover, in the previous section, it was 
established that the findings shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 in Chapter 5 reflect a 
positive relationship between leverage and risk. The pay-off structure outlined 
by Respondent 1 from financial institutions suggests that, if there are no 
securities pledged to the bank, pay-offs to managers (as employees) are 
prioritised and go beyond limited liability. Hence, the prediction of Brander and 
Lewis (1986) that leverage causes overinvestment in risky assets is only 
partially supported in this context, as it assumes the limited liability of equity and 
that managers act in the interest of shareholders. The results are also in line 
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with the findings of Huang and Song (2006), who find that firms with high levels 
of leverage tend to engage in riskier investments.  
Proposition 7: Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms are more likely to be Shari’a 
compliant.  
Shari’a compliance has significant implications on the capital structures of Saudi 
Arabian firms (Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007). It is important to note that there is no 
regulatory barrier to the use of conventional (non-Shari’a-compliant) loans. 
Commercial banks in the Kingdom can provide firms with both Shari’a-compliant 
and conventional loans. Thus, it is the preference of the firm that governs the 
significance of Shari’a compliance. Shari’a compliance implies that there is a 
strict cap (33%) on the level of debt that firms can obtain from conventional 
loans. When the 33% conventional debt ceiling is violated, firms risk being 
excluded from being Shari’a-compliant (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). However, when 
Shari’a compliance is enforced, firms generally rely on internally generated 
funds and maintain spare borrowing capacities (Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Moreover, 
Mirakhor and Zaidi (2007) argue that the profit sharing concept of Shari’a 
compliant contracts promotes greater stability in financial markets and helps in 
mitigating agency problems by aligning the interests of the financial 
stakeholders of the firm.  
In assessing whether companies are Shari’a compliant with regards to their 
loans, the majority of the respondents in the petrochemical sector claim that 
they are mostly Shari’a-compliant [R1PQ4; R2PQ4; R4PQ4]. The general 
message from the respondents was that they do not have to be Shari’a 
compliant, but they try their best to be [R1PQ4; R4PQ4]. However, Respondent 
3 stated that the loans obtained by his company are not necessarily Shari’a 
compliant, and that the issue of compliance “depends on shareholders’ 
philosophy and views” [R3PQ4]. Accordingly, the results indicate that Shari’a 
compliance is not a necessity in this sector and largely depends on the 
preferences of the shareholders of the firm.  





All respondents in the food sector claimed that their respective companies are 
Shari’a compliant [R1FQ4; R2FQ3]. According to Respondent 1, Shari’a 
compliance is a part of “the company’s strategy. Lately, [the company has] been 
using Shari’a compliant debt products wherever they are available” [R1FQ4]. 
The results imply that Shari’a compliance is preferred in this sector.  
The results in the industrial investment sector show that loans must be Shari’a 
compliant [R1IIQ4; R2IIQ4]. Respondent 1 stated that “any loans [the company] 
decides to take must be Shari’a compliant” [R1IIQ4], while Respondent 2 stated 
that Shari’a compliance “depends on the top management’s culture. In our case 
loans are complying with Shari’a law” [R2IIQ4]. Accordingly, the results for the 
industrial investment sector illustrate that Shari’a compliance is, in fact, an 
important consideration.  
Moreover, the majority of respondents in the cement sector stated that their 
loans are in compliance with Shari’a [R1CQ4; R2CQ4; R3CQ4; R4CQ4]. The 
preference for loans to be Shari’a compliant seems to be the industry norm in 
the cement sector. Respondent 2 proclaimed that, while it is important that 
loans are in compliance with Shari’a laws, the satisfaction of shareholders 
typically motivates this decision [R4CQ4]. Respondent 1 stated that his 
“company’s sources of debt finance have to be 100% Shari’a compliant” 
[R1CQ4]. Respondent 4 argued that “in Saudi Arabia, project finance is being 
dealt with through murabaha agreements that comply with Shari'a law” 
[R4CQ4]. However, Respondent 5 maintained that “the cost of loans is one 
main consideration [and] it does not have to be Shari’a compliant” [R5CQ4]. 
Nevertheless, Respondent 5 also stated that his company “increasingly prefers 
Shari’a-compliant loans” to conventional ones [R5CQ4]. Therefore, Shari’a 
compliance is prevalent in this sector.  
The interview results from the perspective of financial institutions show that all 
of the respondents indicated that loans must be Shari’a-compliant. However, 
the respondents made a distinction on the importance of Shari’a compliance 
between public and private companies, as well as small and large companies. 
Respondent 2 stated that Shari’a compliance is generally seen in public 





companies [R2BQ2]. Moreover, according to Respondent 3, Shari’a compliance 
is particularly important for listed companies, especially those companies that 
appeal to a large number of investors [R3BQ3]. However, the respondent 
suggested that Shari’a compliance is less significant for larger companies 
[R3BQ3]. The Islamic environment that characterises the Saudi economy, thus, 
implies that Shari’a compliance is emphasised and made public by companies 
that wish to attract local investors. Moreover, Respondent 1 stated that, 
because most companies have Islamic balance sheets, loans tend to be Shari’a 
compliant [R1BQ3].  
Therefore, the interview results serve as overwhelming evidence of the 
importance of Shari’a compliance for companies. Shari’a compliance is not 
compulsory, but companies do comply in order to attract more investors. The 
results indicate that Shari’a compliance is predominant in public companies that 
tend to publicise the fact that they are compliant in order to attract more 
investors. However, it is important to note that Shari’a compliance is primarily 
based on the preferences of shareholders, and, for large companies, it is 
viewed as less significant. The nature of Shari’a compliant contracts aligns the 
interest of shareholders and debt holders (Mirakhor and Zaidi, 2007). Such 
loans may provide further incentive to use debt as a disciplining device.  
Proposition 8: Debt is used as a tool for disciplining management. 
Agency theorists argue that conflicts may arise between managers and equity 
holders when managers use a firm’s free-cash flows for opportunistic purposes 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers may, thus, overinvest in negative NPV 
or risky projects for self-serving purposes—such as perks, power and empire 
building (Jensen, 1986). Debt can serve as a disciplining device that 
discourages managers from overinvesting a firm’s free cash flows, since 
managers have to cover their debt obligations and are monitored by financial 
institutions (Jensen, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1995). Since Shari’a compliant 
contracts dominate the credit market, as has been previously indicated, 
respondents were questioned on whether the disciplining function of debt 
motivates their capital structure decisions.  





All of the respondents in the petrochemical and food sectors claimed that debt 
is used as a disciplining tool for management [R1PQ10; R2PQ11; R3PQ8; 
R4PQ11; R1FQ11; R2FQ9]. However, for firms in the industrial investment 
sector, Respondent 2 stated that debt is not used as a discipline tool for 
management [R2IIQ11]. Respondent 1 countered that the availability of SIDF 
implies strict discipline. Therefore, debt is used as a disciplining tool [R1IIQ11]. 
If there is continuous monitoring by government lending institutions, such as the 
SIDF, then it could be argued that the conditions imposed with the provision of 
the SIDF loans prevent firms from wasting future free cash flows.  
Nevertheless, the interview results for the cement sector show that the majority 
of the respondents claimed that they do not use debt as a disciplining tool 
[R1CQ10; R2CQ8; R3CQ11]. Respondent 2 stated that debt is used, among 
other things, to maintain customer loyalty through lines of credit, and not to 
discipline managers [R2CQ8]. However, some of the respondents indicate that 
debt is sometimes used to discipline managers. Respondent 4 stated that 
“management should be alert at all times to avoid falling in default, and this 
requires a strict discipline in cash management” [R4CQ11]. The problem with 
this explanation is that the relationship between debt and its ability to discipline 
management seems rather vague. If the company is struggling, it may well fall 
into default even if cash is efficiently managed and not wasted. The doctrine of 
discipline regarding free cash flow is that companies take on debt to avoid 
wasting excess cash. This is the crux of the issue.  
All respondents from the financial institutions agree that debt is used as a 
disciplinary tool for managers [R1BQ8; R2BQ6; R3BQ9]. Respondent 1 
asserted that “sometimes shareholders require management to abide by certain 
accounting principles. Financial commitments definitely have disciplinary 
reactions” [R1BQ8]. This result is in line with the findings of Healy and Palepu 
(2001), who emphasize the importance of accounting standards and disclosure 
rules in enhancing the credibility of the firm with respect to its lenders and 
protecting its investors.  





Accordingly, the findings of the interviews regarding whether debt is used as a 
disciplinary tool show that the majority of respondents claimed to have used 
debt in this way. However, it is important to note that the monitoring and 
disciplining effect of debt is an inherent benefit, and not necessarily the primary 
reason for seeking external funding. Moreover, the quantitative findings show 
that profitable firms would carry less debt. If debt is used principally and 
effectively for disciplining managers, the firm’s cash flows are not wasted. 
Therefore, firms would follow the pecking order in using their free-cash flows for 
investment and would rely less on debt for funding (Chang, 1999). This could 
explain the quantitative finding that profitable Saudi manufacturing firms carry 
less debt. The findings are also consistent with the agency theory prediction of 
the use of debt as a disciplining device (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
1986).  
Proposition 9: The shareholders of a firm significantly influence its capital 
structure.  
The ownership of structure of a firm can have significant implications on its 
capital structure decisions (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Booth et al., 2001). In the 
context of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms, it has been established in the 
previous sections that shareholders can influence capital structure decisions 
through their appetite for debt and their preference for Shari’a compliance. The 
influence of shareholders was further emphasised when respondents were 
specifically asked about the manner in which shareholders influence capital 
structure decisions.  
The findings of the interviews for the petrochemical sector on the influence of 
shareholders on capital structure show that the majority of respondents agree 
that shareholders have an influence on capital structure. Respondents 1 and 3 
argued that their influence is limited [R1PQ11; R3PQ9]. Respondent 2 argued 
that shareholders would prefer for his company to take on more debt [R2PQ12]. 
This demonstrates the ‘debt-happy’ culture of this particular company’s 
shareholders. Respondent 4 opined that reputable shareholders increase the 
credibility of the company, which could facilitate its access to finance and could 





have a significant influence on the amount of equity that is assigned to the 
firm’s investment projects [R4PQ12]; thus, shareholders “definitely have a say 
in the capital structure decision” [R4PQ12]. Hence, shareholders’ influence on 
capital structure decisions is prevalent in the petrochemical sector.  
In the food industry, Respondent 1 argued that his company seeks “to maximise 
shareholder value” [R1FQ12]. However, Respondent 2 stated that shareholders 
have an indirect effect on the firm’s leverage, through its dividend policy 
[R2FQ10]. Managers, hence, have to balance the amount of dividends paid 
back to a company’s shareholders with retained earnings that are used for 
reinvestment, so as not to hinder the firm’s growth prospects.  
For companies in the industrial investment sector, the findings demonstrate that 
shareholders have an influence on capital structure. Respondent 1 contended 
that shareholders’ requests for more rights and bonus issues “may not be 
economically sound but [are] sometimes necessary” [R1IIQ12]. Respondent 2 
argued that shareholders’ ability to contribute more equity when needed 
significantly influences capital structure decisions [R2IIQ12].   
The result for the cement industry shows that, for majority of the respondents, 
shareholders, through their dividend policy, have an influence on the level of 
debts of the companies [R2CQ10; R3CQ12; R4CQ12]. An increase in the 
dividend pay-out implies a reduction in the retained earnings. This will force 
companies to either increase debt or equity to fund their investments. However, 
Respondents 1 and 5 argued that shareholders have no impact on capital 
structure decisions [R1CQ11, R5CQ12].  
The results from the perspective of financial institutions indicate that 
shareholders influence the leverage levels of companies [R1BQ9; R2BQ7]. 
However, the results depend on the type of companies. Respondent 1 argued 
that certain shareholders do not prefer debt, whereas others can be more “debt 
happy” [R1BQ9]. Moreover, the respondent asserted that “shareholders with 
good reputation facilitate access to finance” [R1BQ9]. Respondent 3 stated that 
shareholders have no influence on the capital structure of listed companies, and 





that they are only effective for private companies [R3BQ10]. Accordingly, 
lenders emphasise the importance of shareholders in influencing firms’ capital 
structures.  
Hence, the findings of the interviews demonstrate that shareholders significantly 
affect capital structure decisions. The extent of their influence depends on the 
nature of the firm. The results are in line with the findings of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) and Booth et al. (2001), who find that major shareholders significantly 
influence capital structure decisions. It is, thus, relevant to quantify the effect of 
different shareholders in order to provide greater insight about the influences of 
different shareholders on capital structure decisions.  
Hypothesis 4: Family ownership has a positive impact on leverage. 
The existence of large family ownership blocks in firms can influence capital 
structure decisions. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that large ownership 
blocks help mitigate agency problems when owners actively manage the firm. 
Therefore, large family ownership blocks can replace debt as a disciplining 
device, if family owners actively monitor the firm. The second channel is through 
the fact that family owners prefer to carry more debt, as equity would dilute their 
ownership stake and control of the firm.  
In order to assess this empirically, dummy variables were used to represent 
family ownership. The results in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that firms that have 
large family ownership blocks carry more debt than those that do not. The 
results for the pooled sample with White-corrected standard errors show that 
firms with family ownership carry 5% more debt than those that do not have 
family ownership on both measures of leverage, and these results are 
significant at the 1% level. The result is, hence, consistent with the proposition 
that family-owned firms would carry more debt. The results can be attributed to 
the fact that family-owned firms prefer debt in order to avoid diluting their equity 
stakes and reducing their control of the firm. The results are also in line with 
empirical studies that demonstrate a positive relationship between family 
ownership and leverage (Bianco and Nicodano, 2006; King and Santor, 2008; 





Mehran, 1992). However, the finding contradicts the results reported by Al-Ajmi 
et al. (2009), who report a negative relationship between family ownership and 
leverage. Accordingly, the family ownership of a firm can help explain corporate 
attitudes towards debt and significantly influences capital structure decisions.  
Hypothesis 5: Institutional ownership has a negative impact on leverage.  
Institutional ownership blocks affect capital structure decisions through two 
main channels. First, large institutional ownership blocks can help mitigate 
agency problems. Chen et al. (2007) demonstrate that institutional investors 
actively monitor a firm’s activities. Thus, institutional ownership can act as a 
substitute for debt in reducing agency problems. Secondly, Michaely and 
Vincent (2012) demonstrate that institutional owners devote considerable 
resources to collecting information, which reduces informational asymmetries. 
This, in turn, reduces the cost of equity. Both channels imply that institutional 
ownership leads to lower leverage. In order to assess this empirically, dummy 
variables were used to represent family ownership. The results in Tables 5.6 
and 5.7 show that firms that have large institutional ownership blocks carry 
more debt. The results for the pooled sample with White-corrected standard 
errors show that firms with institutional ownership carry 13% more debt, when 
leverage is measured as total liabilities to total assets ,and 9% more debt, when 
leverage is measured as long-term debt to total assets. These results are highly 
significant at the 1% level.  
The results reject the proposition of a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and leverage. The positive relationship can be attributed to the fact 
that institutional investors do not replace the monitoring and disciplining function 
of debt. Another possible explanation is that institutional investors do not 
sufficiently reduce information asymmetries in this context, and hence, in 
accordance with pecking order theory, the cost of equity would remain high. The 
results are consistent with the findings of empirical studies that demonstrate 
that firms with institutional owners would have higher leverage (Berger et al., 
1997; Chen and Steiner, 1999). More specific to the Saudi market, the result is 





consistent with the findings of Al-Ajmi et al. (2009), who find a positive 
relationship between institutional investors and leverage.  
Proposition 10: Government Owned firms are likely to carry more debt. 
Hypothesis 6: Government ownership has a positive impact on leverage. 
Governments could have significant equity holdings in Saudi manufacturing 
firms. Allen et al. (2005) argue that governments tend to prioritise government 
loans to SOEs. Moreover, the backing of the government increases the 
credibility of the firm, which would imply greater access to external finance. 
Therefore, given that Saudi manufacturing firms utilise government loans in the 
form of SIDF loans in their capital structure—coupled with the benefit of higher 
credibility and lower risk of default—the prediction is that firms with large 
government ownership blocks would carry more debt. This prediction is tested 
in two ways. First, semi-structured interview results were analysed in order to 
provide insight into the perspectives of managers and financial institutions on 
the effect of government ownership on capital structure. Quantitative financial 
analysis, in the form of a dummy variable for government ownership was then 
examined to complement the interview results.  
The interview results for the petrochemical sector indicate that the majority of 
respondents took the view that government ownership has no effect on capital 
structure, as government financial institutions are regarded as separate entities 
[R1PQ12; R2PQ13; R4PQ13]. However, Respondent 3 opined that government 
ownership “facilitates access to finance” [R3PQ10]. Moreover, all respondents 
from the food sector and the industrial investment sector 41  claimed that 
government ownership is unrelated to access to finance [R1FQ13; R2FQ11; 
R1IIQ13]. The majority of respondents from the cement sector42 also claimed 
that government ownership is unrelated to access to finance [R1CQ12; 
R3CQ13; R5CQ13]. Respondent 5 stated that “even SIDF, the government 
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financing institution, pays no consideration to the government being a 
shareholder” [R5CQ13]. However, Respondent 4 opined that it is “easier to 
obtain loans when the government is [both] lender and shareholder” [R4CQ13].  
Accordingly, the interview results indicate that the general opinion is that the 
relationship between government ownership and leverage is spurious. To 
validate this point further, the empirical results outlined in Table 5.7 of Chapter 5 
illustrate an insignificant relationship between government ownership and 
leverage, when measured as TLTA. The result implies that government 
ownership has no effect on leverage. This is in line with the majority of 
responses reported in the semi-structured interviews. Nevertheless, when 
leverage is measured as LTDTA, the results outlined in Table 5.10 indicate that 
there is a positive relationship between government ownership and leverage. 
The result is consistent with the positive relationship between government 
ownership and leverage reported by Al-Sakran (2001) on the market level and 
is inconsistent with the negative result reported for the industrial sector. The 
result is also inconsistent with the findings of Al-Ajmi et al., (2009) who 
demonstrate a negative relationship between government ownership and 
leverage. Since the qualitative findings do not support the quantitative results 
on a positive relationship between government ownership and leverage, the 
proposition cannot be accepted. Accordingly, government equity participation 
does not relate to a firm’s capital structure decisions, and hence, should not be 
considered.  
Proposition 11: Saudi manufacturing firms are more likely to carry more debt 
when debt is easily accessible or available. 
After considering the different implications of equity holders on capital structure, 
it is important to consider the manner in which debt holders influence capital 
structure decisions. The analysis of the effect of debt holders on capital 
structure begins by considering the extent to which debt is available for 
manufacturing firms in Saudi Arabia. Several authors argue that firms would rely 
on internally generated funds, rather than debt, if external credit was costly or 
difficult to access (Ferri and Jones, 1979; Beck et al., 2002; Cassar and 





Holmes, 2003). Hence, managers were questioned on whether they have 
difficulty accessing debt.  
The findings from the semi-structured interviews show that, for the 
petrochemical sector, the majority of the respondents claim that the availability 
of credit has no influence on leverage [R1PQ13; R3PQ11; R4PQ14]. According 
to Respondent 1 “It is relatively easy to access credit… [The firm has] never 
defaulted [and its] business is strong [and it enjoys] a strong history and 
excellent reputation” [R1PQ13]. However, Respondent 2 argued for a positive 
relationship between the level of leverage and the availability of credit, as the 
company needs “to keep some unutilised, especially with high working capital” 
[R2PQ14]. Respondent 3 asserted that leverage depends on the business cycle 
of the economy [R3PQ11]. He mentioned that his company faced difficulty 
accessing credit in the past but that it currently has no such problem [R3PQ11]. 
Thus, the results indicate that the capital structure of manufacturing firms in the 
petrochemical sector does not depend on the availability of credit.  
Similarly, in the food sector, both respondents claim that debt is readily 
available [R1FQ14; R2FQ12]. Respondent 1 stated that the availability of credit 
has no bearing on the level of debt that the company assumes, except when 
the risk is shared with the bank. The respondent contended that his company 
has always enjoyed “substantial [credit] facility lines with banks” and, therefore, 
finance can be readily obtained for its projects [R1FQ14]. Hence, firms in the 
food sector do not face difficulties in accessing credit.  
However, for firms in the industrial investment sector, the results are mixed. 
While Respondent 1 claimed that his company faces “no problem with the 
availability of credit” [R1IIQ14], Respondent 2 argued that “there are some 
financial covenants that may restrict the appetite for borrowing”, even when 
credit is available [R2IIQ14].  
In the cement sector, the majority of the respondents believed that the 
availability of credit affects their firms’ leverage to a certain extent [R1CQ13; 
R4CQ14 R5CQ14]. However, Respondent 3 maintained that “the strong 





financial position of the company is appropriate for easy access to funding” 
[R3CQ14]. Similarly, Respondent 2 claimed that leverage is not dependent 
upon the availability of credit [R2CQ11].  
Respondents from financial institutions 43  provided mixed views on the 
significance of the availability of credit. Respondent 3 stated that the availability 
of credit sometimes influences leverage and points to the attitude of banks 
following the financial crisis. He claimed that banks “decided to turn 180 
degrees and became much more strict [sic]” in providing loans to companies. 
However, Respondent 1 argued against this, stating “as a bank you prefer to be 
involved with a successful businesses”, implying that the availability of credit is 
contingent on the success of the business [R1BQ10]. The success and 
profitability of Saudi manufacturing firms suggests that the availability of credit is 
less of a constraint in this particular sector.  
Hence, the results indicate that the majority of Saudi manufacturing firms face 
no barriers to accessing credit. Hence, the proposition is accepted. It is also 
relevant to note that firms that are underleveraged did not mention their inability 
to access debt as a justification for lower leverage. In fact, such firms, as 
argued by Respondent 1 from the industrial investment industry, have 
substantial “excess cash” that is utilised to fund their operations [R1IIQ7]. Some 
respondents asserted that funds are available, but financial covenants and the 
length of processing make them unattractive [R1IIQ7; R2IIQ14]. Moreover, the 
findings show the significance of the availability of credit on capital structure to 
be more pronounced in the cement sector.  
Proposition 12: Saudi manufacturing firms are more likely to have access to 
international funding.  
The results of the previous section demonstrate that credit is available in the 
local market and should be easily accessible to local manufacturing firms. 
However, the multinational nature of some of the manufacturing firms 
interviewed means that credit may not be restricted to the local market. The 
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expectation is that, in general, Saudi manufacturing firms are more likely to 
have some of their debt from international sources. To validate this point further, 
respondents were asked whether they could obtain loans from international 
financial institutions to fund their operations.  
Firms in the petrochemical sector have access to both local and international 
finance. All respondents pointed to their use of international debt in their capital 
structure [R1PQ14; R2PQ15; R3PQ12; R4PQ15]. Respondent 1 stated that his 
company uses “both regional and international finance [and] about 60% of [the 
firm’s] loans are international” [R1PQ14]. However, the use of external finance 
also depends on the location of the company’s current project [R1PQ14]. 
Respondent 2 asserted that, for projects in international countries, the source of 
finance is external debt [R2PQ15]. Further, when the company has foreign 
partners located overseas, the probability of relying on external finance 
increases [R2PQ15]. Respondent 3 stated that his firm’s use of external finance 
is conditional on international partners and engineering, procurement and 
construction (EPC) contractors [R3PQ12]. Accordingly, the use of international 
debt is predominant in this sector.  
The results for the food sector show that firms in this sector do not rely on 
external finance to conduct their business. Respondent 2 noted that, although 
external financing can be used, the firm prefers to rely on local financing 
[R2FQ13]. Respondent 1 argued that it is not economically viable to use 
external financing and that his company “used to obtain financing from external 
banks but stopped due to additional cost (withholding tax), [as external banks 
are] less competitive than the local market” [R1FQ15]. Therefore, the interview 
results from the food sector indicate that, provided that manufacturing occurs 
internally, companies that seek international financing would expose 
themselves to exchange rate and other risks, in addition to the high costs of 
debt. Accordingly, international finance is not economically feasible in this 
context.  
The results from the industrial investment sector regarding the use of external 
finance are mixed. Respondent 1 claimed that his company “would prefer local 





finance” [R1IIQ15]. However, Respondent 2 argued against this, stating that his 
company uses external finance, along with its foreign partners, but the 
exchange rate risk remains a concern [R2IIQ15]. Hence, the results indicate 
that finance can be obtained from international sources, but the preference is 
for local funding.  
The results for the cement sector show that most respondents44 do not use 
external finance for their project [R2CQ12; R3CQ15; R4CQ15; R5CQ15]. 
According to Respondent 3, the reasons for not seeking international finance 
are related to the fact that negotiations for international funds tend to be time-
consuming. Also, the conditions of the loans are cumbersome and can 
adversely affect the timely implementation of the project [R3CQ15]. Hence, 
international loans are not economically feasible [R5CQ15]. Respondent 4 
attributed this result to the nature of guarantees required and other restrictions 
by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) [R4CQ15]. Accordingly, the use 
of international debt is less prevalent in the cement sector.  
The result from the perspective of financial institutions suggests that external 
financing from other countries is rarely used. Respondent 1 stated “external 
finance is used to a less[er] extent” [R1BQ11]. Respondent 2 argued that 
“external finance is appropriate only for specialised projects” and is otherwise 
expensive and unwise [R2BQ8]. In addition, Respondent 3 maintained that “the 
use of external finance is very limited and that only a small segment of the 
market uses external finance” [R3BQ13].  
Accordingly, in general, the results indicate that the majority of Saudi 
manufacturing firms have access to finance from international sources.  
Therefore, the proposition is accepted. However, the availability of international 
finance depends on whether the companies have international partners or 
projects. There are several considerations—such as negotiation periods, rules 
and SAMA regulations—with which a firm must comply in order to finance its 
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projects from international sources. More importantly, international finance can 
be uneconomical, and costs associated with exchange rate risk can weigh 
heavily on borrowers. Thus, on average, credit is available to Saudi 
manufacturing firms both locally and internationally, with local finance being the 
preferred option.  
Proposition 13: Saudi manufacturing firms with strong banking relations are 
likely to carry more debt. 
Hypothesis 7: Relationship banking has a positive impact on leverage.  
Commercial banking concentration can significantly affect a firm’s capital 
structure decisions (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; 
and Gonzalez and Gonzalez, 2008). The Saudi Arabian banking sector is highly 
concentrated (SAMA, 2013), and it can be argued that relationship banking 
attains greater importance in this context, as underlined by Peterson and Rajan 
(1995). In such markets, relationship banking has a positive impact on leverage 
(Fan et al., 2010). This prediction was tested in two ways. First, semi-structured 
interview results were analysed in order to provide insight into the perspectives 
of managers and financial institutions on the effect of relationship banking on 
capital structure. Quantitative financial analysis, in the form of a dummy variable 
for relationship banking, was then examined to complement the interview 
results. 
The results show that all of the respondents in the petrochemical sector agreed 
that their relationship with banks has a positive effect on leverage [R1PQ15; 
R2PQ16; R3PQ13; R4PQ16]. However, Respondent 2 emphasised that the 
relationship is institutional and not necessarily personal [R2PQ16]. According to 
Respondent 3, this relationship “facilitates it in terms of level of importance, 
attention and exposure”. However, it does not change the terms and conditions 
of the loan [R3PQ13]. Respondent 4 argued that a firm’s capital structure 
depends on the performance, reputation and quality of the managers [R4PQ16]. 
The respondent stated “sometimes banks don’t lend to a project but rather to 
the people that manage the project” [R4PQ16]. Accordingly, relationship 
banking is a significant strategic determinant of capital structure in this sector.  





Both respondents in the food sector stated that their relationship with their 
banks helps facilitate their access to bank loans. Respondent 1 argued that 
relationships with banks are crucial in obtaining funds from banks [R1FQ16]. 
However, Respondent 2 pointed out that, regardless of this relationship, other 
factors—such as a company’s ratings and track records—are essential to 
secure loans from banks [R2FQ14].  
For companies in the industrial investment sector, the influence of relationship 
banking on the level of leverage is mixed. Respondent 2 stated that good 
relationship with banks increase the speed with which a firm is able to get 
finance from the banks [R2IIQ16]. However, Respondent 1 suggested that the 
relationship with banks is irrelevant, as his company has “no need to tap into 
commercial bank finance at the moment” [R1IIQ16]. Accordingly, profitable 
firms that generate enough liquidity to finance their projects through retained 
earnings follow the pecking order and do not necessarily need to have close 
relationships with banks.  
In the cement industry, the findings show that the majority of respondents state 
that relationship banking has an influence on capital structure [R2CQ13; 
R4CQ16; R5CQ16]. Respondents 2, 4 and 5 claim that the relationship 
between the firm and the bank facilitates access to credit [R2CQ13; R4CQ16; 
R5CQ16]. However, Respondents 1 and 3 believe that the relationship between 
the firm and the bank has no bearing on leverage, because leverage and the 
ability to access funds depend on the company’s financial position, reputation 
and the company’s credit rating [R1CQ15; R3CQ16]. Accordingly, relationship 
banking is particularly important for facilitating access to credit in this sector.  
The results from the financial institutions show that all of the respondents 
indicated that the relationship between firms and banks increases the possibility 
of securing loans but does not necessarily guarantee that the loan is granted 
[R1BQ12; R2BQ9; R3BQ14]. Respondent 2 argued “relationships matter but 
banks do severe due diligence, especially after 2008” [R2BQ9]. However, 
Respondent 3 stated that, although relationship banking gives you quick 
access, banks still have to conduct due diligence, and while the relationship 





does not guarantee that the company will secure the loan, it might help in 
“easing the conditions” of the loan [R3BQ14]. Thus, the results support the 
findings of Boot (2000), who demonstrates that firms with strong banking 
relationships have lower information asymmetry and easier access to finance.  
Hence, the results of the semi-structured interview indicate that companies that 
enjoy strong relationships with banks have greater access to finance and, 
therefore, carry more debt. To investigate this empirically, a dummy variable 
was used to represent relationship banking. This variable took the value 1 if 
members of the firm’s board were also on the board of the banks, and zero 
otherwise. The results in Table 5.6 show that, when leverage is defined as total 
liabilities-to-total assets (TLTA), firms that have strong relationship with their 
banks have higher leverage than those that do not have strong relationships 
with their banks. The results for the pooled sample with White-corrected 
standard errors showed that firms with strong relationship with their banks are, 
on average, 12% more leveraged than their counterparts with weaker 
relationships with their banks, and the results are significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, when leverage is defined as long-term debt-to-total asset (LTDTA), 
the results in Table 5.7 show that firms with strong relationships with their banks 
are, on average, 5% more leveraged than their counterparts, and the results are 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, the hypothesis is accepted.  
Both the interview results and the quantitative financial analysis point to the fact 
that relationship banking is a significant determinant of capital structure; 
therefore, the proposition is accepted. The result can be attributed to the fact 
that strong banking relationships reduce information asymmetries between a 
firm and its creditors. Thus, managers of Saudi manufacturing firms ought to 
maintain close relationships with their banks in order to obtain greater access to 
finance. The result is consistent with the findings of Boot (2000) and Gonzales 
and Gonzales (2008), who report a positive relationship between relationship 
banking and leverage.  
Proposition 14: Saudi manufacturing firms that have access to government 
loans are more likely to carry more debt.  





Another channel through which Saudi manufacturing firms can obtain external 
funds is through government loans. The SIDF provides manufacturing firms with 
low interest loans of up to 75% of capital paid over 20 years as discussed in 
Chapter 3. These loans are arguably the most important mode of financing for 
Saudi Manufacturing firms. The SIDF loan increases the leverage of the 
company that receives the loan, and this amount can vary depending on the 
area in which the company operates. Galdino and Micco (2004) argue that 
government intervention through the provision of loans and other assistance 
helps promote growth and increases leverage, especially for industries that 
have significant tangible assets that can be used as collateral, like the 
manufacturing industry. Hence, the prediction is that Saudi manufacturing firms 
would take advantage of cheap government loans in financing their operations 
and, therefore, carry more debt.  
The interview results on capital structure formation and the influence of 
government on capital structure show that all respondents for the petrochemical 
and food sector claimed to have received SIDF loans, regardless of the amount, 
which increases their respective companies’ leverage [R1PQ3; R2PQ1; R3PQ2; 
R4PQ2; R1FQ3; R2FQ1]. In the industrial investment sector, Respondent 2 
claimed that government loans are the most important factor that influences the 
capital structure of the firm [R2IIQ17]. Similarly, the majority of respondents in 
the cement industry agreed that the presence of government loans in the form 
of SIDF positively influences their leverage [R3CQ17; R4CQ17; R5CQ17]. 
Respondent 5 suggested that capital structure depends on the availability of 
SIDF loans [R5CQ6]. There are, hence, two possible scenarios:  
Table 6.1: Respondent 5 from cement sector - capital structure scenarios 
 In case SIDF loan is  
available (Scenario one) 
In case SIDF loan is not 
available (Scenario two) 
Equity 25 % 50 % 
Commercial loan 25 % 50 % 
SIDF soft loan 50% -- 
Total 100 % 100 % 
 





Table 6.1 implies that the presence of SIDF loans increases leverage by 25%, 
as only 25% of capital can be pledged as equity [R5CQ6]. However, 
Respondent 1 from the cement sector stated that his company only uses SIDF 
loans when there is a need to finance a project, and that these loans do not 
necessarily have a permanent role in his firm’s capital structure [R1CQ16].  
The results, from the perspective of the financial institutions, show that 
government support in the form of SIDF loans has an impact on a firm’s capital 
structure and leverage positions [R1BQ13; R3BQ15]. Respondent 1 claimed 
that “government involvement makes leverage easier from a commercial 
banking point of view” [R1BQ13]. This can be attributed to the fact that SIDF 
loans have strict covenants, which reduces the need for further due diligence by 
commercial banks.  
Thus, the results of the interviews indicate that SIDF loans play a crucial role in 
the determination of companies’ leverage positions. The availability of SIDF 
loans positively impacts a firm’s leverage, and, hence, the proposition is 
accepted. In the absence of SIDF, manufacturing firms tend to have a 1:1 debt 
to equity ratio. However, when SIDF loans are available, debt can account for 
up to 75% of capital structure. The availability of SIDF loans for manufacturing 
projects helps explain the aforementioned debt orientation in the capital 
structure of manufacturing firms.  
Proposition 15: Government subsidies significantly influence the capital 
structure decision of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
In the context of Saudi Arabia, land and fuel subsidies play a major role in the 
manufacturing sector, particularly in the petrochemical and cement sectors 
(Mahdi, 2011a; Mahdi, 2011b; Peel, 2013). The availability of government 
subsidies reduces the costs for a firm and thus reduces the need for external 
funding. Therefore, respondents were questioned on the manner in which 
government support affects their leverage.  
The interview results for the petrochemical industry are mixed. Respondents 1 
and 2 claimed that subsidies are significant to capital structure decisions 





[R1PQ16; R2PQ17]. Respondents 3 and 4 made no reference to subsidies and 
only mentioned government support in terms of financing [R3PQ14; R4PQ17]. 
In the food industry, the results were also mixed. Respondent 1 claimed that 
government financial support through SIDF is important but made no reference 
to subsidies [R1FQ17]. However, Respondent 2 suggested that “subsidies 
mean more control” and, hence, his preference would be to have no subsidies 
[R2FQ15]. 
The results from the industrial investment sector are mixed. Respondent 1 
claimed that “government subsidies have some influence through industrial 
lands” [R1IIQ17]. However, Respondent 2 referred to government support, in 
terms of financing (SIDF), to be the main influential factor [R2IIQ17].  
In the cement sector, the majority of respondents addressed government 
support in the form of SIDF loans and made little reference to subsidies 
[R1CQ16; R4CQ17; R5CQ17]. Respondent 3 claimed that government support 
in general is an important factor to capital structure decisions [R3CQ17]. 
However, Respondent 2 emphasised that government subsidies are not only 
essential in influencing the company’s need for finance, but also in affecting a 
firm’s prospects for expansion [R2CQ14]. The respondent stressed the 
importance of fuel subsidies to the cement industry as the main influential factor 
[R2CQ14]. Moreover, the results from the perspective of financial institutions 
show that respondents refer to SIDF loans as the main factor, with little 
reference to government support in terms of subsidies [R1BQ13, R3BQ15].  
The findings indicate that subsidies are less important than financial 
government support in the form of SIDF. Hence, the proposition is rejected. 
Subsidies increase profits and competitive advantage of individual 
manufacturing firms while reducing their need for external finance. However, 
subsidies, in the context of Saudi manufacturing firms, serve as an added 
advantage, and firms view government support through SIDF as the main 
influence on their capital structure decisions. Subsidies are not observed to be 
sufficient in eradicating a firm’s need for external finance. Instead, they reduce 
some of the costs imposed on the firm and help increase the competitive 





advantage of local firms. The results are inconsistent with the findings of Mitra 
and Webster (2008), who indicate that government subsidies could have an 
influence on a firm’s capital structure decisions. 
Proposition 16: Suppliers are more likely to influence the capital structure of 
Saudi manufacturing firms.  
Suppliers can influence capital structure decisions by bargaining for larger 
shares of a firm’s surplus earnings. Several studies demonstrate that firms can 
use debt to reduce the bargaining power of suppliers (Dasgupta and Sengupta, 
1993; Brown et al., 2009; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). By issuing debt, a firm 
commits to paying out a proportion of its surpluses to lenders and is able to limit 
the amount of surpluses that suppliers can extract through their bargaining 
power. To test this theory, respondents were asked about the manner in which 
suppliers influence their capital structure decisions.  
The majority of respondents claimed that suppliers do not have a significant 
influence on capital structure decisions for firms in the petrochemical, food and 
industrial investment industries [R1PQ17; R2PQ18; R4PQ18; R1FQ18; 
R2FQ16; R1IIQ18; R2IIQ18]. Respondent 3 from the petrochemical sector 
claimed that the effect is a “one time” effect on capital expenditure [R3PQ15]. 
However, even though the majority of the respondents in the cement industry 
suggested that suppliers have no impact on the capital structure of companies 
[R1CQ17; R2CQ15; R3CQ18; R5CQ18], Respondent 4 argued that the 
payment terms offered by suppliers could impact a firm’s capital structure 
[R4CQ18]. In addition, Respondent 5 stated that suppliers have an impact on 
capital structure if they are involved in the financing of capital projects; 
otherwise, they have no impact on leverage [R5CQ18].  
The interview results from the perspective of the financial institutions indicated 
that suppliers may have an influence on the capital structure of firms through 
lines of credit [R1BQ14; R3BQ16]. However, if no lines of credit were extended, 
suppliers would not have any influence on a firm’s capital structure [R1BQ14]. 
The influence depends on the extension of lines of credit. Accordingly, suppliers 





would only influence the capital structures of Saudi manufacturing firms if they 
were financial stakeholders.  
The findings indicate that, on average, suppliers do not have an influence on 
the capital structure of a firm; thus, the proposition is rejected. The little 
evidence that points to the significance of suppliers emphasises their role as a 
financial stakeholder through lines of credit [R3PQ15; R5CQ18]. However, none 
of the respondents made reference to the bargaining power of suppliers. The 
results, therefore, do not support the arguments of studies that relate supplier 
influence to capital structure (Brown et al., 2009; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). 
These findings can be attributed to the lack of supplier bargaining power in the 
Saudi manufacturing industry.  
Proposition 17: The quality of the products of Saudi manufacturing firms is 
compromised during periods of economic downturn. 
Proposition 18: Customers are more likely to influence the capital structure of 
manufacturing firms.  
Customers of highly leveraged firms could influence their capital structure 
decisions. Titman (1984) contends that customers are unwilling to deal with 
firms that are highly leveraged, as they are more prone to bankruptcy than their 
conservatively leveraged peers. Customers take into account the direct 
switching costs (of finding alternative products) and implicit costs (of 
compromised quality or reliability) and bargain with highly leveraged firms to 
reduce their prices (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). Moreover, Hillier et al. (2008) 
assert that, during periods of financial distress, customers may receive inferior 
products. Therefore, respondents were asked about the extent to which their 
product quality is compromised during periods of economic downturn. 
Additionally, the respondents were questioned about the manner in which 
customers affect their capital structure decisions.  
When assessing the effect of capital structure decisions on the quality of the 
products, especially during periods of economic distress, most respondents in 
the petrochemical sector state that their capital structure decisions have no 





impact on product quality [R1PQ18; R2PQ19; R4PQ19]. Respondent 2 
asserted that “the quality of the product is never compromised” [R2PQ19]. 
Similarly, Respondent 4 claimed that the firm does not compromise on product 
quality. The respondent went on to argue that, when the market is weak, 
product quality is essential because competition is higher [R4PQ19]. In fact, in a 
buyer’s market, lower quality will negatively affect sales. Sometimes companies 
look at cost saving methods, or delay the introduction of luxurious products, 
rather than compromise the quality of the product [R4PQ19]. However, 
Respondent 3 countered that “many products are affected by market 
conditions” [R2PQ20]. Nevertheless, the majority of the respondents in the 
petrochemical suggest that customers do not have any impact on the 
companies’ capital structure [R1PQ19; R2PQ20; R4PQ20]. However, 
Respondent 3 disagreed, as customers do have an impact on leverage through 
lines of credit [R3PQ17]. Accordingly, customers would only influence capital 
structure if they were extended lines of credit.  
The results from the food sector show mixed evidence regarding the 
compromise of quality during periods of economic downturn. Respondent 1 in 
the food sector stated that during market downturns “price adjustments take 
place in order to remain competitive and maintain market share”; therefore, 
“innovation in the product itself” takes place [R1FQ19]. A firm is more likely to 
cut costs or cut down on production levels, and the quality and size of 
packaging might be compromised in order to retain profit margins [R1FQ19]. 
Respondent 2 claimed that quality is not compromised [R2FQ17]. Nevertheless, 
the interview results from the food sector indicate that customers have no 
influence on capital structure [R1FQ20; R2FQ18]. The results indicate that, 
even if the quality of the product was compromised, customers would not have 
enough bargaining power to influence a Saudi manufacturing firm’s capital 
structure decision in the food sector.  
Furthermore, both respondents from the industrial investment sector insisted 
that quality is not compromised during periods of economic downturn [R1IIQ19; 
R2IIQ19]. Respondent 1 in the industrial investment sector emphasised the 





importance of maintaining quality and suggested searching for cheaper 
suppliers as a way of adjusting to economic downturns [R1IIQ19]. With regards 
to customer influence, the respondent claimed that customers can influence 
leverage through lines of credit [R1IIQ20], but Respondent 2 argued that 
customers have no influence on leverage [R2IIQ20].  
Similarly, the majority of the respondents in the cement industry considered that 
capital structure decisions have no impact on the quality of the product 45 
[R1CQ18; R2CQ16; R3CQ19; R5CQ19]. Respondents 3 and 5 argued that 
there is a need to maintain the quality of the product in order to meet market 
standards, irrespective of the constraints or financing decisions [R3CQ19; 
R5CQ19]. Moreover, the majority of the respondents in the cement industry 
claimed that customers have no impact on leverage [R1CQ19; R2CQ17; 
R3CQ20; R5CQ20]. However, Respondent 4 claimed that customers do affect 
leverage through lines of credit [R4CQ20].  
Nevertheless, the results from the perspective of financial institutions show that 
the majority of the respondents argued that customers could influence the 
companies’ capital structure and leverage [R1BQ15; R2BQ11; R3BQ17]. 
Respondents 1 and 2 referred to the quality of the customer as an influential 
factor [R1BQ15; R2BQ11]. Respondent 1 stated that, if the government is a 
major customer, then it could have an impact on the company’s capital 
structure, as some government institutions are often late on payments 
[R1BQ15]. In this case, the company will have to resort to debt in order to 
finance its operations if cash inflows are late [R1BQ15]. Respondent 3 indicated 
that customers affect leverage through lines of credit [R3BQ17].  
The overall finding suggests that customers do not have an impact on the firm’s 
leverage. Hence, the proposition is rejected. Hillier et al. (2008) argue that a 
firm’s leverage has a negative impact on its product quality, making customers 
reluctant to deal with such firms. Yet the evidence suggests that firms in the 
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manufacturing industry do not compromise on the quality of their product, 
irrespective of the market conditions. Accordingly, customers have no reason to 
bargain for price concessions during periods of economic downturn.  
Proposition 19: Employees are less likely to have an influence on the capital 
structure of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
A firm’s capital structure decision can affect its employees through several 
channels. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to lay off employees in the 
event of financial distress (Hillier et al., 2007). In turn, employees of highly 
leveraged firms bargain for better contracts in order to compensate for the 
implicit costs of financial distress (Sarig, 1998). Hence, there is a positive 
relationship between leverage and labour costs. These costs can be sufficient 
in discouraging a firm’s leverage (Berk et al., 2010). Perotti and Spier (1993) 
argue that a firm can respond to the bargaining power of trade and labour 
unions by increasing its leverage, which reduces its surpluses and protects the 
firm from the threat of unions. Firms have to trade off the benefits of debt with 
the additional labour costs imposed from employees bargaining for higher 
wages. It is, however, important to note that labour unions do not exist in the 
context of the Saudi Arabian market. Thus, the bargaining power of employees 
is less pronounced.  
The results of the interviews for the manufacturing industries—petrochemical, 
food, industrial and cement—show that employees in Saudi Arabia do not have 
any impact on their company’s capital structure [R1PQ20; R2PQ21; R3PQ18; 
R4PQ21; R1FQ21; R2FQ19; R1IIQ21; R2IIQ21; R1CQ20; R2CQ18; R3CQ21; 
R5CQ21]. Only Respondent 4 from the cement industry claimed that employees 
have an indirect influence, through their stock option plans [R4CQ21]. 
Therefore, the Respondent claimed that “a lower level of equity might be 
decided upon in consideration of potential issuance of new shares to 
employees” [R4CQ21]. This statement is consistent with the findings of 
empirical studies that demonstrate that leverage is positively related to 
managerial compensation (Sarig, 1998; Berkovitch et al., 2000). Hence, 





employees would only affect the capital structure decision of a firm if they were 
to have a financial stake in it.  
The perspective of financial institutions shows similar results to those observed 
from the respondents from firms in the manufacturing industry [R1BQ16, 
R2BQ12, R3BQ18]. However, Respondent 3 argued that only key employees 
impact the firms’ leverage, due to the decisions that they make [R3BQ18].  
The results of the interviews show that, in the context of Saudi Arabian 
manufacturing firms, employees have little influence on capital structure 
decisions unless they are in a managerial position. Moreover, none of the 
respondents made reference to the bargaining power of employees. Thus, the 
proposition is accepted. Accordingly, employees do not have enough 
bargaining power to influence the capital structure of Saudi manufacturing firms, 
as labour unions in Saudi Arabia are virtually non-existent.  
6.3 Capital Structure and Competitive Environment  
The competitive environment in which a firm operates could influence capital 
structure decisions. It relates to how firms adjust their capital structure in 
response to a rival firm’s competitive behaviour (Gertner et al., 1988). Highly 
leveraged firms are more exposed to market volatility and predatory behaviour 
of rival firms with conservative capital structures (Chevalier, 1995). Capital 
structure decisions also relate to competitive aggressiveness. Managers who 
recognise that a rival firm’s increase in leverage induces greater competitive 
aggressiveness would respond by increasing their own firm’s leverage in order 
to combat competition (Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2006). Capital 
structure decisions can, accordingly, signal value and the financial position of a 
firm both to credit markets and competitors alike (Istaitieh and Rodriguez-
Fernandez, 2006). Hence, this section investigates whether capital structure is 
related to the competitive environment in the Saudi manufacturing industry. 
Proposition 20: Leverage exposes Saudi manufacturing firms to market volatility 
and predation in periods of economic downturn. 





Market timing theory relates to the behaviour of firms in response to changes in 
the business cycle. Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006) posit that 
financially strong (unleveraged) firms can time the market and take advantage 
of economic downturns to aggressively position and price their products to drive 
their weaker (leveraged) competitors out of the market. To investigate this 
issue, respondent were asked whether their capital structure exposes their 
companies to market volatility.  
The results from the petrochemical sector were split. Respondent 1 stated that 
“our level of debt does not affect the company’s exposure to market volatility” 
[R1PQ24]. According to Respondent 2, the reason why the capital structure of 
his company does not expose it to market volatility is based on the fact that the 
company buys on contract and the effect of movements in the market is 
neutralised because of this forward agreement in place [R2PQ25]. This is in line 
with the argument of Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006), who posit that 
the prior negotiation of contracts helps reduce a firm’s exposure to market 
volatility and predation during periods of economic downturn. However, 
Respondents 3 and 4 argued that leverage exposed their respective firms to 
market volatility [R3PQ22; R4PQ25]. According to Respondent 3, “leverage 
(short-term or medium-term) could be harmful to the project if the economy is in 
a downturn” [R3PQ22]. Respondent 4 stated that his firm’s leverage position is 
determined by considering the cyclicality of its products [R4PQ25]. Hence, 
Respondent 4 recognised that, because of his company’s product volatility, its 
leverage position is kept comparatively low [R4PQ25]. This indicates that the 
higher the volatility in the market for the product, the lower the expected 
leverage of the company.  
The results are mixed in the food sector. Respondent 1 from the food sector 
stated that market volatility affects the capital structure of public companies that 
seek external finance and invest in the stock market [R1FQ25]. If equity is 
insufficient, market volatility affects a firm’s ability to raise funds [R1FQ25]. This 
again implies that there exists a negative relationship between market volatility 





and leverage. Respondent 2 stated that the effect of volatility on leverage is 
small because of the 1:1 debt and equity ratio adopted by the firm. [R2FQ23] 
In the industrial investment sector, all of the respondents confirmed that market 
volatility has an impact on the firms’ leverage and capital structure positions 
[R1IIQ25]. Respondent 1 linked market volatility to the company’s profits and 
capital structure decisions [R1IIQ25; R2IIQ25]. As profits decrease because of 
the volatility experienced in the market, a company’s retained earnings will also 
fall [R1IIQ25]. Therefore, to finance future projects, there will be less reliance on 
retained earnings and more on debt, which in turn increases the firm’s future 
leverage. Moreover, according to Respondent 2, “product prices, demand, and 
input prices volatility exposes companies with weak capital structure (i.e., those 
with high debt-to-equity ratio) to financial and operational risk” [R2IIQ25].  
The results from the respondents in the cement sector46 show that the majority 
of respondents claim that leverage has an effect on their company’s exposure 
to market volatility [R3CQ25; R4CQ25; R5CQ24]. Respondent 4 claimed that 
“higher debt levels would expose the company to higher risk in situation of 
market volatility” [R4CQ25]. Respondent 5 expressed a similar opinion 
[R5CQ24]. However, Respondent 1 claimed that capital structure does not 
affect a firm’s exposure to market volatility [R1CQ24]. Similarly, Respondent 3 
stated that, although there is an effect, it is less significant [R3CQ25]. 
The results from the perspective of financial institutions show that the majority 
of the respondents believe that leverage does affect a company’s exposure to 
market volatility. This is especially the case when companies are over-
leveraged [R1BQ20; R3BQ22]. Hence, companies adopt conservative leverage 
ratios during periods of market volatility. Respondent 2 claimed that some 
companies time the market in order to take advantage of low interest rates 
during periods of economic downturns when deciding on their capital structures 
[R2BQ5]. 
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Therefore, the results show that, on average, capital structure exposes 
companies to market volatility. Thus, the proposition is accepted. In addition, 
the results are also in line with the quantitative findings shown in Tables 5.6 and 
5.7 that indicate that leverage and risk are positively related. The results 
indicate that, during periods of economic downturn, Saudi manufacturing firms 
adjust their capital structures to more conservative leverage levels. 
Respondents from manufacturing firms with conservative leverage positions 
opine that they are less exposed to market volatility. Nevertheless, none of the 
respondents implied that they are exposed to the predatory behaviour of rival 
firms during periods of economic downturns, which is inconsistent with the 
argument put forth by Istaitieh and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2006). The only 
reference to market timing in order to take advantage of low interest rates was 
made by Respondent 2, from the perspective of financial institutions. This 
observation indicates that, while market timing may not apply in the context of 
the manufacturing industry, it could be the case that creditors observe this 
behaviour in other Saudi industries.  
Proposition 22: Competitors influence the capital structure and investment 
strategy of Saudi manufacturing firms.  
Competition can have significant influences on a firm’s capital structure and 
investment strategy. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) argue that firms adjust their 
capital structure in response to the leverage decisions of rival firms. The authors 
posit that firms that observe an increase in the leverage of rival firms react by 
increasing their investments to protect their market share. The authors suggest 
a positive relationship between the increase in leverage of a firm and its rival’s 
investments. Hence, given the evidence that Saudi manufacturing firms are 
exposed to market volatility, Respondents were specifically questioned on the 
impact of competitors on their capital structures and whether this had any 
implications on their investment strategies.  
When assessing the effect of competition on the capital structures of Saudi 
manufacturing companies, the majority of respondents from the petrochemical 
sector stated that competition has no impact on leverage [R1PQ21; R2PQ22; 





R3PQ19; R4PQ22]. However, Respondent 1 claimed that his company only 
looks at competition as a “benchmark for performance” [R1PQ21]. Respondent 
2 suggested that the effect is more pronounced in other industries, such as the 
power industry [R2PQ22]. This indicates that managers of Saudi manufacturing 
firms in the petrochemical industry do not take into account the capital structure 
decisions of their rivals.  
Similarly, the results for the food industry show that competition has no 
influence on the level of leverage of the firm [R1FQ22; R2FQ20]. Respondent 2 
claimed that his company looks at rival strategies and that “no mimicking” 
occurs in terms of capital structure [R1FQ22]. Therefore, manufacturing firms in 
this sector do not adjust their leverage position according to their rivals.  
The results for the industrial investment sector also indicate that competition 
has no impact on leverage [R1IIQ22; R2IIQ22]. Respondent 2 claimed that 
competition can have a positive impact on leverage if competition is high, since 
firms are more likely to borrow and increase their investments in order to gain 
market share [R2IIQ22]. This implies a positive relationship between leverage 
and the investments of rival firms, which is in line with the findings of Kovenock 
and Phillips (1997), Chevalier (1995) and Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995, 
1996). However, the respondent stated that, because competition is minimal in 
his sector at present, this factor has no impact on debt levels [R2IIQ23]. This 
implies that, when competition is low, it has little influence on capital structure 
decisions.  
The findings of the respondents from the cement industry show that the majority 
of the respondents claimed that competition has no effect on capital structure 
[R1CQ21; R2CQ19; R3CQ22; R4CQ22]. However, Respondent 5 stated that 
there is a positive relationship between competition and the level of debt, when 
companies want to maintain equal or superior quality of the goods/services they 
provide, relative to their competitors [R5CQ22]. In this case, firms increase their 
debt in order to maintain their competitive position.   





Furthermore, the results from the perspective of financial institutions show that 
the majority of the respondents believe that there is evidence of firms mimicking 
their rival’s capital structures [R1BQ18; R2BQ14; R3BQ20]. If successful 
competitors have high debt, other firms will take on more debt [R1BQ18]. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Van der Wijst et al. (1993), who 
demonstrate that firms in the same industry have similar debt levels.  
The results show little support for the effect of competition in influencing capital 
structure and investment strategy. Thus, the proposition is rejected. Moreover, 
while one respondent47 opined that there is a positive relationship between a 
firm’s investment and a rival firm’s leverage, the majority of respondents 
claimed that competition is of no significance to a firm’s capital structure and 
investment strategy. The findings in this thesis indicate that Saudi 
manufacturing firms are financially strong, face no barriers to accessing credit 
and enjoy strong banking relationships, which enable them to obtain loan 
commitments to combat competition. Maksimovic (1990) supports this notion in 
arguing that firms that could obtain favourable loan commitments are more 
capable of combating competition. Hence, competition has little influence on 
capital structure in this context.  
Proposition 20: Debt induces greater competitive aggressiveness. 
Another channel whereby the competitive environment relates to capital 
structure is the competitive aggressiveness of firms. If debt induces greater or 
lesser competitive aggressiveness, managers ought to consider the capital 
structure decisions of their rivals. Thus, respondents were questioned on the 
manner in which capital structure affects the competitive aggressiveness of 
Saudi manufacturing firms.  
When assessing the impact of leverage on the level of competitive 
aggressiveness, the findings from the respondents in the petrochemical sector 
are mixed. Respondents 2 and 3 stated that leverage has no impact on the 
level of aggressiveness in the context of the manufacturing industry [R2PQ29; 
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R3PQ26]. However, Respondent 1 did maintain that “leverage does have a 
strong effect in some cases” [R1PQ28]. Respondent 4 concurred, stating that 
“higher debt might lead to higher aggressiveness but, at the same time, you 
have to take into account the cost of servicing that debt” [R4PQ29].  
Similarly, results from the food sector are mixed. Respondent 1 claimed that 
leverage positively affects the company’s level of competitive aggressiveness 
[R1FQ29]. However, Respondent 2 stated that it has very little effect on 
aggressiveness [R2FQ26]. The respondents from the industrial investment 
sector stated that the level of leverage has no impact on the competitive 
aggressiveness [R1IIQ29; R2IIQ29].  
The results from the cement sector show mixed results48. Respondents 1 and 3 
argued that leverage has no impact on the level of their competitive 
aggressiveness [R1CQ28; R3CQ29]. Instead, it depends on the volume of 
demand [R3CQ29]. Nevertheless, Respondent 2 stated that extending credit 
terms to distributors helps the firm in competing more aggressively [R2CQ24]. 
Respondent 4 argued that leverage does have an impact on competitive 
aggressiveness, albeit a negative one: as leverage increases, the level of 
competitive aggressiveness falls, due to the requirement to make systematic 
debt service payments to bank, which might leave the firm with less cash flow 
[R4CQ29].  
The results from the perspective of financial institutions provide some evidence 
that leverage will induce greater competitive aggressiveness. Respondent 1 
argued “that leverage may cause over aggressiveness especially if cash flows 
are really dwindling. High leverage can cause some companies to do the wrong 
things under pressure” [R1BQ23]. Similarly, Respondent 2 claimed that 
leverage induces the firm to cut prices and create discounts in order to service 
its debt [R2BQ17]. Respondent 3 provided an argument that high leverage can 
only affect the level of competitive aggressiveness, depending on past 
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performance [R3BQ25]. Firms with a good track record are likely to survive “bad 
times” regardless of their high leverage [R3BQ25].  
Therefore, the general result is that capital structure has no implications on 
competitive aggressiveness in the context of Saudi manufacturing firms. Thus, 
the proposition is rejected. However, few respondents believed that debt 
induces greater competitive aggressiveness [R1PQ28; R4PQ29; R1FQ29; 
R2CQ24], and only one respondent from the cement sector suggested that it 
would reduce competitive aggressiveness [R4CQ29]. The results are consistent 
with the findings of Campello (2003), who argues that competitive dynamics are 
irrelevant for firms that operate in high-debt industries. The result provides 
further justification for the evidence reported in this thesis that the majority of 
managers of Saudi manufacturing firms do not consider competitors when 
deciding on their capital structures. This can be attributed to the fact that most 
managers do not recognise the implications of debt on competitive 
aggressiveness and, thus, do not find competition to be relevant to capital 
structure decisions.  
Proposition 23: Disclosure rules would affect the capital structure and 
competitive advantage of Saudi manufacturing firms  
Pecking order theory states that adverse selection problems arise from 
information asymmetry between the financial stakeholders/managers of the 
firm, who know a firm’s true value, and outside investors, who do not.This 
results in the market mispricing a firm’s claims (Klein et al., 2002). Stringent 
disclosure rules have significant implications in mitigating agency costs and 
reducing information asymmetry (Healy and Palepu, 2001). In the context of 
Saudi Arabia, listed firms abide by the disclosure rules of SOCPA, which are 
less stringent than the IFRS (Iqbal, 2012). The publication of information to 
outside investors through financial reports is a requirement for publicly listed 
companies. However, private companies are not required to disclose their 
financial reports to the public as long as they provide the Department of Zakat 
and Income Tax (DZIT) with proof that they have paid their zakat liabilities 





(KPMG, 2012). Accordingly, it can be argued that the Saudi Market suffers from 
significant information asymmetry.  
In the semi-structured interviews, respondents were asked about the extent to 
which information transparency affects their capital structure and competitive 
advantage. The general finding for the petrochemical sector is that the market 
in Saudi Arabia is not as transparent as in developed markets. The majority of 
respondents, therefore, stated that information transparency does not affect 
capital structure [R1PQ25; R2PQ26; R3PQ23]. According to Respondent 2, “the 
level of reporting required under CMA rules is not anywhere near what is 
required in developed markets”. Hence, “[the firm does] not need go into details 
in [its] financial report” [R2PQ27]. Public announcements are generic and non-
specific when it comes to pricing strategies and market penetration. However, 
Respondent 4 claimed that information transparency has an impact on capital 
structure, as information about a company’s debt levels are disclosed to the 
public [R4PQ26]. Accordingly, the results indicate that the majority of managers 
in this sector believe that the level of transparency required in Saudi Arabia 
through SOCPA rules is insufficient in signalling to the market a firm’s true value 
and financial position. 
In the food sector, the majority of the respondents stated that, even though 
transparency is important, it is not significant to capital structure decisions 
[R1FQ26; R2FQ24]. However, companies refuse to disclose details because 
they fear that such disclosures will present important information to their 
competitors, which will weaken their competitive advantage. Therefore, 
respondents in the food sector argued that transparency might hinder their 
competitive strategy, and, as a result, only the bare essentials are disclosed to 
the market. Respondent 1 stated that his company “[has] to be transparent but 
[does] not want to communicate too much and weaken [its] position” [R1FQ26]. 
Respondent 2 further stated that his firm “[does] not discloses details of 
breakdown of sales and [tries] to group sensitive items” [R2FQ24]. Accordingly, 
firms try to disclose as little information as possible to avoid comprimising their 
competitive position.  





Furthermore, the results from the industrial investment sector49 show that higher 
levels of transparency could influence competitive advantage and, to some 
extent, a company’s capital structure [R2IIQ26]. Respondent 1 stated that his 
company complies with the disclosure rules of the CMA but felt that some 
information should not be disclosed [R1IIQ26; R1IIQ27]. The Respondent, 
hence, argued that his company’s “information is grouped in order for 
shareholders to get the right idea without hindering competition… also 
information about strategy and direction of company are sometimes required 
which negatively influence the company’s competitive advantage” [R1IIQ27]. 
Respondent 2 stated that, if information disclosure were not limited, it could 
hinder a company’s competitive advantage and impact its capital structure 
[R2IIQ26]. Therefore, the current disclosure rules do not impact the competitive 
position of firms in the industrial investment sector, as most information is 
grouped.  
In the cement industry, the majority of the respondents believe that information 
transparency could impact competitive advantage, and, to a lesser extent, their 
capital structure [R3CQ26; R4CQ26; R5CQ25]. Respondents 1, 2 50  and 3 
pointed to the fact that companies need to abide by CMA and government 
disclosure rules [R1CQ25; R2CQ22; R3CQ27]. However, these respondents 
made it clear that important information must always be withheld from the 
market place to prevent competitors from taking advantage of it [R1CQ25; 
R2CQ22; R3CQ27]. Respondent 4 focused on the effect that transparency of 
non-public information, like a firm’s R&D, would have on its strategy and 
competitiveness [R4CQ27]. The respondent stated that transparency could help 
to determine the right capital structure for a company through accurate cash 
projections [R4CQ26]. Respondent 5 emphasised the significance of 
transparency between the company and its creditors in impacting capital 
structure. According to the respondent, “banks do not believe in the customer 
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withholding information. The banks have to be fully  
satisfied of the economic viability of the project before they can agree to fund 
the project” [R5CQ26]. From this angle, it is evident that the higher 
transparency reduces information asymmetry between a firm and its creditors 
and could influence the capital structure of a firm. Nevertheless, Respondent 1 
claimed that current disclosure rules imply that information transparency has no 
effect on capital structure [R1CQ25].  
From the point of view of financial institutions 51 , the results are mixed. 
Respondent 2 suggested that information transparency to lenders is absolutely 
crucial in order for lenders to accurately project the amount of funding a firm 
needs in the future [R2BQ15]. For banks to advance funds to businesses they 
have to be certain that there is a high probability that their funds will be repaid 
on time, together with the amount borrowed. Thus, they require more 
information about a company’s capital structure and corporate strategy. Since 
lenders are not competitors to these companies, the disclosure of information to 
financial institutions will not affect competitive advantage. It may, however, 
facilitate its access to funds. Nevertheless, Respondent 1 claimed that, 
although transparency is important, it is “not as detrimental as management 
style” in influencing capital structure [R1BQ21].  
The results indicate that higher levels of transparency than those currently 
required could affect a firm’s capital structure. Therefore, the proposition is 
accepted. Saudi manufacturing firms refuse to disclose detailed information that 
would hinder their competitive advantage. Nevertheless, transparency to 
creditors is required at all times. The results indicate that current disclosure 
rules are insufficient in revealing to competitors the value and financial position 
of the firm. Hence, there is significant information asymmetry in this market. The 
results are consistent with the findings of Klein et al. (2002), who argue that, in 
the presence of high information asymmetry, markets are unable to accurately 
predict the value of a firm. Accordingly, information about firms’ capital 
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structures could be used as a proxy for their value and financial position in this 
context.  
 
Proposition 24: Saudi manufacturing firms use debt as a signalling tool.  
The capital structures of financially strong incumbent firms can be used as an 
effective deterrent to market entry (Poitevin, 1989; Istaitieh and Rodriguez-
Fernandez, 2006). When information asymmetry is high, the signalling function 
of debt assumes importance (Klein et al., 2002). Thus, respondents were 
questioned on whether debt is used as a signalling tool to rival firms. The 
majority of the respondents in the petrochemical sector argued that debt is 
indeed used as a signalling tool [R1PQ27; R3PQ25; R4PQ28]. Respondent 1 
claimed that it is used as a signalling tool for joint ventures and competitors 
[R1PQ27]. Respondent 3 stated that the signalling is mainly intended for the 
market and other stakeholders [R3PQ25]. Respondent 4 emphasised the 
competitive edge that debt gives to the company, relative to its competitors, and 
indicated that the firm is in a better position than its competitors [R4PQ28]. 
However, Respondent 2 stated that debt is not used as a signalling tool 
[R2PQ28]. The findings, overall, indicate that debt is used as a signalling tool 
for manufacturing firms in the petrochemical sector.  
The interview results for the food sector indicate that debt is not used as a 
signalling tool [R1FQ28; R2FQ25]. However, the results for the industrial 
investment sector are split. Respondent 1 argued that debt is not used as a 
signalling tool [R1IIQ28], whereas Respondent 2 stated that his firm utilises 
debt to send signals to the market and to monitor financial covenants [R2IIQ28]. 
Hence, debt is not used to signal a manufacturing firm’s financial position to its 
rivals in this sector.  
Nevertheless, the majority of firms in the cement industry say that debt is not 
used as a signalling tool [R1CQ27; R2CQ23; R5CQ27]. However, Respondent 
3 claimed that a debt level that currently stands at 6% of total capital signals the 
firm’s ability to access additional finance when needed [R3CQ28]. Accordingly, 
the respondent contended that conservative leverage positions signal to rivals a 





firm’s ability to combat competition. The use of debt as a signalling tool for 
Respondent 4 is linked with the company’s cash management ability. The 
respondent asserted that a default on a debt payment would signal to the 
market that the company is unable to manage its operations and meet its 
scheduled interest payments, which would adversely affect its competitive 
position [R4CQ28].   
The results from the perspective of financial institutions show that the majority 
of the respondents did not see debt as a signalling tool [R2BQ16; R3BQ24]. In 
fact, Respondent 2 stated that shareholders usually prefer low debt. However, 
Respondent 1 asserted that debt can be used by firms to signal their prestige 
and reputation to others [R1BQ22]. Firms increase their reputation by being 
customers of certain banks. Losing such banking relationships would send 
negative signals to both creditors and competitors.  
In general, the results indicate that the majority of respondents do not use debt 
as a signalling tool. Therefore, the proposition is rejected. Daves and Tucker 
(1993) demonstrate that more signalling occurs when market competition is 
high. However, the evidence shows that the signalling function of debt is more 
prominent among firms in the petrochemical sectors, and less so for firms in the 
industrial investment and cement sectors. The recognition of the signalling 
function of debt by the respondents is consistent with the findings of Gertner et 
al. (1988), who argue that firms can use their capital structure to signal their 
financial position to both capital markets and competitors.  





Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.0 Introduction 
The thesis investigated the relationship between capital structure and corporate 
strategy in the context of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms. It examined the 
effect of the determinants of capital structure and the implications of corporate 
and competitive strategies on capital structure. This thesis focuses on the 
manufacturing industry, due to the significant government support that is 
provided for the industry and its significance in contributing to the Saudi Arabian 
GDP.  
The thesis answers the following research question: 
To what extent does corporate strategy influence capital structure 
decisions of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms? 
In addressing the research question, the thesis utilised a mixed methodology 
approach. A sample of 43 listed manufacturing companies was used over a 
five-year period from the third quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2012. 
Using a pooled OLS regression, the quantitative analysis assessed the 
determinant of leverage using two different dependent variables (long-term 
debt-to-total assets and total debt-to-total assets). The dependent variables 
included numerical variables that proxy for profitability, size and risk, along with 
dummy variables that proxy for ownership structure and relationship banking. 
The qualitative approach consisted of semi-structured interviews with senior 
managers, and this represented a significant part of the data analysis. The 
qualitative findings support the quantitative analysis.  
7.1 Key Findings  
The key findings of the thesis are listed under three main categories: 
determinants of capital structure, capital structure and stakeholders and capital 
structure and competitive environment. The general results indicated that 
classical corporate finance determinants of leverage better explain the capital 





structure decision of Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms. Strategic motivations 
for leverage were found to be less prevalent in this context.  
7.1.1 Determinants of Capital Structure 
The findings indicated that Saudi Arabian manufacturing firms were found to 
more debt-oriented than was previously reported on the market level by Al-Ajmi 
et al. (2009). However, the results illustrated that the cost of servicing debt 
remained a significant factor that influences the capital structure decisions of 
Saudi manufacturing firms, despite the availability of cheap government 
financing. The unique tax structure that characterises the Saudi market was 
reported to be significant to capital structure decisions. While the interview 
results reporting that zakat is important in determining capital structure 
decisions were mixed, the quantitative results supported the fact that some 
firms avoid issuing long-term debt (which is zakat payable) or reduce their 
leverage to avoid paying more zakat. The evidence reported on the effect of 
profitability on leverage demonstrated that more profitable firms carry lower 
leverage. This evidence can be attributed to the influence of taxation and lends 
support to Saudi manufacturing firms following pecking order theory in financing 
their projects, primarily through retained earnings. In this sense, the high 
profitability of Saudi manufacturing firms could help explain why some firms 
choose to be debt-oriented.  
Industry effects were reported to be significant. The evidence illustrated the fact 
that many managers have a target optimal capital structure in mind when 
deciding on their financing, which largely depends on the availability of SIDF 
loans. The high level of tangible assets lends further explanation for the debt 
orientation of these firms.  
The effect of size in determining capital structure was mixed. Specifically, it was 
found to be inversely related to leverage only when leverage was measured as 
total liabilities to total assets (TLTA). The mixed results could be attributed to 
the fact that the sample of manufacturing firms consists of primarily large firms. 
Small and medium enterprises are not listed in the Saudi stock market 





(Tadawul) and are, hence, untested. In addition, this thesis indicated that there 
is a positive relationship between risk and leverage.  
7.1.2 Capital Structure and Stakeholders 
The findings of the thesis have demonstrated that bankruptcy laws are unclear 
in Saudi Arabia. This implies that highly leveraged firms are more likely to 
overinvest in risky projects. The quantitative results supported this contention. 
The evidence could be attributed to the pay-off structure put in place in the 
event of bankruptcy in Saudi Arabia, which favours employees (including 
managers) beyond limited liability. Shari’a compliance was reported to be the 
preference for most firms. This can be attributed to the Islamic culture that 
characterises the Saudi market and to publicly listed manufacturing firms’ 
intentions to attract a larger audience of investors. In addition, manufacturing 
firms in Saudi Arabia were reported to use debt as a disciplining tool for 
management. This lends support to agency theories of capital structure. It can 
also be explained with reference to the added benefit of Shari’a compliant 
contracts in reducing agency costs.  
Shareholders were found to be important in influencing the capital structure 
decisions of firms. Their personal preferences and reputations were reported to 
be significant to capital structure decisions. Both family-owned firms and 
institutionally owned firms are likely to carry more debt. Yet, government 
ownership was found to be insignificant in determining the firms’ leverage. This 
can be attributed to the fact that family owners risk diluting their equity holdings 
and control by issuing equity. The positive results on institutional ownership 
could be linked to the fact that institutional ownership may not necessarily 
replace the monitoring effect of debt. Moreover, it could be attributed to the fact 
that institutional investors do not sufficiently reduce information asymmetry in 
the market but could reduce information asymmetry with lenders. Hence, the 
cost of debt is reduced.  
The availability of credit is found to be insignificant in influencing the capital 
structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms. This indicates that 





manufacturing firms do not face any problems accessing external funds. 
However, even though such firms have access to both local and international 
funding, firms, as the evidence suggested, prefer local finance. This could be 
attributed to the cheaper financing options available in the local market, along 
with the exchange risk, delays and regulatory problems associated with 
international financing. This is supported by the positive results reported on the 
relationship between the availability of government loans and leverage. More 
importantly, the findings demonstrated that Saudi manufacturing firms with 
strong banking relations are likely to carry more debt. This can be attributed to 
the lower information asymmetry these companies face against their creditors. 
Finally, non-financial stakeholders (customers, employees and suppliers) and 
government subsidies were reported to have little influence on the capital 
structure decisions of Saudi manufacturing firms. The evidence indicated that 
non-financial stakeholders have little bargaining power in this context. 
Furthermore, the government plays a more crucial role, as an equity and/or debt 
holder, in this industry.   
7.1.3 Capital Structure and Competitive Environment  
The evidence illustrated that competitors are less likely to influence the capital 
structure decision of Saudi manufacturing firms. The findings demonstrated that 
even though leverage exposes firms to market volatility during periods of 
economic downturns, there was no evidence to support the predatory practices 
of rival firms in those periods. This can be attributed to the fact the majority of 
respondents do not recognise the implications of capital structure decisions on 
competitive aggressiveness. Furthermore, close banking relationships and high 
profits imply that these firms are financially strong and are able to combat 
competition. The findings demonstrated that, while greater transparency would 
affect the capital structure decisions and competitive advantages of these firms, 
less stringent disclosure rules would enable managers to group sensitive items 
in order not to compromise their competitive position. Finally, the results 
illustrated that the majority of managers do not recognise or use capital 
structure decisions to signal their financial position to rival firms.  





7.2 Contribution to Academic Literature  
This thesis contributes to the academic world by presenting a general 
conceptual theoretical framework for testing the relationship between capital 
structure and corporate strategy, which takes into account the determinants of 
capital structure. This framework could be extended to challenge the degree to 
which corporate strategies affect capital structure decisions in other 
jurisdictions. The thesis also presents a developed framework that considers 
the characteristics of the Saudi Arabian manufacturing industry. This framework 
could be extended to other industries with similar characteristics in Saudi Arabia 
and to other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  
The thesis contributes to the literature on the determinants of capital structure 
by indicating that zakat and profitability are negatively related to capital 
structure, while the nature of assets, risk, family and institutional ownership, and 
relationship banking are positively related to leverage in the context of Saudi 
Arabian manufacturing firms. Trade-off, Pecking order and agency theories of 
capital structure are adapted and tested in the Saudi manufacturing industry 
context. The findings of the thesis support trade-off theories by demonstrating 
that managers have a target optimal capital structure. The evidence reported in 
this thesis demonstrated that Saudi manufacturing firms follow the pecking 
order in financing their activities. The results also support agency theories in 
illustrating that debt is used as a disciplining device in this context. 
Nevertheless, there was little evidence to support market timing and 
stakeholder theories of capital structure.  
7.3 Contribution to Managers  
The thesis showed managers the possible strategic considerations of their 
capital structure decisions. The evidence demonstrated the importance of 
strong banking relationships and the availability of government loans as 
important strategic considerations for capital structure. There are several 
implications for both managers and financial institutions from these findings. 
First, managers ought to maintain close relationships with banks in order to 





facilitate future access to funding. Secondly, due diligence by financial 
institutions must take place in order to ensure that decisions to grant loans are 
backed by a thorough analysis of their fundamentals and cash flow generating 
processes, not just based on banking relationships.  
The findings indicated that government SIDF loans play a crucial role in the 
determination of companies’ leverage positions. This thesis argues, accordingly, 
that managers should take advantage of these loans whenever they are 
available. The results of the thesis also illustrate that debt can be used as a 
disciplining device. Therefore, firms should consider the inherent strategic 
benefits of financing decisions in reducing agency cost and disciplining 
management, especially when loans are Shari’a compliant.  
Moreover, while there is little evidence to support the stakeholder theory of 
capital structure, the Ministry of Labour is in the process of establishing new 
laws that will enable employees to join labour unions under the General Union 
of Saudi Workers (Arabnews, 2013). The introduction of labour unions could 
strengthen the bargaining power of employees, and, hence, may have future 
significant implications on capital structure decisions. Therefore, managers 
ought to consider the implications of labour unions in influencing their future 
capital structure decisions.  
While the results of the thesis demonstrated little support for the influence of 
competition on capital structure and investment strategies, one respondent52 
opined that there is a positive relationship between his firm’s investment and his 
rival firm’s leverage. Moreover, some respondents indicated that debt induces 
greater competitive aggressiveness [R1PQ28; R4PQ29; R1FQ29; R2CQ24], 
and only one respondent from the cement sector suggested that it would reduce 
competitive aggressiveness [R4CQ29]. The recognition of the relationship 
between capital structures and competitive aggressiveness suggests that 
managers should pay more attention to the competitive implications of the 
capital structure decision of rival firms. Disclosure rules in Saudi Arabia are 
                                                                            
52
 Respondent 2, from the industrial investment sector, claimed that the more competition there is in an 
industry, the more likely it is that firms will borrow more in order to increase their existent market share. 





reported to be less stringent than those of the IFRS, implying higher information 
asymmetry in this market. The findings indicated that, despite the presence of 
information asymmetry, debt is not generally used as a signalling tool. However, 
there was some evidence to support the use of debt in order to convey signals 
to both capital and product markets about firms’ financial and competitive 
positions. Such signals, therefore, ought to be considered and used by 
managers. Accordingly, managers could adjust their investment and competitive 
strategies based on the capital structure decisions of their rivals.  
7.4 Contribution to Policy Makers  
The evidence reported in the thesis points to a call for clearer bankruptcy laws 
in Saudi Arabia. More defined bankruptcy laws would help protect firms’ 
shareholders and lenders. The findings of the thesis also imply that policy 
makers ought to consider implementing more stringent disclosure rules in order 
to reduce information asymmetry in the market and to protect lenders and 
inexperienced investors.  
7.3 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Unlike other developed countries, transparency in the Saudi market is limited, 
thus data accessibility is restricted. Non-listed firms’ financial reports are not 
publicly available. Moreover, the non-availability of primary data is a limitation 
for the thesis, as further information could help explain the determinants of 
capital structure. More specifically, the unavailability of detailed quarterly 
financial reporting made it difficult to test competitive strategy quantitatively. 
Likewise, some determinants of capital structure used in other studies were 
difficult to include. In addition, an appropriate trade-off was made between the 
sample size and the length of the data period. A longer period would have 
benefited the thesis by spanning a longer historical period. However, it would 
have also led to the exclusion of more manufacturing firms from the data.  
Further research conducted in this area may benefit from and make use of the 
specific theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3 to test the theoretical 
prediction of a relationship between capital structure and competitive strategy in 





the context of other industries within the Saudi market. Extending this study to 
other jurisdictions, specifically those in the GCC area with attributes similar to 
those of the manufacturing firms in Saudi Arabia, with greater data availability, 
would lead to more robust results, especially in testing factors that relate to the 
competitive environment quantitatively. Moreover, the inclusion of other 
determinants of capital structure would provide a better view of the 
determinants of capital structure in this context.  
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List of sample manufacturing firms used in quantitative analysis: 
1. 2020 SAFCO 
2. 2290 YANSAB 
3. 3050 SOUTHERN CEMENT 
4. 2140 AL-AHSA  
5. 2030 SARCO 
6. 2010 SABIC 
7. 2110 CABLES 
8. 3030 SAUDI CEMENT 
9. 2230 SAUDI CHEMICAL 
10. 2130 SAUDI INDUSTRIAL 
11. 2250 SIIG 
12. 2190 SISCO 
13. 2070 PHARMACEUTICAL  
14. 2270 SADAFCO 
15. 2050 SAVOLA 
16. 3090 TABUK CEMENT 
17. 3020 YAMAMAH CEMENT 
18. 3060 YANBU CEMENT 
19. 2150 GLASS 
20. 2080 GAS AND INDUST. 
21. 2090 GYPSUM  
22. 2040 CERAMIC 
23. 2240 ZAMIL 
24. 2060 INDUSTRIALIZATION 
25. 2220 MAADANIYAH  
26. 3040 QASSIM CEMENT 
27. 2260 SAHARA 
28. 2120 SAUDI ADVANCED 
29. 2160 AMIANTIT  
30. 2280 ALMARAI 
31. 2170 ALUJAIN  
32. 3010 ARABIAN CEMENT 
33. 2200 PIPES  
34. 3080 EASTERN CEMENT 






36. 2100 FOOD 
37. 2210 NAMA 
38. 2300 SPM  
39. 2310 SIPCHEM  
40. 2320 ALBABTAIN  
41. 2340 ALABDULLATIF 
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Research Ethics  
Participant Information Sheet 
1. Title of Research: Capital Structure and Competitive strategy: The Case of 
Saudi Arabian Manufacturing Industry 
2. Researcher: Amr Attar  
3. Contact Email: amr.attar@brunel.ac.uk 
4. Purpose of the research: To explore the link between capital structure and 
competitive strategy in the Saudi Arabian manufacturing sector. To what extent 
does your company’s capital structure influence your competitive strategy? 
5. What is involved: Structured interviews in which you, as a senior manager 
(CEOs, CFOs or Board Member), will be asked about your respective 
company’s capital structure and corporate strategy. The interviews are 30-
60mins in length in which approx. 20-30 questions are asked about the 
company’s capital structure, the different stakeholders that influence the capital 
structure decision, the extent to which capital structure influences competitive 
strategy and the different macroeconomic and company specific parameters 
influence the company’s competitive strategy. The interview will be conducted 
at your respective offices or at a location of your convenience in Jeddah or 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  
6. Voluntary nature of participation and confidentiality. I hereby confirm that 
all participation is voluntary and confidential. I also confirm that no recording will 
be done during interviews. Participant’s information will remain anonymous for 
the purpose of this research. Notes of your responses will be made during the 
interview and then transformed into transcripts. The transcripts will highlight 













Methods of financing.  
Working capital financing. Companies look for finance for trade (importing). 
Financing of the capital expenditure, expansion, set up. Companies typically do 
a market study then approach the SIDF, then go to the banks to augment the 
financial position, and also bridge financing. The SIDF process might take a 
year or two, if the company has strong credentials, it might get loans through 
commercial banks that bridges its loans from the SIDF. Financing of sales for 
petrochemicals, pre-shipment finance, and inventory finance are other methods 
typically used. Investment arms of banking are encouraging Sukuk. Advance 
payments given by the government is typically 20/30%. Due to heavy advance 
payments, you tend to find balance sheets showing over leverage. Cement 
companies are usually financed 2:1 (debt to equity) with strong cash flows. 
[R1BQ1] 
Types of debt products available to the firm. 
Short term long term overdrafts, syndicated loans, LC financing. [R1BQ2] 
Shari’a compliance.  
Most companies have an Islamic balance sheet and therefore the loans tend to 
be sharia compliant. [R1BQ3] 
Significance of zakat.  







Determinants of level of debt. 
There are restrictions by banks not to over leverage. Usually commercial banks 
put a cap on leverage. The SIDF is used for any new venture, the minimum 
Equity must be 25% of the total balance sheet. What usually determines it is the 
sensitisation of cash flow, i.e. how much debt you can take is how much debt 
you can support. [R1BQ5] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt. 
Opportunity and cost. Depends on the tenor, and growth prospects. The cost of 
finance isn’t detrimental. [R1BQ6] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws. 
Bankruptcy laws do not protect a firm that is bankrupt unlike the US. First paid 
is staff, which goes beyond limited liability. Then trade payables, then debt 
holders. If a firm has assigned securities, which are pledged to the bank, then 
they have priority. [R1BQ7] 
Debt as disciplining tool. 
Sometimes shareholders require management to abide by certain accounting 
principles. Financial commitments definitely have disciplinary reactions. 
[R1BQ8] 
Influence of shareholders.  
Culturally, certain shareholders do not prefer to have debt and so minimise how 
much a company resorts to debts. Others are more “debt-happy”. You tend to 
find that culture affects it depending on the composition of the board. 
Shareholders with good reputation facilitate access to finance. [R1BQ9] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit. 
As a bank you have to manage your ratios. Deployment of credit takes into 
account the selection process. As a bank you prefer to be involved with 
successful businesses in their areas. Stay away from certain sectors (e.g. 








To a less and less extent. [R1BQ11] 
Relationship banking. 
Reputational issues do matter a lot. Access to banks will be easier but banks 
still have to do their homework anyway. [R1BQ12] 
Government support (loans and subsidies). 
Government involvement makes the finance decision easier because there is 
always a credible entity at the end of the business. Makes leverage easier from 
a commercial banking point of view. [R1BQ13] 
Influence of suppliers. 
Some suppliers offer lines of credit; others don’t so the nature of the supplier is 
important. [R1BQ14] 
Influence of customers.  
If the government is a major customer it could influence the capital structure of 
the firm. For example, some ministries are late on payments and therefore the 
company would seek finance. If the customer is adequately influential then you 
have to deal with them and they can force your capital structure. [R1BQ15] 
Influence of employees.  
Traders- if incentives are skewed towards revenue only, the incentive will be to 
sell as much as possible and therefore carry high debt. But they generally have 
no influence [R1BQ16] 
Product market structure and capital structure.  
Without having a due consideration for that the prospects for growth would be 
very limited. Companies have to identify the source of capital before engaging 
in a project. [R1BQ17] 
Influence of competition. 
Some companies follow the examples of others. Latecomers tend to mimic 







Other stakeholders.  
Banks. [R1BQ19] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
There’s a much higher regulatory impact on the banks so expect adherence to 
Basel principle and so on, which determines how much capital is set aside. So 
companies are very much exposed to market volatility. They would rather lose a 
customer than change a bank’s rules. [R1BQ20] 
Information transparency 
Information transparency is very limited. Companies that are not listed do not 
have to abide by CMA rules. It is, however, becoming more prominent. Banks 
insist on information transparency. Financial transparency is not as detrimental 
as management style (how much receivables or who your customers are). 
[R1BQ21] 
Debt as a signalling tool. 
Definitely. Some firms mention that they are customers of X Y and Z banks as a 
form of prestige and reputation. A firm manages its reputation through debt. 
Losing a relationship with a bank is a big deal. [R1BQ22] 
Competitive aggressiveness 
Leverage may cause over aggressiveness especially if cash flows are really 
dwindling. High leverage can cause some companies to do the wrong things 
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Methods of financing 
The Saudi market is not as mature as western markets. You see a lot of plain 
vanilla bilateral with banks with very little bond or capital market issuances. As 
the market matures more companies will realise the benefit from diversifying. 
They start looking for fixed income investments, would consider banks and 
Sukuk. Many companies get cheap rates and don’t see why they should go for 
a premium on bonds and sukuk. Banks can lend up to 25% of total equity, but 
this will be reduced to 10% over the next years. [R2BQ1] 
Shari’a compliance 
Publicly traded companies more so. [R2BQ2] 
Significance of zakat.  
No. [R2BQ3] 
Determinants of level of debt. 
The sector. Safer, blue chip sectors can access more debt. Pharmaceuticals 
could have large leverage ratio especially when dealing with the government. 
Some supplier requests payment before delivery to the vendor. [R2BQ4] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt. 
It still remains cheaper than cost of equity. The decision might be tactical at 






Debt as disciplining tool.  
Yes. There is a fine line between what’s socially correct to what companies 
want. [R2BQ6] 
Influence of shareholders.  
They are considered to be the most important influence. [R2BQ7] 
International finance.  
Can but not wise. If you go external it’s usually more expensive. There is a 
plethora of liquidity in the market. Only go external for specialised project 
finance. A local bank will be interested in participating if a large external 
financier has been doing it for a number of years. Any funds however used to 
finance an affiliate outside must get approval. [R2BQ8] 
Relationship banking.  
Relationships matter but banks do severe due diligence especially after 2008. 
[R2BQ9] 
Influence of suppliers.  
Some influence. [R2BQ10] 
Influence of customers.  
Discounts or payments (LCs). Quality of customers (government). [R2BQ11] 
Influence of employees.  
No significant effect in this market. [R2BQ12] 
Product market and capital structure.  
Yes. The premium is passed on to customer. We’ve seen this here. Leasing 
companies borrowing from banks and then passing on premium to customers.  
The standard norm is decide on the cost 25% E, 50% SIDF, Commercial banks. 
[R2BQ13] 
Influence of competition.  






Information transparency.  
There is a general trend of being more transparent to bankers. The more 
transparent a company is with their banker, the more clear bankers will know 
what to give you for the upcoming years. The last thing a bank wants to hear is 
surprises. This sends shockwaves across the industry. [R2BQ15] 
Debt as signalling tool.  
No. Shareholders look for low debt. [R2BQ16] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
If they are public companies, they will probably create discount to get in the 









Position: CEO (ex-SIDF)  
Financial Consultancy 
Date: 11/01/2012 
Methods of financing.  
Equity serves to a certain limit. Commercial banks and SIDF specifically 
finances industrial projects. Not every sector would be accepted to get this 
financing. SAF (Saudi agricultural fund) is specific to the agricultural sector for 
example. Ministry of finance set programs for hotels, hospitals etc.. [R3BQ1] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Short term and long term overdrafts, syndicated loans, LC financing. [R3BQ2] 
Shari’a compliance.  
For listed Saudi companies this is a major factor, especially for companies that 
are appealing to mass investors. For bigger companies it is less important. 
Companies tend to publicise when they are shari’a compliant. [R3BQ3] 
Significance of zakat.  
Zakat is a consideration. There is a special way of calculating zakat and it can 
be optimised. [R3BQ4] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
The risk associated with its business and sector it operates on. If it’s a cash 
generating sector then there is a higher capacity of debt. The strategy of the 
company, the appetite of financial market and the type of business are all 






Nature of assets.  
Industrial sector, machinery and fixed assets this gives you tangible things for 
the lenders, which partly covers your lender’s risk. So it really matters. For high 
R&D companies it’s usually harder to get finance. [R3BQ6] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt. 
It depends on the type of lending rational. It also depends on the assets. From a 
lender’s point of view it’s a crucial factor. [R3BQ7] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
Bankruptcy laws in Saudi are not very clear. [R3BQ8] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
Yes. Also to gauge their performance. [R3BQ9] 
Influence of shareholders.  
For listed companies, no, but for a private company, yes. There are some 
shareholders that are culturally against borrowing (beyond a certain level). 
Some require the company to be 100% Shari’a compliant. This makes 
accessibility to funds uneasy. This was especially the case 10-15 years ago, 
when Islamic financing wasn’t as available as it is now. In listed companies, 
shareholders that are not controlling shareholders have little say. All listed 
companies are now required to switch to Shari’a compliant. [R3BQ10] 
Government ownership. 
Yes. If you are a company owned by the government you can walk through the 
system much easier. You can use the government arm. The risk taken is a 
government risk. This puts pressure on the lenders and makes them hesitant to 
resist. However, the ownership must be a sizeable to put that kind of pressure. 
[R3BQ11] 
Dependence upon availability of credit.  
Sometimes yes, especially in periods of downturns. In Saudi Arabia it has an 
impact in periods like 2008 where banks were loose in their risk evaluation. 






International finance.  
Very limited. Can get through outside contractors. Export banks for example. 
However, only a small segment of the market can go for that. Banks do. 
[R3BQ13] 
Relationship banking.  
Yes it does, provided you have a case. If you have a good relationship it gives 
you a quick access but doesn’t grant you the financing. You will still have to go 
through the process. However, it might help in easing the conditions. [R3BQ14] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
SIDF loans go up to 50%. Nowadays, the SIDF can lend up to 75% of capital in 
undeveloped regions, which has a major impact. Therefore, firms only need to 
come up with 25% in equity. [R3BQ15] 
Influence of suppliers.  
Through lines of credit. [R3BQ16] 
Influence of customers.  
If you are in the manufacturing industry and you need to give your customers a 
credit line you need to have the capacity to carry on this working capital 
requirement. [R3BQ17] 
Influence of employees.  
The employee has to be in a key position to make this impact. Examples of 
such employees are: a general manager, a CFO, or a member of the board. 
[R3BQ18] 
Product market and capital structure. 
Definitely. Listed companies, especially, try to be efficient in their resources. 
This gives shareholders better results. Some companies use it as a tool and 
utilise it expansions, supplier relationships and management. We have a 






Influence of competition.  
If you are a listed company, you want your ratios to look better than competitors 
by efficient use of resources. Therefore it does to a certain extent. [R3BQ20] 
Other stakeholders.  
Lenders in this case are stakeholders when they impose covenants. [R3BQ21] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
The effect is doubled if the company is highly leveraged and the market is 
volatile. If you lack the management to safely go through it, over-leverage has a 
very negative impact. Cases of this were apparent in 2008. [R3BQ22] 
Information transparency.  
With CMA regulation asking for more disclosure and transparency, certain 
mandatory requirements could strip you in front of the competition. It continues 
to be a thin line between being transparent and giving away too much. Some 
companies will disclose, and some will just accept the fine. [R3BQ23] 
Debt as a signalling tool.  
It’s not really used as a signalling tool in this market. [R3BQ24] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
When you are highly leveraged, your risk factor becomes very alarming to you 
as a board or management. It depends on performance and history. We have 
seen highly leveraged companies survive “bad times” especially with a good 













Position: Financial Manager  
Sector: Petrochemical 
Date: 21/11/2011 
Capital structure formation.  
The company was 100 per cent government owned. In 1980s, 30% of the 
company went IPO. This was a government decision in order to promote 
population participation in the company. [R1PQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
We use both the capital market and the product finance market [R1PQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Commercial banks, sukuk, SIDF loans etc… [R1PQ3] 
Shari’a compliance. 
Our loans don't necessarily have to be sharia compliant, but we try our best. 
[R1PQ4] 
Significance of zakat  
Zakaat is an important element that is taken into consideration. Our intention is 
to comply with legal and tax regulation but try to optimise tax through leverage 
and other means. [R1PQ5] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
We look at the cost and tenor, growth and other factors. [R1PQ6] 
Optimum capital structure. 







Depend upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Yes, we do look at the cost but also consider tenor growth. [R1PQ8] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
Bankruptcy laws have no effect. [R1PQ9] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
We use debt as disciplining tool. [R1PQ10] 
Influence of shareholders.  
Major shareholders are represented in the board. They therefore have some 
influence but that influence is limited. [R1PQ11] 
Government ownership.  
They are two separate entities. [R1PQ12] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
For our company, it is relatively easy to access credit. We have never defaulted. 
Our business is strong, and we enjoy a strong history and excellent reputation. 
[R1PQ13] 
International finance.  
We use both regional and international finance. Around 60 % of our loans are 
international. [R1PQ14] 
Relationship banking.  
Relationship with banks have strong influence in facilitating access to finance. 
[R1PQ15] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
Government loans and subsidies provide significant support to our capital 
structure. [R1PQ16] 
Influence of suppliers.  







Effect of downturns on quality.  
It has no effect on quality. [R1PQ18] 
Influence of customers.  
They do not influence the capital structure decision. [R1PQ19] 
Influence of employees.  
They do not influence the capital structure decision. [R1PQ20] 
Influence of competition.  
There is little influence from our competitors; however, we do use competitors 
as benchmark for performance purposes. [R1PQ21] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
We do not mimic the capital structure of companies with similar products. The 
effect is insignificant. [R1PQ22] 
Other stakeholders.  
Mainly commercial banks. [R1PQ23] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
Our level of debt doesn't affect exposure to market volatility. [R1PQ24] 
Information transparency.  
Information transparency is important but doesn’t affect the capital structure 
decision. [R1PQ25] 
Disclosure.  
We have strict disclosure policies that help achieve this balance. [R1PQ26] 
Debt as signalling tool.  
Use debt as signalling tool for joint ventures and competitors [R1PQ27] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  









Position: Financial Manager  
Sector: Petrochemical  
Date: 29/12/2011 
Capital structure formation.  
Started in the 1970s with the help of SIDF. We rely Mainly working capital 
facility currently. Sales are around $2bn, working capital in excess of 1$bn. 
Monitoring through current ratio. In 2008, we had a case of inventory 
overstocking. The discipline of maintaining a minimum period of working capital 
is an important factor in capital management. [R2PQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
Mostly murabaha or tawarruq. Some markets do not have shari’a compliant 
options for financing. However, we tend to use shari’a compliant options if and 
when they are available. [R2PQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Murabaha, tawarruq, and ijara structures (in peterochemicals). [R2PQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
Mostly shari’a compliant. [R2PQ4] 
Significance of zakat.  
Yes. You pay zakat on long-term debt, but on short-term debt, zakat is paid only 
if it’s rolled over. Nowadays, they are making audits that make sure that short-
term debt is really short term. If it is continued for long term basis it is 






Determinants of level of debt.  
1:1 debt to equity, below this is not optimum. Above it is too risky. However, this 
might not be applicable in the case of industrials. 1:1 compared to fixed assets 
is only due to large working capital. Working capital is gaged by current ratio. 
However, capital structure of fixed assets could be gaged to debt to equity. 
[R2PQ6] 
Optimum capital structure.  
Use 25% from commercial banks, 25% equity, and the rest from the SIDF. 
[R2PQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
Manufacturing firms have considerable tangible assets and are more likely to 
obtain finance than other industries such as real estate and services. [R2PQ8] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Not really. It depends on the industry and sector. Banks would accept giving 
you a high percentage of debt in the power industry for example. But in real 
estate projects, banks would only give you a maximum of 50%. It’s mostly the 
underlying risk of the asset that is financed that influences the capital structure. 
[R2PQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
No effect. [R2PQ10] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
Debt is used as a tool for disciplining management. [R2PQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
Of course! Our shareholders prefer it if the company takes on some debt. 
[R2PQ12] 
Government ownership.  






Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
Need to keep some unutilised especially with high working capital. [R2PQ14] 
 
International Finance. 
For projects in international countries, we use external debt. [R2PQ15] 
Relationship banking.  
It’s more of an institutional relationship rather than a personal relationship. 
Board members would contribute but the relationship is mainly institutional. 
[R2PQ16] 
Government support.  
SIDF covenants usually influence that decision. Lands are usually the most 
common subsidy. [R2PQ17] 
Influence of suppliers.  
No effect. [R2PQ18] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
The quality of the product is never compromised. [R2PQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
No effect. [R2PQ20] 
Influence of employees.  
No. Executives might have some influence if performance (ROE) determines 
their compensation. [R2PQ21] 
Influence of competition.  
Only to some extent. In power industry this can be critical. But the norms of the 
market that banks usually determine is what they follow. [R2PQ22] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  






Other stakeholders.  
Banks. [R2PQ24] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
The more volatility products are subject to, the riskier and therefore the less 
leverage you are allowed. In our case we buy to contract and not to stock 
therefore the risk is mitigated through these contracts. Therefore, even in 2008 
when commodity prices dropped we were not affected as much because we 
bought to contract. The exposure is there but it doesn’t affect our leverage 
capacity because of the structure of the business. [R2PQ25] 
Information transparency 
No influence. [R2PQ26] 
Disclosure 
The level of reporting required under CMA rules is not in anywhere near what is 
required in developed markets. Therefore, we do not need to go into details in 
our financial reports. Announcements are generic and non-specific when it 
comes to pricing strategies and market penetration. [R2PQ27] 
Debt as a signalling tool. 
No, we do not use debt as a signalling tool. [R2PQ28] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
No. It depends on the industry. The banks usually determine leverage. Our 
















Appendix 8  
Respondent 3 
Position: Board Member 
Sector: Petrochemical  
Date: 12/01/2012 
Capital structure formation.  
Started with Debt financing from day 1. Our commitments are fixed in terms of 
machinery and equipment. Typically use 70:30 debt to equity. [R3PQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
Long term. SIDF, Commercial and Commercial syndicated depending on the 
size of the loan. [R3PQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm. 
Depends on the age of the project. If it’s a green field, there are limited debt 
products available. However, if the project is already established then things 
change tremendously and more debt products are available including Sukuk. 
[R3PQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
No but largely depends on shareholders philosophy and views and if they have 







Significance of zakat.  
Yes. [R3PQ5] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
Depends on the size of the plant, the structure of the company (joint 
stock/publicly listed) strategic partners (off takers of product or tech provider), 
and government involvement. [R3PQ6] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Yes but also look at tenor, refinancing ability. [R3PQ7] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
Use it as a challenge to management or a condition. [R3PQ8] 
Influence of shareholders.  
There is minimal involvement by shareholders in industrial projects. [R3PQ9] 
Government ownership.  
Facilitates access to finance. [R3PQ10] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
No. But it depends on the cycle of the economy. In the past we’ve been affected 
but we are currently enjoying a healthy and liquid environment. [R3PQ11] 
International finance.  
Yes. International Finance Company. Export banks. Provided there are 
international investment partners and EPC contractors. [R3PQ12] 
Relationship banking. 
Facilitates it in terms of level of importance, attention and exposure. However, 
their relationships have no effect on terms and conditions. If there was no 
involvement of government, and tech provider and the company was completely 
independent then shareholder personal guarantees can significantly influence 






Government support (loans and subsidies).  
There are many semi government institutions (such as PIF. Pensions, SIDF, 
Sanabil, Export program, Ministry of finance) that provide pure financial support 
in the case of this company and leverage from the banking industry (backed by 
government support). [R3PQ14] 
Influence of suppliers. 
Yes. However, it is considered a “one time” effect on capital expenditure. 
[R3PQ15] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
Many products affected by market conditions. [R3PQ16] 
Influence of customers.  
Yes in terms of payment terms. LCs. This also affects cash flow and liquidity 
requirements. As such, they affect operating expenditure. [R3PQ17] 
Influence of employees.  
No effect. [R3PQ18] 
Influence of competition.  
It is industry practice rather than competition that influences the debt decision. 
[R3PQ19] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
Precedence creates industry norm. [R3PQ20] 
Other stakeholders.  
JV partners, technology providers and lenders. [R3PQ21] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
Whenever the terms of leverage (short term or medium term) could be harmful 
to the project if the economy faces problems. [R3PQ22] 
Information transparency.  







Do not share information publicly but only with regulators. [R3PQ24] 
Debt as a signalling tool.  
It is sometimes used as a signalling tool to the market and stakeholders and 
shareholders. [R3PQ25] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  




Position: CEO  
Sector: Petrochemical 
Date: 09/01/2012 
Capital structure formation.  
In the beginning the companies position was weaker than it is and it was much 
more difficult to find investors. It was first a private listed company at the time. 
Depended mainly on equity as a main source of capital structure due to 
absence of track record. The company no longer faces such problems. We now 
have access to liquidity in the market through rights issue and debt market and 
became more of a mature company. [R4PQ1] 
Methods of financing. 
Commercial banks, SIDF, PIF. Internationally use export credit agencies, which 
give guarantees to commercial banks. Use right issues to collect equity. Project 






Types of debt products available to the firm. 
Have done direct lending from banks, right issues, and are looking into doing 
Sukuk. [R4PQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
Doesn’t have to be but we try our best. Try to stick to local, shari’a compliant 
banks. [R4PQ4] 
Significance of zakat. 
Taxation of foreign partner and zakat have an impact on the capital structure 
decision. We look at total capital structure and return on investment and look at 
optimisation of return. Tax and Zakat have some effect on the optimisation on 
that return. [R4PQ5] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
Typically, want to have the least amount of equity. Decision is based both on 
the market and banks. Knowing the market we have gone between 25% equity 
to 75% debt and 30% equity to 70%. [R4PQ6] 
Optimum capital structure.  
We have done 25% Equity to 75% Debt but nowadays use 30% Equity to 70% 
Debt. Some projects were required to have 50% Equity. Some projects are 
done with 100% equity. However, 25 to 30 percent equity is the norm. The SIDF 
loan has a limit of 600 million riyals, so we take whatever we get from the SIDF 
and then take whatever we can to complete it from commercial banks. [R4PQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
If it is a new product that hasn’t been tested in the market has an impact on 
financing. If the technology is proven and the product is established the capital 
structure decision will not be affected. Therefore, from the asset point of view, 
we have capital intensive plans, therefore we can access more debt. Other 






Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Of course! We try to optimise return on investment and must reach a balance 
between debt an equity to optimise this return. [R4PQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
If you are in a situation where more leverage brings you closer to bankruptcy 
then definitely affected. However, we did not reach that point. [R4PQ10] 
Debt as a disciplining tool.  
The main objective is getting a better advantage. We tap into SIDF and others 
who are known for good due diligence which will give us a better position. So to 
a certain extent we do. [R4PQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
If the company is owned by well-known shareholders, it will affect the credibility 
of the company. In terms of starting a new project, shareholders affect the 
amount of equity that is assigned to the project. They also have influence in 
rights issues, ipo etc.. Most of major shareholder are represented in the board. 
Definitely have a say in capital structure decision. [R4PQ12] 
Government ownership.  
No effect. [R4PQ13] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
Not really. We have no problem with payables or receivables. [R4PQ14] 
International finance.  
We do, especially for international projects. [R4PQ15] 
Relationship banking.  
It really depends on the performance of the company. Sometimes banks don’t 
lend to a project but rather to the people that manage the project. So it has an 
impact based on the performance and reputation of the company and the 






Government support (loans and subsidies).  
Government support is a major influence on the financing structure. SIDF gives 
50% of every project as a loan has a very important impact on the capital 
structure decision. Normally don’t like to call them subsidies, we also provide a 
good income and jobs, so they support the industry rather than subsidies it. 
[R4PQ17] 
Influence of suppliers.  
Pricing the raw materials into the projects, reliability of suppliers is also a 
consideration. However, we didn’t reach the stage where credit is a major 
influence on our capital structure decision. [R4PQ18] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
Do not touch product quality. When the market is weak, product quality is 
essential because competition is higher. It is the last thing to compromise. In 
fact, when it’s a buyer’s market, lower quality will negatively affect your sale. 
Sometimes companies tighten their belts buy looking at cost saving methods. In 
Saudi, do not touch employment. Instead look at better ways of doing things. 
Delay luxurious programs for example. As such, we don’t reach the limit of 
compromising quality. [R4PQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
Location of customers, if a product has to be shipped to a far location, there can 
be an influence overall. If you are competing with producers who have 
preferable relationships with certain customers, customers will have an impact 
on how this market can be penetrated and ultimately have an impact on the 
capital structure decision. However, the effect is not significant. [R4PQ20] 
Influence of employees.  
Depends on whether project is capital or labour intensive. If capital intensive, 
employees will have limited affect. If it is labour intensive, the structure might be 






Influence of competition.  
It will have an impact on the viability of the product. If a market is strongly 
controlled, the financing structure will be affected. If there is less competition, 
could demand less equity and higher debt. However, we do not really compare, 
but look at the general norm in the market for the product. We do not go to 
specific companies and compare. We can tap into the market more than other 
competitors because of better track record. [R4PQ22] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
In the development of the project, start with feasibility study which benchmarks 
the project with other similar entities. The effect on capital structure will only be 
affected if a company is able to obtain better financing, and as such poses a 
threat as a competitor because they are in a better financial decision. [R4PQ23] 
Other stakeholders.  
Rules and regulation. [R4PQ24] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
If this causes a problem of paying to the banks, then definitely. This would be 
taken into consideration in starting up a project. There could be conditions in 
the financing agreement to cover these conditions. The 2008 crisis was a bad 
event; it was a huge dip but didn’t last for long. The nature of our product is 
cyclical (3-4yrs) which is taken into consideration. Therefore in 2008 we had 
access to liquidity ahead of times, and a right issue that was planned ahead of 
the crisis, which gave us a favourable position. Banks on the other hand were 
cautious and access to credit was limited, must be linked to an asset. [R4PQ25] 
Information transparency. 
We abide by CMA laws and therefore must announce everything we are doing 
and so it becomes public immediately. We must also disclose how much debt is 








There is certain information that might affect your competitiveness and so 
anything that has to be announced must be reviewed and carefully announced. 
We adapt a certain disclosure policy and try to abide by CMA and other 
regulators but must balance it in such a way that does affect the shareholders, 
must not jeopardise the return on investment. Never reveal cost of production 
for example. Grouping is one method used for competition not to get exact 
figures. [R4PQ27]  
Debt as signalling tool.  
Definitely. It gives you a better competitive advantage. This affects reliability 
and shows that you are in a better position than your competitors. Always show 
that we have muscle when needed. [R4PQ28] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
Leverage affects the aggressiveness in the product market. There are two sides 
of this. Higher debt might lead to higher aggressiveness, but at the same time 
you have to take into account the cost of servicing that debt. Of course, must 
make a good return to cover the cost of servicing that debt and therefore 
become more aggressive. [R4PQ29] 
 
 
Appendix 10  
Respondent 1 
Position: Financial Manager  







Capital structure formation.  
Initially, the company started with small capital, small processing factory worth 
40 million riyals. Gradually went through difficult time in early 80s, lost almost 
half of capital, changed marketing strategy and product mix, new product. 
Captured market share and started gaining market share up to 70%. 
Restructured and became a holding. Started growing in other complimentary 
sectors, packaging line to service its edible oil business. Grew to provide 
services to third parties. Funding was on subsidiary level and parent company. 
Maximising shareholder value orientation was the prime aim. We started as a 
listed company from day one. We had access to capital market funding. We 
depended on initial equity and some funding from banks. Buyouts were a mix of 
equity and debt. Used right issue in funding acquisition, which put us on the 
map as a major company in this industry. [R1FQ1] 
Methods of financing. 
Equity, right issue, debt. Recapitalising retained earning. Commercial debt 
mainly. [R1FQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
SIDF soft loans, commercial loans, classical short term line, letter of credit (LC) 
and letters of guarantee (LG), as well as some funding from suppliers. We tend 
to use Islamic version of it, Murabaha and reverse murabaha (tawarruq) are the 
most popular ones. [R1FQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
It’s on the company’s strategy. Lately, we have been using shari’a compliant 
debt products wherever they are available. [R1FQ4] 
Significance of zakat.  
Yes. We try to fund fixed assets through equity (70%), the rest through debt. 
Otherwise, end up paying more zakat. Zakat is calculated on two fronts, either 






Determinants of level of debt.  
Do not exceed gearing ratio (interest bearing debt to equity 1:1) 1.5 to 1 
leverage ratio (D/E). [R1FQ6] 
Optimum capital structure.  
50% SIDF. For a holding company it is around 50:50 debt to equity. For bigger 
projects there’s more debt, thus around 70:30 debt to equity. [R1FQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
Yes. The nature of assets affects capital structure. [R1FQ8] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Equity is the most expensive source of financing, debt is always cheaper. The 
structuring of our balance sheet is on maximising shareholder value, and 
covenants. Cost of servicing debt isn’t very significant. [R1FQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.   
Yes. We look at solvency ratios. [R1FQ10] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
Yes, but rarely. [R1FQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
We aim to maximise shareholder value. [R1FQ12] 
Government ownership.  
The ownership by the general investment fund, but the financiers were SIDF. 
Not really related. [R1FQ13] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
We always had substantial facility lines with banks. Project financing where the 
risk is shared was a bit difficult. [R1FQ14] 
International finance.  
Used to obtain financing from external banks but stopped due to additional cost 






Relationship banking.  
This helped a lot in easing raising funds. In the third world, this plays a 
significant influence and gives credibility and assurances that cannot be 
ignored. However, we have an established track record, which vouches for us. 
In addition, our mix of board members used to help and gave credibility to the 
firm. [R1FQ16] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
This makes a big difference in areas where this can be accessed. SIDF funds 
50% of projects. 25% to 30% E and 20 to 25% is from commercial banks. The 
rest is financed by SIDF. As such, when SIDF funds are available they play a 
major role in the capital structure decision. [R1FQ17]  
Influence of suppliers.  
No effect. [R1FQ18] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
Price adjustments used to take place in order to remain competitive in order to 
maintain its market share. Innovation in products itself used to take place. In 
distressed times used to cut cost, even in production level. Used to reintroduce 
product in terms of size of package, quality of packaging, but also retain margin. 
So yes. [R1FQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
No effect. [R1FQ20] 
Influence of employees.  
No effect. [R1FQ21] 
Influence of competition.  
No influence. Look at strategy but no mimicking. Banks fund parent company, 
and  parent company divides those funds to subsidiaries. [R1FQ22] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  






Other stakeholders.  
Banks mainly. [R1FQ24] 
Exposure to market volatility. 
Yes. Especially if invested in stock market. If you are a player in the stock 
market, the level of allocation that is put in the market is at high risk. So if equity 
is not enough, market volatility affects you. [R1FQ25] 
Information transparency.  
It has little influence. Have to be transparent but do not want to communicate 
too much and weaken your position. [R1FQ26] 
Disclosure.  
We do not reveal information that would weaken our position. [R1FQ27] 
Debt as a signalling tool.  
Not in this context. [R1FQ28] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
Definitely, leverage affects our aggressiveness in the product market. We can 














Sector: Food  
Date: 02/02/2012 
Capital structure formation.  
Our capital structure is typically 1:1 equity to debt with 10 to 15% of debt from 
the SIDF. [R2FQ1] 
What methods of financing.  
Short term and Medium term loans. We are now starting to issue sukuk (5 
years). 80% of our facilities are 5-year facilities. [R2FQ2] 
Shari’a compliance. 
Our loans must be shari’a compliant. [R2FQ3] 
Significance of zakat.  
No. This is because our ROA and profitability is large. Loans used for working 
capital are Zakat paying, however, in the case of our company; we are not 
affected due to high profitability. [R2FQ4] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
We do not want to exceed 3 times EBITA. [R2FQ5] 
Nature of assets.  
It affects it to some extent. [R2FQ6] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
No. We haven’t had problems with servicing our debt or access to finance. 
[R2FQ7] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
No influence. [R2FQ8] 
Debt as a disciplining tool.  







Influence of shareholders.  
Shareholders want to recoup some of the returns but do not wish to take more 
than is required for the company to grow (40% of profits as dividends). 
[R2FQ10] 
Government ownership.  
Not related. [R2FQ11] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit? 
No. [R2FQ12] 
International finance.  
We can but we don’t. [R2FQ13] 
Relationship banking.  
Some influence. We deal almost with all banks and try to get the best rates. Our 
company’s rating is considered to be “AAA”. [R2FQ14] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
Government loans form only 10% of our financing, so their effect is very small. 
Subsidies mean more control so we wish there weren’t any subsidies. [R2FQ15] 
Influence of suppliers. 
Suppliers have very little influence. [R2FQ16] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
There is no effect on product quality. [R2FQ17] 
Influence of customers.  
Customers have very little influence. [R2FQ18] 
 
Influence of employees.  






Influence of competition.  
The effect of competition is not significant. [R2FQ20] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
Very little mimicking happens. [R2FQ21] 
Other stakeholders.  
Banks. [R2FQ22] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
The effect is small because our 1:1 debt to equity ratio is considered to be 
relatively safe. [R2FQ23] 
Information transparency.  
The effect is small. We do not disclose details of breakdown of Sales. Today, 
our company is considered to be the most transparent compared to our 
competitors. We d give more details but also try to group sensitive items. We 
aim to be the most transparent in the market. [R2FQ24] 
Debt as a signalling tool. 
We do not use debt as a signalling tool. [R2FQ25] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  









Appendix 12  
Respondent 1 
Position: Financial Manager  
Sector: Industrial Investment  
Date: 28/12/2011 
Capital structure formation.  
The company was established in the 1980s and relied mainly on equity + SIDF. 
The SIDF fund fully repaid and not sought after again. Capital generated 
internally was enough. In the 80s and 90s, we depended on government sales. 
We had a problem with collection of receivables; however, everything was paid 
off at once at the end of 90s, which made the company have a sudden excess 
of cash. This was mostly used in investment in the petrochemical sector in order 
to diversify the business. The capital employed in the core business is around 
1/3 of total capital. The rest is investment available for sales. The decision to go 
IPO at the time was a government requirement. [R1IIQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
SIDF (in the beginning), but we also rely on overdrafts. [R1IIQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Overdrafts. Revolving credit used short term. Never used to finance long-term 
assets. [R1IIQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
Any loans we decide to take must be sharia compliant. [R1IIQ4] 
Significance of zakat.  
No. Take into account the need for company of extra financing rather than the 






Determinants of level of debt.  
We mostly use equity due to availability of cash. Anticipated acquisitions were 
not realised. Nevertheless, we do recognise that the current capital structure is 
not optimum. [R1IIQ6] 
Optimum capital structure.  
It is common to have a low leverage ratio especially due to high R&D activities. 
Most companies in this industry have either had or currently have loans from 
SIDF. They also have excess cash. When a company has access to capital 
markets, the SIDF loan becomes no longer attractive due to the requirements 
and length of processing. [R1IIQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
It affects it in terms of expansion or future acquisition. But currently most assets 
are financed by equity. [R1IIQ8] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
No influence. [R1IIQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
Yes definitely, especially due to high R&D intensity. [R1IIQ10] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
Consider if for future projects, but we do use the SIDF due to its strict discipline. 
[R1IIQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
Definitely. Shareholders have a significant influence. They want bonus shares, 
rights issues. This may not always be economically sound but sometimes 
necessary. [R1IIQ12] 
Government ownership. 
It is completely unrelated to access to loans. [R1IIQ13] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  






International finance.  
We would prefer local finance. [R1IIQ15] 
Relationship banking.  
No. There is no need for to tap into commercial bank finance at the moment. 
[R1IIQ16] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
Government subsidies have some influence through industrial lands. [R1IIQ17] 
Influence of suppliers.  
They have no influence. We have fixed, long term suppliers. [R1IIQ18] 
Effect of quality on downturns.  
No. We must maintain quality at all times. We work with multinationals and their 
licensed products and have strict quality controls. We were not affected by 
economic downturn, but there was a search for cheaper suppliers. However, the 
process of switching would take almost a year. [R1IIQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
They indirectly influence it through lines of credit. [R1IIQ20] 
Influence of employees.  
They have no influence. [R1IIQ21] 
Influence of competition.  
The link is the lines of credit given to customers. High credit increases 
competition. However, the decision between equity and loans is not influenced. 
High account receivables could be used as a marketing strategy, which gives 
the client an advantage. [R1IIQ22] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
They have no influence. [R1IIQ23] 








Exposure to market volatility.  
Investments are available for sales (market to market). By the end of period any 
difference between market value and cost will be reported as realised gains or 
losses, which fluctuates equity. We must consider when to liquidate. But holding 
period returns are very high. The decision of liquidation must take into 
consideration the cycle of the business especially in this industry. We were 
invested in these businesses at par or less than par value. But definitely market 
cyclicality is considered. [R1IIQ25] 
Information transparency.  
We comply with disclosure of material disclosure of the CMA. Information 
transparency required in acquisitions. [R1IIQ26] 
Disclosure.  
Annual reports disclose a lot of information. Some information we feel shouldn’t 
be disclosed. We try to educate the CMA about the nature of the industry. It’s 
difficult to achieve this balance. We try to group information in order for 
shareholders to get the right idea without hindering competition. Sales and 
Costs are especially grouped rather than detailed. Also, information about 
strategy and direction of company are sometimes required which negatively 
influence the company’s competitive advantage. [R1IIQ27] 
Debt as a signalling tool.  
We do not use debt as a signalling tool. [R1IIQ28] 











Sector: Industrial Investment  
Date: 08/02/2012 
Capital structure formation.  
Considerable changes in capital structure due to some internal and external 
factors. Ranges between 60:40 and 65:35 Debt to Equity [R2IIQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
Equiy and Debts (from commercial Banks and Government development funds; 
namely SIDF). [R2IIQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Islamic Tawarooq Loans and soft loan from SIDF (Saudi Industrial Development 
Fund). [R2IIQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
Depends on the top management’ culture tone. In our case loans are complying 
with Shari’a law. [R2IIQ4] 
Significance of zakat.  
Yes, as Zakat is based on the company’s available funds regardless of it 
sources. [R2IIQ5] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
Externally, level of debt determined by the upper limits set by financing bodies, 
while internally; to large extent determined by Capital Costs; PPE, Working 






Optimum capital structure.  
Our business is a Greenfield business in the region initiated by our company, so 
company structure in this industry is not relevant. [R2IIQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
Nature of assets in this business entails provision of highly automated process 
and operation that implies the need of a huge finance, which strongly impact 
capital structure decision. [R2IIQ8] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Yes, interest cost of capital is an inevitable driver of the capital structure. 
[R2IIQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
No effect. [R2IIQ10] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
Not Applicable. [R2IIQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
The financial position of shareholders to inject finance in the company would 
affect capital structure to large degree. [R2IIQ12] 
Government ownership.  
In our case, government is heavily involved as a lender through SIDF, it 
conditioned certain structure to be intact to guarantee other Partners 
commitment and restrict further borrowings via financial covenants and cost 
limits. [R2IIQ13] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
In general yes, but there are some financial covenants that may restrict the 






International finance.  
Yes as a mixed companies having foreign partner shares in equity. For asking 
finance from external countries or markets, the exchange risk is always in 
presence. [R2IIQ15] 
Relationship banking.  
Absolutely good and sound relations with banks have considerable impact to 
get quick access to finance. [R2IIQ16] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
This factor greatly affects our capital structure. Government loans/subsidies are 
the main determinant of our capital structure. As they represent the highest 
financier, they determine the adequate structure even if by way of covenants. 
[R2IIQ17] 
Influence of suppliers.  
Suppliers impact capital structure through the nature of products they provide to 
our company (e.g. heavy machineries, technology, etc), and through the strict 
governmental regulations within the industry (loss prevention, insurance, 
environmental hazards, etc.), but the influence is small. [R2IIQ18] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
No influence. [R2IIQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
Not Applicable. [R2IIQ20] 
Influence of employees.  
Not Applicable. [R2IIQ21] 
Influence of competition.  
Competition impacts capital structure as the company needs the acquisition of 







Influence of companies with similar products.  
Depends on the level of competition. However, in our case no local competition 
yet, therefore, the impact is minimal, if any. [R2IIQ23] 
Other stakeholders.  
Yes, public institutions that care about environmental hazards will impact capital 
structure through governmental regulations. [R2IIQ24] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
In general, yes. Products prices, demand, input prices volatility will expose the 
company with weak capital structure (high debt to equity ratio) to financial and 
operational risk. [R2IIQ25] 
Information transparency.  
Information transparency is critical factor in marketing strategy; however, 
discretionary information transparency is required to restrict access to your 
information by competitors, otherwise, information disclosure impact capital 
structure. [R2IIQ26] 
Disclosure rules.  
Firms should disclose information at a level not to benefit competitors in the 
same industry. [R2IIQ27] 
Debt as signalling tool.  
To a large extent to monitor financial covenants. [R2IIQ28] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  












Capital structure formation. 
Company was formed more than 50 years ago. [R1CQ1] 
Methods of financing. 
Permanent finance is through owners ‘equity. Finance theory “M&M” concept of 
favourable impact of low cost of debt largely doesn’t apply to Saudi companies 
due to the very modest Zakat shied on cost of debt, and also probably due to 
Islamic prohibition on usury, which’ s largely interpreted as any form of interest. 
[R1CQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Banks’ short and medium term loans. [R1CQ3] 
Shari’a compliance. 
Our company’s sources of debt finance have to be 100% Sharia compliant. 
[R1CQ4] 
Significance of zakat.  
No. Zakat shield of 2.5% of cost of debt renders it largely irrelevant. [R1CQ5] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
Immediate need for financing large capital projects, as well working capital 
needs. [R1CQ6] 
Nature of assets.  







Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Yes to some extent. [R1CQ8] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
They have no effect. [R1CQ9] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
We do not use it as a tool for disciplining management. [R1CQ10] 
Influence of shareholders.  
No effect. [R1CQ11] 
Government ownership.  
It has no effect. [R1CQ12] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
Yes. [R1CQ13] 
International finance.  
Yes. There’s no regulatory barrier to that. [R1CQ14] 
Relationship banking.  
Commercial banks actually chase business with our company and other cement 
companies due to their strong balance sheets and high profitability. Their board 
members have no impact. [R1CQ15] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
External debt financing, including government SIDF loans, is used only to 
finance capital projects when needed. Government loans don’t play any 
permanent role in capital structure decision. [R1CQ16] 
Influence of suppliers.  






Effect of downturns on quality.  
No effect. [R1CQ18] 
Influence of customers.  
No effect. [R1CQ19] 
Influence of employees.  
No effect. [R1CQ20] 
Influence of competition.  
No effect. [R1CQ21] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
No effect. [R1CQ22] 
Other stakeholders.  
No. [R1CQ23] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
No. [R1CQ24] 
Information transparency.  
It has no effect. [R1CQ25] 
Disclosure. 
Regulatory and accounting disclosure requirements have to be complied with 
as a matter of policy and compulsion. [R1CQ26] 
Debt as a signalling tool.  
We do not use it as a signalling tool. [R1CQ27] 
Competitive aggressiveness. 









Position: Board Member 
Sector: Cement 
Date: 28/01/2012 
Capital structure formation.  
Started of 450 million riyals, and stayed that way for 20 years. 2 years ago 
increased capital to 900 million through bonus shares. The SIDF financed 50% 
of the project at 2%. Many cement/industrials companies resorted to SIDF and 
Bridge Financing through commercial banks. Approval of SIDF is an indication 
that the company is on the right track. Nowadays, require companies to become 
listed. Also give new entrants a push in order to deter oligopolistic concentration 
in the industry. [R2CQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
SIDF, Cash Flows. 50% SIDF, 50% Equity + Bridge financing. Nowadays with 
low interest rates, we try to generate expansion internally. [R2CQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
SIDF, Commercial banks.. [R2CQ3]  
Shari’a compliance.  
We prefer to be Shari’a compliant. However, note that it is done by a lot of 
companies to satisfy shareholders. R4CQ4 
Significance of zakat.  
In the past, but now no. Do not really make a difference especially as it’s only 






Determinants of level of debt.  
We currently have zero debt. Had 250 million last year and paid before maturity. 
But usually not more than 50% of shareholder equity. [R2CQ6] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Yes. But currently used the company’s reserves to pay off debt and raise 
capital. With low interest rates, the cost of servicing debt is less critical. With 
high profit margins (45%), we can service all debts from profits. [R2CQ7] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
We use it to maintain customers through lines of credit. Show flexibility and get 
loyalty from them. But don’t use it much as a tool for discipline. [R2CQ8] 
Government ownership.  
Yes. A lot of cement companies have the government as a shareholder. 
[R2CQ9] 
Influence of shareholders.  
In the past, yes. Especially when other competitors started to increase capital. 
When giving all dividends to shareholders, it would send the signal that the 
company has no better way of investing it and no prospects for growth and 
expansion, which put a lot of pressure on management. [R2CQ10] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
No. [R2CQ11] 
International finance.  
We can but we don’t need to. [R2CQ12] 
Relationship banking.  
Absolutely yes. If you have a good relationship credit is facilitated at any time. 
[R2CQ13] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
Currently, we are having difficulty expanding. We are not able to due to 






operate by using fuel from the local market. You also must get government 
approval if you need to increase capital. [R2CQ14] 
Influence of suppliers.  
No effect. [R2CQ15] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
Quality is affected sometimes but we try to always maintain a certain standard. 
The ban on exports was one of the shocks that we have been exposed to. But 
we service a large area and so we weren’t affected as much. [R2CQ16] 
Influence of customers.  
Some customers have LCs. But no significant influence. [R2CQ17] 
Influence of employees. 
No effect. [R2CQ18] 
Influence of competition. 
Not at all. [R2CQ19] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
Not really, but the whole sector would be affected by the trend. There is no 
reason to increase capital due to low prospects for expansion in the past. We 
tend to give dividends instead. However, recently the trend was to increase 




Information transparency.  
Abide by CMA rules, but try to stay away from mentioning the selling prices and 
average prices. However, although it isn’t said explicitly, one can read into it 






Debt as a signalling tool. 
We do not use it as a signalling tool. [R2CQ23] 
Competitive aggressiveness. 
We can extend credit terms to distributers, which will help us, compete more 












Capital structure formation.  
When the company was founded 50 years ago, capital structure was made up 
of 100% of shareholders equity. However, it is now 94% from shareholders 
equity and 6% from loans. [R3CQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
At first, the company had high liquidity, which enabled it to finance the majority's 
projects, but in some cases, it needed to resort to borrowing through 
government funds "SIDF" or commercial banks. [R3CQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
There are two types of products that characterise the company's debt. If debt is 
used in working capital, then the company uses L/C's and L/G's, but if there are 
expansions, capital is sought from government loans or commercial loans. 
[R3CQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
Yes, I believe the source of funding and it's compatibility with Sharia is very 
important for company. [R3CQ4] 
Significance of zakat.  
Zakat doesn't only depend on the amount of debt but there are other factors 
taken into account, such as fixed assets, retained earnings and reserves. 







Determinants of level of debt.  
It depends on the flowing: - 
A. Dividends policy. 
B. Feasibility study and cash flows. 
C. Lending rate. 
[R3CQ6] 
Optimum capital structure.  
I think 60% equity to 40% debts is safe. [R3CQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
Large capital expenditures will significantly affect the composition of capital. 
[R3CQ8] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Yes, of course. [R3CQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
We adhere to the laws of the CMA with regards to bankruptcy. [R3CQ10] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
We do not use it as a tool for disciplining management. [R3CQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
The company has shareholders who depend on the amount of dividends, so 
yes they affect the structure of capital. [R3CQ12] 
Government ownership.  
We are a listed company and the government doesn't have shares in our 
company, so there is no impact. [R3CQ13] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
I believe that the strong financial position of the company is appropriate for easy 






International finance.  
Currently, there is no need for the external financing. [R3CQ15] 
Relationship banking.  
I believe if there is an effect, it will be very weak due to the company's very 
strong financial position, which enables it to get any financing facilities it needs 
with competitive rates. [R3CQ16] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
I believe that the government has a great role for the company and to other 
companies in the same industry. [R3CQ17] 
Influence of suppliers.  
I think it depends on whether there are large expansions. Generally, no effect. 
[R3CQ18] 
Effect of downturns on quality. 
I believe the maintaining of the product quality is considered to be one of the 
priorities and has nothing to do directly with the composition of capital. 
[R3CQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
No effect. [R3CQ20] 
Influence of employees.  
No effect. [R3CQ21] 
Influence of competition.  
In my opinion, it has nothing to do with competition, but depends on the needs 
for expansion and any developments in the economy, which result in increases 
in demand for the company's product. [R3CQ22] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
I believe that the structure of capital depends on the extent of need for funding 






dividend policy, so there may be some differences in the capital structure of 
companies with similar products. [R3CQ23] 
 
Other stakeholders.  
No. [R3CQ24] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
Certainly there is, but the nature of the impact of the cement industry makes the 
fluctuations in the market less significant. [R3CQ25] 
Information transparency.  
It impacts it greatly. [R3CQ26] 
Disclosure rules.  
The balance is achieved through adhering to CMA and government disclosure 
rules. However, it is difficult to maintain that balance especially in the Cement 
Industry and with limited number of companies in this industry. [R3CQ27] 
Debt as a signalling tool.  
The amount of debt is currently only 6% , so we can signal that we have the 
ability to access to additional funding when needed. [R3CQ28] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
In my opinion doesn't have a direct impact. Competitiveness depends on the 












Capital structure formation.  
Company started with equity finance, at that point of time no debt financing 
arrangement was entered into as the financial model was not yet finalized, and 
priority was to legally incorporate the company. Capital structure presently is 3 
to 1 Debt to Equity 3 to 1. [R4CQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
The company decided to finance its cement project by means of Equity, debts 
and Shareholders loans. [R4CQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Many types of credit facilities are available such as Letters of credit Medium and 
short-term loans, Surety bonds, etc…[R4CQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
 In Saudi Arabia, project finance is being dealt with through Murabaha 
Agreements that comply with Sharia law. [R4CQ4] 
Significance of zakat. 
Yes. Zakat can be a determinant factor in taking on debts, since zakat is 
assessed on the "Net worth" of the company. [R4CQ5] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
The level of debts is determined by: project cost, shareholders financing 
potential, the availability of loans from Governmental funds (SIDF) and 






the nature of financial covenants and other terms imposed by the lenders. 
[R4CQ6] 
Optimum capital structure.  
A good reference would be the structure frequently suggested/ required by the 
lenders i.e., 60/40 (Debt/Equity).In general optimum structure is the one where 
cost of debt is lower than the cost of equity and with the level of debt that does 
represent high risk of default and bankruptcy. [R4CQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
In some cases, especially in heavy industries the acquisition of Assets 
(Machineries and other equipment) requires considerable amount of funds. And 
in situation where funds for equity are not enough for investment purposes, the 
need for Debt finance is a must therefore capital structure is affected 
accordingly. [R4CQ8] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
Lower financial charges and more flexible credit terms are appealing for higher 
level of debts in the capital structure of the firm and vice versa. [R4CQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
A strict bankruptcy law is always deterrent to opt for a higher level of leverage in 
the capital structure. [R4CQ10] 
Debt a disciplining tool.  
Management should be alert at all times to avoid falling in default and this 
requires a strict discipline in cash management. [R4CQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
Shareholders affect the capital structure decision to the extent that the capital 
structure is commensurate with their expected return on equity. [R4CQ12] 
Government ownership. 
In general, a concentrated ownership structure offers better guarantee to the 






also easier to obtain loans when the Government is at the same time lender 
and shareholders. [R4CQ13] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit. 
It only depends to a certain extent. [R4CQ14] 
International finance.  
Because of the nature of guarantees required and other restrictions, by 
SAMA,(Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency), financing is not sought after from 
external countries. [R4CQ15] 
Relationship banking.  
Good reputation and high previous credit rating usually facilitate access to 
obtain credit facilities. [R4CQ16] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
Government loans are usually offered with lower financial charges than 
commercial Banks. In this case the capital structure can consider a higher level 
of debt and a lower level of equity. [R4CQ17] 
Influence of suppliers.  
The level of debt service and the payment of installments have a direct bearing 
on cash flow available for operations and should therefore take into 
consideration the credit terms offered by suppliers. [R4CQ18] 
Effect of downturns on quality.  
In period of economic distress company is in need of more cash flow available 
for operations. A higher level of debts is therefore not a good option in as much 
as it would reduce cash flow available for operations "Marketing, advertizing, 
softer credit terms to customers etc.. [R4CQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
The level of debt service and the payment of installments have a direct bearing 
on cash flow available for operations and on the company credit terms offered 







Influence of employees.  
In cases where the company adopts employee stock option plans, as incentives 
to its employees, there is always a potential for the employees to exercise their 
options and acquire new shares in the company. To that extent a lower level of 
equity might be decided in consideration of potential issuance of new shares to 
the employees. [R4CQ21] 
Influence of competition.  
Higher level of debts compared to competition will require more cash flow to be 
allocated to debt service. Therefore the level of debt and the related payment of 
installments should not have material effects on cash flow available for 
operations. [R4CQ22] 
Influence of companies with similar products.  
Our capital structure decision should be determined to the extent that it is in line 
with the benchmark of the weighted average cost of capital in the cement 
sector. [R4CQ23] 
Other stakeholders.  
From a shareholder prospect lower level of equity will procure higher rate of the 
ROE. However, other factors should be considered such as the risk of 
bankruptcy as consequences of defaults. [R4CQ24] 
Exposure to market volatility.  
Higher level of debts will expose the company to higher risk in situation of 
Market volatility (Interest rate, Libor, Bond Market..etc). [R4CQ25] 
Information transparency.  
Transparency is part of good cash management practice. Accurate cash 
projections also will help the company to determine the right capital structure 
however dissemination of material non public information can have negative 






Disclosure rules.  
Transparency should strictly be observed in the whole reporting system of the 
company. However there must be Chinese walls to protect material non public 
information (R&D etc…). [R4CQ27] 
Debt as a signalling tool.  
A situation of default in the payment of instalments to the Lenders is a signal of 
distress and should be a wake up call to the company to take immediate 
corrective measures to improve cash management and meet credit term 
maturities. [R4CQ28] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
Higher level of leverage is in nature to reduce the level of aggressiveness in 
Product Market because high leverage requires systematic payments of debt 
service which leaves less cash flow in order for the company to opt for more 










Industry: Cement  
Date: 24/03/2012 
Capital structure formation.  
Authorized, Issued and fully paid up capital at the formation of the Company 
was SR. 550 million divided into 55 million shares of SR 10 each. To date, the 
fully paid up capital is SR. 900 million. [R5CQ1] 
Methods of financing.  
Bank Loans, and now sukuk are entering into the market and are getting 
popular particularly for large projects. In Saudi Arabia there is a Government 
Institution called Saudi Industrial Development Fund. (SIDF) This Institution 
grants soft loans of up to 50 %, subject to a maximum of SR. 400 million, of the 
cost of project it approves. The cost of our first production line was about SR. 
1.1 billion and was financed as with SAR550mil equity, SAR350mil from 
commercial banks, SAR200mil from SIDF.  
SIDF approved a loan of SR. 400 million for our first line, we availed only SR. 
200 million as the conditions attached with the balance loan of SR. 200 million 
were not acceptable. [R5CQ2] 
Types of debt products available to the firm.  
Bank loans. Now Sukuk are entering into the market and are getting popular 
particularly for large projects. [R5CQ3] 
Shari’a compliance.  
Not really. However, cost of loan is one main consideration. It does not have to 






compliant loans. For our 2nd production line the loans are Sharia compliant. 
[R5CQ4] 
Significance of zakat. 
No. [R5CQ5] 
Determinants of level of debt.  
Debt and capital are two balancing factors to finance a project. There are two 
scenarios generally followed to finance a project. In case SIDF loans are 
available, it will be 25% equity, 25% from commercial banks, and 50% from 
SIDF. In case SIDF loans are not available, it will be 50% equity and 50% from 
commercial banks.  
We followed scenario one for production line # 1 and scenario two for our 2nd 
production line. [R5CQ6] 
Optimum capital structure.  
Look at previous Answer (6). This, however, depends on the credit worthiness 
and standing of the sponsors. [R5CQ7] 
Nature of assets.  
Cement Industry is capital intensive. Higher capital injection becomes 
necessary when SIDF and commercial loan are not available. [R5CQ8] 
Dependence upon the cost of servicing debt.  
To certain extent, yes. [R5CQ9] 
Influence of bankruptcy laws.  
To safeguard the loans all financing institutions look for better asset coverage of 
the loans. As such, demand an adequate amount of capital injection. In case, 
however, of extremely profitable projects and excess cash supply in the market, 
I have noticed, the banks are more accommodative. [R5CQ10] 
Debt as disciplining tool.  
It is the Board of Directors that approves new loans based on cost /benefit 






watch that its cash requirement are kept within the limit approved by the Board 
of Directors. [R5CQ11] 
Influence of shareholders.  
It is generally the financing available from SIDF and Banks that has direct affect 
on the capital structure. [R5CQ12] 
Government ownership.  
Ownership structure is the most important consideration for the banks to grant 
loan. My experience is that Government participation, as shareholder does not 
help in any way to an easy access to loans. Even SIDF, the Government 
financing Institution, pays no consideration to Government being a shareholder. 
[R5CQ13] 
Dependence upon the availability of credit.  
Yes. [R5CQ14] 
International finance.  
Finance from external countries or markets are available, like, export finance 
loans. This, however, takes long time to negotiate and comply with the long list 
of conditions that can adversely affect the timely implementation of the project. 
Sometimes they are not economical. [R5CQ15] 
Relationship banking.  
A lot!!! [R5CQ16] 
Government support (loans and subsidies).  
The availability of SIDF loans influences the capital structure decision. 
[R5CQ17] 
Influence of suppliers.  
Suppliers can exercise no influence in this regard unless they offer part 






Effect of downturns on quality.  
The quality of the product has to be maintained to meet the standard required 
by the market, irrespective of the constraints, financing, and capital, 
whatsoever. [R5CQ19] 
Influence of customers.  
Customers can exercise no influence in this regard. [R5CQ20] 
Influence of employees.  
The Senior Management does participates in the matter. However, it is the 
sponsor who has the final say in this regard. Senior management is 
responsible, to carry out the decisions and negotiate and arrange necessary 
financing. [R5CQ21] 
To successfully compete in the market our product should be, in no way, less in 
quality than the competing product. We designed our plant keeping this goal in 
mind, which entailed some additional cost. Capital and loans were structured 
accordingly. [R5CQ22] 
Other stakeholders.  
Yes, the sponsors of the project have major role in this regard. [R5CQ23] 
Exposure to market volatility. 
Yes. [R5CQ24] 
Information transparency. 
The senior management of the company is well versed with the market situation 
because of its long presence in the market. It helps us a lot to take advantage 
of the benefits available for lower cost or excess cash availability. [R5CQ25] 
Disclosure rules. 
Banks do not believe in the customer withholding information. The banks have 
to be fully satisfied of the economic viability of the project before they can agree 






Debt as signalling tool.  
Our debt servicing is timely and under control. There is no need to use debt as 
a tool for whatsoever reason. [R5CQ27] 
Competitive aggressiveness.  
Cement industry is considered cash rich and highly profitable. Therefore, all 
expansion plans in the country are by easy to get financing. As such, all cement 
companies are highly leveraged. [R5CQ28] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
